The revision of the 2014 European tobacco products directive: an analysis of the tobacco industry's attempts to 'break the health silo'.

BACKGROUND: The 2014 European Union (EU) Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) was negotiated in a changed policy context, following adoption of the EU's 'Smart Regulation' agenda, which transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) anticipated would increase their influence on health policy, and the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which sought to reduce it. This study aims to explore the scale and nature of the TTCs' lobby against the EU TPD and evaluate how these developments have affected their ability to exert influence. METHODS: Analysis of 581 documents obtained through freedom of information requests, 28 leaked Philip Morris International (PMI) documents, 17 TTC documents from the Legacy Library, web content via Google alerts and searches of the EU institutions' websites, plus four stakeholder interviews. RESULTS: The lobby was massive. PMI alone employed over 160 lobbyists. Strategies mainly used third parties. Efforts to 'Push' (amend) or 'Delay' the proposal and block 'extreme policy options' were partially successful, with plain packaging and point of sales display ban removed during the 3-year delay in the Commission. The Smart Regulation mechanism contributed to changes and delays, facilitating meetings between TTC representatives (including ex-Commission employees) and senior Commission staff. Contrary to Article 5.3, these meetings were not disclosed. CONCLUSIONS: During the legislative process, Article 5.3 was not consistently applied by non-health Directorates of the European Commission, while the tools of the Smart Regulation appear to have facilitated TTC access to, and influence on, the 2014 TPD. The use of third parties undermines Article 5.3

Understanding the emergence of the tobacco industry's use of the term tobacco harm reduction in order to inform public health policy

OBJECTIVES: To explore the history of transnational tobacco companies’ use of the term, approach to and perceived benefits of ‘harm reduction’. METHODS: Analysis of internal tobacco industry documents, contemporary tobacco industry literature and 6 semistructured interviews. RESULTS: The 2001 Institute of Medicine report on tobacco harm reduction appears to have been pivotal in shaping industry discourse. Documents suggest British American Tobacco and Philip Morris International adopted the term ‘harm reduction’ from Institute of Medicine, then proceeded to heavily emphasise the term in their corporate messaging. Documents and interviews suggest harm reduction offered the tobacco industry two main benefits: an opportunity to (re-) establish dialogue with and access to policy makers, scientists and public health groups and to secure reputational benefits via an emerging corporate social responsibility agenda. CONCLUSIONS: Transnational tobacco companies’ harm reduction discourse should be seen as opportunistic tactical adaptation to policy change rather than a genuine commitment to harm reduction. Care should be taken that this does not undermine gains hitherto secured in efforts to reduce the ability of the tobacco industry to inappropriately influence policy

Timeline of TTC investment and activities in smokeless tobacco and nicotine markets.

<p>Source: media reports on industry mergers and acquisitions (identified via Nexus UK) and tobacco company websites.</p

Snus company market shares (volume) in Sweden and Norway by percentage, 2011.

<p>Adapted from Euromonitor Passport GMID Sweden and Norway data <a href="http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001506#pmed.1001506-Euromonitor6" target="_blank">[97]</a>,<a href="http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001506#pmed.1001506-Euromonitor7" target="_blank">[98]</a>.</p><p>Snus brands from small independent companies were identified through random searches on the internet.</p