Allometric trajectories of body and head morphology in three sympatric Arctic charr (Salvelinus alpinus (L.)) morphs

A study of body and head development in three sympatric reproductively isolated Arctic charr (Salvelinus alpinus (L.)) morphs from a subarctic lake (Skogsfjordvatn, northern Norway) revealed allometric trajectories that resulted in morphological differences. The three morphs were ecologically assigned to a littoral omnivore, a profundal benthivore and a profundal piscivore, and this was confirmed by genetic analyses (microsatellites). Principal component analysis was used to identify the variables responsible for most of the morphological variation of the body and head shape. The littoral omnivore and the profundal piscivore morph had convergent allometric trajectories for the most important head shape variables, developing bigger mouths and relatively smaller eyes with increasing head size. The two profundal morphs shared common trajectories for the variables explaining most of the body and head shape variation, namely head size relative to body size, placement of the dorsal and pelvic fins, eye size and mouth size. In contrast, the littoral omnivore and the profundal benthivore morphs were not on common allometric trajectories for any of the examined variables. The findings suggest that different selective pressures could have been working on traits related to their trophic niche such as habitat and diet utilization of the three morphs, with the two profundal morphs experiencing almost identical environmental conditions

Empathy, engagement, entrainment: the interaction dynamics of aesthetic experience

A recent version of the view that aesthetic experience is based in empathy as inner imitation explains aesthetic experience as the automatic simulation of actions, emotions, and bodily sensations depicted in an artwork by motor neurons in the brain. Criticizing the simulation theory for committing to an erroneous concept of empathy and failing to distinguish regular from aesthetic experiences of art, I advance an alternative, dynamic approach and claim that aesthetic experience is enacted and skillful, based in the recognition of others’ experiences as distinct from one’s own. In combining insights from mainly psychology, phenomenology, and cognitive science, the dynamic approach aims to explain the emergence of aesthetic experience in terms of the reciprocal interaction between viewer and artwork. I argue that aesthetic experience emerges by participatory sense-making and revolves around movement as a means for creating meaning. While entrainment merely plays a preparatory part in this, aesthetic engagement constitutes the phenomenological side of coupling to an artwork and provides the context for exploration, and eventually for moving, seeing, and feeling with art. I submit that aesthetic experience emerges from bodily and emotional engagement with works of art via the complementary processes of the perception–action and motion–emotion loops. The former involves the embodied visual exploration of an artwork in physical space, and progressively structures and organizes visual experience by way of perceptual feedback from body movements made in response to the artwork. The latter concerns the movement qualities and shapes of implicit and explicit bodily responses to an artwork that cue emotion and thereby modulate over-all affect and attitude. The two processes cause the viewer to bodily and emotionally move with and be moved by individual works of art, and consequently to recognize another psychological orientation than her own, which explains how art can cause feelings of insight or awe and disclose aspects of life that are unfamiliar or novel to the viewer

Keeping the collectivity in mind?

The key question in this three way debate is the role of the collectivity and of agency. Collins and Shrager debate whether cognitive psychology has, like the sociology of knowledge, always taken the mind to extend beyond the individual. They agree that irrespective of the history, socialization is key to understanding the mind and that this is compatible with Clark’s position; the novelty in Clark’s “extended mind” position appears to be the role of the material rather than the role of other minds. Collins and Clark debate the relationship between self, agency, and the human collectivity. Collins argues that the Clark’s extended mind fails to stress the asymmetry of the relationship between the self and its material “scaffolding.” Clark accepts that there is asymmetry but that an asymmetrical ensemble is sufficient to explain the self. Collins says that we know too little about the material world to pursue such a model to the exclusion of other approaches including that both the collectivity and language have agency. The collectivity must be kept in mind! (Though what follows is a robust exchange of views it is also a cooperative effort, authors communicating “backstage” with each other to try to make the disagreements as clear and to the point as possible.

Corporeality, equality and education. A biopedagogical perspective

N/