Compasión o renuncia? «Esta» es la cuestión de la ética de Schopenhauer

La visió tradicional del pensament ètic de Schopenhauer és veure la renúncia de la voluntat- de-viure com la resposta més vertadera i més ètica a un món com el nostre, en què el patiment és enorme, endèmic i no redimit. Des d’aquesta perspectiva, l’ètica de la compassió, que a Sobre el fonament de la moral Schopenhauer resumeix en el principi «No facis mal a ningú sinó més aviat ajuda a tothom en la mesura que puguis», és la segona millor forma de viure, valuosa tan sols com un pas en el camí vers «salvar-se» de la voluntat- de-viure mitjançant la renúncia completa. En aquest treball suggerim que aquesta imatge tradicional de l’ètica de la compassió com una estació de pas en el camí vers l’opció normativament preferible de la renúncia amaga un conflicte fonamental al cor del pensament ètic de Schopenhauer. En el seu lloc, argumentem que Schopenhauer ha d’interpretar-se en tant que ofereix dos ideals independents i mútuament antagònics de l’ètica: la compassió i la renúncia. Després, posant el «resignacionisme» de Schopenhauer entre parèntesis, explorem el seu ideal de compassió i oferim una reconstrucció de l’ètica de Schopenhauer que defensa l’existència de «graus de valor inherent» entre els éssers vius. El nostre objectiu és demostrar amb aquesta reconstrucció que Schopenhauer ofereix una combinació d’ètica kantiana i ètica del sentit moral que té una considerable originalitat i resulta atractiva des del punt de vista de la teorització ètica contemporània.The traditional view of Schopenhauer’s ethical thought is to see renunciation from the will-to-life as the truest, most ethical response to a world such as ours in which suffering is tremendous, endemic, and unredeemed. In this view, Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion, which he encapsulates in On the Basis of Morality in the principle “Harm no one; rather help everyone to the extent that you can” is a second best way of living, valuable only as a step along the path to “salvation” from the will-to-life in complete renunciation. In this paper, we suggest that this traditional picture of the ethics of compassion as ultimately a way station to the normatively preferable option of renunciation masks a fundamental conflict at the heart of Schopenhauer’s ethical thought. Instead, we argue, Schopenhauer should be interpreted as offering two independent, mutually antagonistic ethical ideals: compassion and renunciation. Bracketing Schopenhauer’s resignationism, we then pursue his ideal of compassion and offer a reconstruction of Schopenhauer’s ethics that espouses ‘degrees of inherent value’ among living beings. We aim to show that on this reconstruction, Schopenhauer offers a hybrid Kantian/moral sense theory of ethics that has considerable novelty and philosophical attractions for contemporary ethical theorizing.La visión tradicional del pensamiento ético de Schopenhauer es ver la renuncia de la voluntad-de-vivir como la respuesta más verdadera y más ética a un mundo como el nuestro, en el que el sufrimiento es enorme, endémico y no redimido. Desde esta perspectiva, la ética de la compasión, que en Sobre el fundamento de la moral Schopenhauer resume en el principio «no dañes a nadie sino más bien ayuda a todos en la medida en que puedas», es la segunda mejor forma de vivir, valiosa solo como un paso en el camino hacia el «salvarse» de la voluntad-de-vivir mediante la renuncia completa. En este trabajo sugerimos que esta imagen tradicional de la ética de la compasión como una estación de paso en el camino a la opción normativamente preferible esconde un conflicto fundamental en el corazón del pensamiento ético de Schopenhauer. En su lugar, argumentamos que Schopenhauer debe interpretarse en tanto que ofrece dos ideales independientes y mutuamente antagónicos de la ética: la compasión y la renuncia. Luego, poniendo el «resignacionismo» de Schopenhauer entre paréntesis, exploramos su ideal de compasión y ofrecemos una reconstrucción de la ética de Schopenhauer que defiende la existencia de «grados de valor inherente» entre los seres vivos. Nuestro objetivo es demostrar que en esta reconstrucción Schopenhauer ofrece una combinación de ética kantiana y ética del sentido moral que tiene una considerable originalidad y resulta atractiva desde el punto de vista de la teorización ética contemporánea

