How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? Evidence from a Bid-Based Wholesale Electricity Market

This paper uses the framework in Wolak (2003a,b and 2007) and data on half-hourly offer curves and market-clearing prices and quantities from the New Zealand wholesale electricity market over the period January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2007 to characterize how the four large suppliers in this imperfectly competitive industry exercise market power. To accomplish this we introduce half-hourly measures of the firm-level ability and incentive of an individual supplier to exercise unilateral market power that are derived from a simplified model of expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour in a multi-unit auction market. We then show that half-hourly market-clearing prices are highly correlated with the half-hourly values of the firm-level and firm-average measures of both the ability and incentive of the four large suppliers in New Zealand to exercise market power. We then present evidence consistent with the view that this increasing relationship between the ability or incentive of individual suppliers to exercise market power and higher market-clearing prices is caused by the four large suppliers submitting higher offer prices when they have a greater ability or incentive to exercise unilateral market power. We show that after controlling for changes in input fossil fuel prices and other factors that impact the opportunity cost of producing electricity during that half hour, each of the four suppliers submits a higher offer price into the wholesale market when it has a greater ability or incentive to exercise unilateral market power. To strengthen the case that this increasing relationship between market prices and the ability and incentive of each of the suppliers to exercise unilateral market power is actually caused by the four large suppliers exercising unilateral market power by changing their offer prices in response to their ability and incentive to exercise market power, we also perform a test of the implications of the null hypothesis that the four large suppliers behave as if they had no ability to exercise market power. We find strong evidence against this null hypothesis and instead find that these hypothesis testing results are consistent with the perspective that these suppliers are exercising all available unilateral market power.Classification-JEL:Unilateral Market power analysis,New Zealand,Electricity Market,multi-unit auction

How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? Evidence from a Bid-Based Wholesale Electricity Market

This paper uses the framework in Wolak (2003a,b and 2007) and data on half-hourly offer curves and market-clearing prices and quantities from the New Zealand wholesale electricity market over the period January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2007 to characterize how the four large suppliers in this imperfectly competitive industry exercise market power. To accomplish this we introduce half-hourly measures of the firm-level ability and incentive of an individual supplier to exercise unilateral market power that are derived from a simplified model of expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour in a multi-unit auction market. We then show that half-hourly market-clearing prices are highly correlated with the half-hourly values of the firm-level and firm-average measures of both the ability and incentive of the four large suppliers in New Zealand to exercise market power. We then present evidence consistent with the view that this increasing relationship between the ability or incentive of individual suppliers to exercise market power and higher market-clearing prices is caused by the four large suppliers submitting higher offer prices when they have a greater ability or incentive to exercise unilateral market power. We show that after controlling for changes in input fossil fuel prices and other factors that impact the opportunity cost of producing electricity during that half hour, each of the four suppliers submits a higher offer price into the wholesale market when it has a greater ability or incentive to exercise unilateral market power. To strengthen the case that this increasing relationship between market prices and the ability and incentive of each of the suppliers to exercise unilateral market power is actually caused by the four large suppliers exercising unilateral market power by changing their offer prices in response to their ability and incentive to exercise market power, we also perform a test of the implications of the null hypothesis that the four large suppliers behave as if they had no ability to exercise market power. We find strong evidence against this null hypothesis and instead find that these hypothesis testing results are consistent with the perspective that these suppliers are exercising all available unilateral market power

Rare loss-of-function variants in SETD1A are associated with schizophrenia and developmental disorders

By analyzing the whole-exome sequences of 4,264 schizophrenia cases, 9,343 controls and 1,077 trios, we identified a genome-wide significant association between rare loss-of-function (LoF) variants in SETD1A and risk for schizophrenia (P = 3.3 × 10−9). We found only two heterozygous LoF variants in 45,376 exomes from individuals without a neuropsychiatric diagnosis, indicating that SETD1A is substantially depleted of LoF variants in the general population. Seven of the ten individuals with schizophrenia carrying SETD1A LoF variants also had learning difficulties. We further identified four SETD1A LoF carriers among 4,281 children with severe developmental disorders and two more carriers in an independent sample of 5,720 Finnish exomes, both with notable neuropsychiatric phenotypes. Together, our observations indicate that LoF variants in SETD1A cause a range of neurodevelopmental disorders, including schizophrenia. Combining these data with previous common variant evidence, we suggest that epigenetic dysregulation, specifically in the histone H3K4 methylation pathway, is an important mechanism in the pathogenesis of schizophrenia

36-month clinical outcomes of patients with venous thromboembolism: GARFIELD-VTE

Background: Venous thromboembolism (VTE), encompassing both deep vein thrombosis (DVT) and pulmonary embolism (PE), is a leading cause of morbidity and mortality worldwide.Methods: GARFIELD-VTE is a prospective, non-interventional observational study of real-world treatment practices. We aimed to capture the 36-month clinical outcomes of 10,679 patients with objectively confirmed VTE enrolled between May 2014 and January 2017 from 415 sites in 28 countries.Findings: A total of 6582 (61.6 %) patients had DVT alone, 4097 (38.4 %) had PE +/- DVT. At baseline, 98.1 % of patients received anticoagulation (AC) with or without other modalities of therapy. The proportion of patients on AC therapy decreased over time: 87.6 % at 3 months, 73.0 % at 6 months, 54.2 % at 12 months and 42.0 % at 36 months. At 12-months follow-up, the incidences (95 % confidence interval [CI]) of all-cause mortality, recurrent VTE and major bleeding were 6.5 (7.0-8.1), 5.4 (4.9-5.9) and 2.7 (2.4-3.0) per 100 person-years, respectively. At 36-months, these decreased to 4.4 (4.2-4.7), 3.5 (3.2-2.7) and 1.4 (1.3-1.6) per 100 person-years, respectively. Over 36-months, the rate of all-cause mortality and major bleeds were highest in patients treated with parenteral therapy (PAR) versus oral anti-coagulants (OAC) and no OAC, and the rate of recurrent VTE was highest in patients on no OAC versus those on PAR and OAC. The most frequent cause of death after 36-month follow-up was cancer (n = 565, 48.6 %), followed by cardiac (n = 94, 8.1 %), and VTE (n = 38, 3.2 %). Most recurrent VTE events were DVT alone (n = 564, 63.3 %), with the remainder PE, (n = 236, 27.3 %), or PE in combination with DVT (n = 63, 7.3 %).Interpretation: GARFIELD-VTE provides a global perspective of anticoagulation patterns and highlights the accumulation of events within the first 12 months after diagnosis. These findings may help identify treatment gaps for subsequent interventions to improve patient outcomes in this patient population