A family of simple paternalistic transfer models

A general framework is analyzed which contains several special transfer (tax and pension) models. In our static two-overlapping-generation framework, every individual works in the first stage of the adult age, while is retired in the second. The government operates a balanced linear transfer system, sometimes with caps. In the models, the individuals may optimize their situation in various ways: contributing to voluntary pension, restraining labor supply and underreporting wages. Individuals are typically short-sighted, therefore they choose paternalistically suboptimal decisions. The models provide useful information on the socially optimal paternalistic transfer system

Tax Morality and Progressive Wage Tax

We analyze the impact of tax morality on progressive income (wage) taxation. We assume that transfers (cash-back) and public expenditures are financed from linear wage taxes. We derive the reported wages from individual utility maximization, when individuals obtain partial satisfaction from reporting wages (depending on their tax morality), and cannot be excluded from the use of public services. The government maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function, also taking into account the utility of public services. The major conjecture is illustrated by numerical examples: the optimal degree of redistribution and the size of the public services are increasing functions of the individuals' tax morality.tax moral, reporting earnings, progressive income tax, welfare economics

A Simple Model of Tax-Favored Retirement Accounts

To defend myopic workers against themselves, the government introduces a mandatory system but to help savers, it adds tax-favored retirement accounts. In a very simple model, where benefits are proportional to contributions, we compare three extreme systems: (i) the pure mandatory system, (ii) the asymmetric system, where only the savers participate in the voluntary system, (iii) the symmetric system, where both types participate proportionally to their wages. The symmetric voluntary system is welfare-superior to the asymmetric one as well as to the pure mandatory system, which in turn are equivalent to each other.mandatory pensions, tax-favored retirement accounts, voluntary contributions, subsidies.

Underreported Earnings and Old-Age Pension: An Elementary Model

This paper analyzes the interconnections of underreported earnings, savings and oldage pension with the help of a most simple, elementary model. The workers can be divided into three groups: 1) well-paid who report their full earnings, 2) well-paid who report only the minimum earnings (evaders) and 3) the poorly paid. We assume that the evaders save a significant part of their hidden earnings for their old age. We compare three pension systems of equal size: (i) the proportional, (ii) the proportional plus basic pension and (iii) the proportional with means testing. Our major result is as follows: if the evaders can be recognized and excluded, then the means-tested system is superior to the basic system.reporting earnings, proportional pensions, basic pensions, meansassisted pensions

Indexation of pensions in Hungary: A simple cohort model

Pensions;Indexation

Hungarian Pension System and its Reform

The goal of this study is to present an insider view on the pension reforms implemented in Hungary between 1996 and 2009. Both political economy as well as institutional economics will be used as the main approaches to analyse and explain the reform process and some of its effects. The following studies provide valuable insights: Palacios and Rocha (1998), Bokros and Dethier eds. (1998), Augusztinovics (1999), Augusztinovics et al. (2002), Simonovits (1999), (2000), (2008a), Czúcz and Pintér (2002), European Commission (2006), Gál (2006), Impavido and Rocha (2006), and Guardiancich (2008). The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 1 considers the legacy of the pension system. Section 2 summarises the debate on the pension reform and the basic decisions. Section 3 outlines the implementation of the pension reform, while Section 4 discusses the implementation problems. Section 5 describes the changes since the reform, while Section 6 analyses and Section 7 evaluates the reform. An Appendix discusses the issues of contribution rates.Hungary, pension reform, social security, private pension

International Economic Crisis and the Hungarian Pension Reform

By 2008, the Hungarian pension system has become too generous and the implied contribution rate hindered growth. When the international economic and financial crisis deprived Hungary from normal credits, its government turned to international organizations for help. The most spectacular element of the conditions attached to the bail-out package was the short and long-run reduction of pension benefits. Within months, the Hungarian government eliminated the unsustainable 13th month benefit, reduced health-insurance contribution rates, replaced wage-price indexation with price indexation and worked out a drastic rise in the normal retirement age in the medium-run. The newly elected conservative party has practically closed the second pillar and plans to use up the released capital to reduce the government deficit, debt and finance public expenditures.international economic crisis, Hungary, pension reform

The Mandatory Private Pension Pillar in Hungary: An Obituary

In 1998, the left-of-center government of Hungary carved out a second pillar mandatory private pension system from the original mono-pillar public system. Participation in the mixed system was optional for those who were already working, but mandatory for new entrants to the workforce. About 50 per cent of the workforce joined voluntarily and another 25 per cent were mandated to do so by law between 1999 and 2010. The private system has not produced miracles: either in terms of the financial stability of the social security system, or greatly improved social security in old age. Moreover, the international financial and economic crisis has highlighted the transition costs of pre-funding. Rather than rationalizing the system, the current conservative government de facto "nationalized" the second pillar in 2011 and is to use part of the released capital to compensate for tax reductions.social security reform, old age risk, defined contribution plan, privatization, political aspect, Hungary

Savings, child support, pensions and endogenous (and heterogeneous) fertility

van Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003) (for short, GLM) analyzed combination of public pension and child support in an OLG model. We impose credit constraint on workers, and extend GLM's analysis from the case where workers do not understand the cost also to the case where they do. GLM's infinite stream of generations is simplified into three generations but heterogeneity of rearing costs and of enjoying children is introduced. Two major results: (i) excluding negative savings, fertility decreases with pension contributions and increases with taxes; (ii) the introduction of fertility-dependent pensions may strengthen heterogeneity in fertility

Does higher tax morale imply higher optimal labor income tax rate?

We analyze the impact of tax morale on optimal progressive labor income taxation. Only universal basic income is financed from a linear tax and the financing of public goods is neglected. Each individual supplies labor and (un)declares earning, depending on his labor disutility and tax morale. Limiting the utilitarianism to the poorer parts of the population (defined by the inclusion share), the optimal tax rate is an increasing function of the tax morale and a decreasing function of the inclusion share, provided that the average wage of those included is higher than 0.54 times the average wage