Compassion or Renunciation? : "That" is the question of Schopenhauer's ethics

The traditional view of Schopenhauer's ethical thought is to see renunciation from the will-to-life as the truest, most ethical response to a world such as ours in which suffering is tremendous, endemic, and unredeemed. In this view, Schopenhauer's ethics of compassion, which he encapsulates in On the Basis of Morality in the principle "Harm no one; rather help everyone to the extent that you can" is a second best way of living, valuable only as a step along the path to "salvation" from the will-to-life in complete renunciation. In this paper, we suggest that this traditional picture of the ethics of compassion as ultimately a way station to the normatively preferable option of renunciation masks a fundamental conflict at the heart of Schopenhauer's ethical thought. Instead, we argue, Schopenhauer should be interpreted as offering two independent, mutually antagonistic ethical ideals: compassion and renunciation. Bracketing Schopenhauer's resignationism, we then pursue his ideal of compassion and offer a reconstruction of Schopenhauer's ethics that espouses 'degrees of inherent value' among living beings. We aim to show that on this reconstruction, Schopenhauer offers a hybrid Kantian/moral sense theory of ethics that has considerable novelty and philosophical attractions for contemporary ethical theorizing.La visió tradicional del pensament ètic de Schopenhauer és veure la renúncia de la voluntat- de-viure com la resposta més vertadera i més ètica a un món com el nostre, en què el patiment és enorme, endèmic i no redimit. Des d'aquesta perspectiva, l'ètica de la compassió, que a Sobre el fonament de la moral Schopenhauer resumeix en el principi «No facis mal a ningú sinó més aviat ajuda a tothom en la mesura que puguis», és la segona millor forma de viure, valuosa tan sols com un pas en el camí vers «salvar-se» de la voluntat- de-viure mitjançant la renúncia completa. En aquest treball suggerim que aquesta imatge tradicional de l'ètica de la compassió com una estació de pas en el camí vers l'opció normativament preferible de la renúncia amaga un conflicte fonamental al cor del pensament ètic de Schopenhauer. En el seu lloc, argumentem que Schopenhauer ha d'interpretar-se en tant que ofereix dos ideals independents i mútuament antagònics de l'ètica: la compassió i la renúncia. Després, posant el «resignacionisme» de Schopenhauer entre parèntesis, explorem el seu ideal de compassió i oferim una reconstrucció de l'ètica de Schopenhauer que defensa l'existència de «graus de valor inherent» entre els éssers vius. El nostre objectiu és demostrar amb aquesta reconstrucció que Schopenhauer ofereix una combinació d'ètica kantiana i ètica del sentit moral que té una considerable originalitat i resulta atractiva des del punt de vista de la teorització ètica contemporània.La visión tradicional del pensamiento ético de Schopenhauer es ver la renuncia de la voluntad-de-vivir como la respuesta más verdadera y más ética a un mundo como el nuestro, en el que el sufrimiento es enorme, endémico y no redimido. Desde esta perspectiva, la ética de la compasión, que en Sobre el fundamento de la moral Schopenhauer resume en el principio «no dañes a nadie sino más bien ayuda a todos en la medida en que puedas», es la segunda mejor forma de vivir, valiosa solo como un paso en el camino hacia el «salvarse» de la voluntad-de-vivir mediante la renuncia completa. En este trabajo sugerimos que esta imagen tradicional de la ética de la compasión como una estación de paso en el camino a la opción normativamente preferible esconde un conflicto fundamental en el corazón del pensamiento ético de Schopenhauer. En su lugar, argumentamos que Schopenhauer debe interpretarse en tanto que ofrece dos ideales independientes y mutuamente antagónicos de la ética: la compasión y la renuncia. Luego, poniendo el «resignacionismo» de Schopenhauer entre paréntesis, exploramos su ideal de compasión y ofrecemos una reconstrucción de la ética de Schopenhauer que defiende la existencia de «grados de valor inherente» entre los seres vivos. Nuestro objetivo es demostrar que en esta reconstrucción Schopenhauer ofrece una combinación de ética kantiana y ética del sentido moral que tiene una considerable originalidad y resulta atractiva desde el punto de vista de la teorización ética contemporánea

Analysis of recurrences in 322 TIS, T1, or T2 glottic carcinomas treated by carbon dioxide laser

An endoscopic approach to early glottic carcinoma is considered a sound treatment for both previously untreated lesions and selected recurrent lesions. Between January 1988 and December 2000, we treated 322 patients by CO2 laser at a single institution; 37 had Tis, 191 T1a, 55 T1b, and 39 T2 lesions (mean follow-up, 77 months; range, 6 to 180 months). Kaplan-Meier curves showed a 5-year overall survival rate of 88%, a determinate survival rate of 99%, a disease-free survival rate of 81%, a rate of ultimate local control with laser alone of 91%, and a laryngeal preservation rate of 97%. Univariate and multivariate analysis showed that the only factor that statistically affected endoscopic control was lateral extension of the tumor with involvement of the bottom of the ventricle (hazard risk ratio, 4.0; 95% confidence interval, 1.71 to 9.35). The 58 recurrences were classified according to their location compared with the site of the primary tumor as follows: 14 in the same area (group A), 27 in adjacent subsites with superficial spreading or multifocal distribution (group B), and 17 in adjacent sites by submucosal diffusion to the visceral spaces, cartilaginous framework, or extralaryngeal tissues (group C). For each group, we analyzed the rate of patients who underwent salvage by endoscopic or open neck procedures and the rate of laryngeal preservation. Recurrences in groups A and B were endoscopically treated in 86% and 74% of cases, respectively. By contrast, in group C no patient was endoscopically cured, and there was a low laryngeal preservation rate (47%). The pathways of spread in recurrent carcinoma are therefore the single most important factor in predicting its endoscopic curability

Treatment of hemangiomas in children using a Nd:YAG laser in conjunction with ice cooling of the epidermis: techniques and results

BACKGROUND: Hemangiomas are the most common type of congenital anomaly in childhood. Although many resolve spontaneously, intervention is required when their growth could damage vital adjacent structures. Various therapeutic approaches to childhood hemangiomas with different types of laser have been described previously. The objective of this study was to determine whether the cooling of the epidermis during irradiation of hemangiomas with a Nd:YAG laser prevents thermal damage and decreases the number of sessions required to treat these lesions. METHODS: Between 1993 and 2001, 110 patients aged 3 months to 4 years, with cutaneous hemangiomas were treated with a Nd:YAG laser. The lesion was cooled with ice prior to, during, and after the irradiation. During each session the laser beam passed through the pieces of ice. The laser power was between 35–45 W with a pulse length of 2–10 seconds. RESULTS: After 6 months of follow-up, from the first session of laser treatment, total resolution was obtained in 72 (65.5%) patients. A second or third session followed in 30 out of 38 patients in which, the initial results were good, moderate, or poor. The parents of the remaining eight children refused this second session and these patients excluded from the study Complications were seen in nine (8.8%) patients. One patient had postoperative bleeding which stopped spontaneously, while atrophic scars occurred in six (5.8%) patients, and hypertrophic scars in two (1.9%) patients. CONCLUSIONS: Nd:YAG laser irradiation in conjunction with ice protection of the epidermis produces good cosmetic results for the treatment of cutaneous hemangiomas in children, and decreases the number of sessions for treatment of these lesions

Kant, Celmins and Art after the End of Art

One typically thinks of the relevance of Kant’s aesthetic theory to Western art in terms of Modernism, thanks in large part to the work of eminent critic and art historian Clement Greenberg. Yet, thinking of Kant’s legacy for contemporary art as inhering exclusively in “Kantian formalism” obscures a great deal of Kant’s aesthetic theory. In his last book, Arthur Danto suggested just this point, urging us to enlarge our appreciation of Kant’s aesthetic theory and its relevance to contemporary art, because, for Danto, “Kant had two conceptions of art.” In this essay, I support and build on Danto’s claim that there are really two conceptions of art at work in Kant’s third Critique, and that the second conception offers a non-Modernist/formalist way that Kant’s aesthetic theory remains relevant to post 1960s art (art “after the end of art” in Danto’s terms). My ultimate aim is to highlight another facet in the continuing relevance of Kant’s aesthetic theory to post- Abstract Expressionist contemporary art, namely, the explicit attention to the differential aesthetic values of nature and art respectively. I shall do this by putting it in dialogue with the art practice of Latvian-American artist, Vija Celmins (1938- ) whose illustrious career since 1960s has made her an ‘artist’s artist’ but who has also recently garnered much wider attention with a retrospective titled “To Fix the Image in Memory.” Celmins takes up artistically a problematic that is quite central philosophically to the concerns of the third Critique, and thus her work illustrates (even if unconsciously) another way in which Kant’s aesthetic theory is of great continuing relevance to the artworld today