An Empirical Investigation of Debt Contract Design: The Determinants of the Choice of Debt Terms in Eurobond Issues

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the determinants for the optimal choice of contract terms on Eurobonds issued by UK companies. We examine predictions of extant theories that associate the choice of debt features namely, maturity, call options, convertible options, and protective covenants to firm and market characteristics. Like in Correia (2003), a simultaneous equations approach is adopted to test the alternative use of contract features for mitigating debt-contracting costs. The evidence provides strong support to the prediction that both callable and short-term debt and convertible and debt with protective covenants are used as alternative control devises to mitigate agency costs. Further evidence suggests, however, that contrary to the fundamentals guiding the choice of maturity and callability structures, the use of conversion options and protective covenants in Eurobond contracts seems to be determined by equity agency costs rather than debt agency costs. Also, some support is found for the risk uncertainty theory underlying the use of convertibles and for liquidity risk arguments regarding the choice to include protective covenants.

Corporate Governance and Executive Perquisites

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between executive perquisite consumption and indicators of corporate governance after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) expanded the disclosure requirements related to perquisites. Design/methodology/approach This study uses ordinary least squares and Tobit regressions to examine the dollar value of perquisites consumed, the number of perquisites consumed and the types of perquisites consumed. Findings The analysis shows that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to award perquisites to executives. Firms characterized as being more prone to the presence of agency problems are associated with greater levels of perquisite consumption. Finally, there is evidence that not all perquisite consumptions can be attributed to an agency problem. Efficiently operating firms are associated with greater levels of perquisite consumption as are larger firms. Research limitations/implications The authors examine firms in the period immediately after the SEC initiated the expanded disclosures. This may limit the generalizability of the results to other exchange-listed firms that changed their perquisite policy as a result of the rule change. Originality/value The paper extends the literature on corporate governance and mandatory corporate disclosure by investigating the association between corporate governance characteristics and perquisite consumption. This paper examines this relation immediately after the SEC expanded the disclosures surrounding perquisites to provide the public with more transparent disclosures

Vertical and Horizontal Agency Problems in Private Firms: Ownership Structure and Operating Performance

We investigate how ownership structure influences op erating performance and implied agency costs. Our sample includes over 42,000 U.K. private and public firms. We document several new results of considerable economic significance relating to: (a) horizontal agency costs arising from unequal ownership within private firms, (b) amplification of agency costs from joint presence within the same firm of horizontal agency problems and vertical agency problems arising from separation of ownership and control, (c) mitigation in agency costs wrought by a second large shareholder, (d) impact of complex ownership structures, and (e) agency cost differences between public firms and comparable private firms.Ye

Robotic Finger Assembly

A robotic hand includes a finger with first, second, and third phalanges. A first joint rotatably connects the first phalange to a base structure. A second joint rotatably connects the first phalange to the second phalange. A third joint rotatably connects the third phalange to the second phalange. The second joint and the third joint are kinematically linked such that the position of the third phalange with respect to the second phalange is determined by the position of the second phalange with respect to the first phalange

Robotic Finger Assembly

A robotic hand includes a finger with first, second, and third phalanges. A first joint rotatably connects the first phalange to a base structure. A second joint rotatably connects the first phalange to the second phalange. A third joint rotatably connects the third phalange to the second phalange. The second joint and the third joint are kinematically linked such that the position of the third phalange with respect to the second phalange is determined by the position of the second phalange with respect to the first phalange

Tendon Driven Finger Actuation System

A humanoid robot includes a robotic hand having at least one finger. An actuation system for the robotic finger includes an actuator assembly which is supported by the robot and is spaced apart from the finger. A tendon extends from the actuator assembly to the at least one finger and ends in a tendon terminator. The actuator assembly is operable to actuate the tendon to move the tendon terminator and, thus, the finger

Search for Kaluza-Klein Graviton Emission in ppˉp\bar{p} Collisions at s=1.8\sqrt{s}=1.8 TeV using the Missing Energy Signature

We report on a search for direct Kaluza-Klein graviton production in a data sample of 84 ${pb}^{-1}$ of \ppb collisions at $\sqrt{s}$ = 1.8 TeV, recorded by the Collider Detector at Fermilab. We investigate the final state of large missing transverse energy and one or two high energy jets. We compare the data with the predictions from a $3+1+n$-dimensional Kaluza-Klein scenario in which gravity becomes strong at the TeV scale. At 95% confidence level (C.L.) for $n$=2, 4, and 6 we exclude an effective Planck scale below 1.0, 0.77, and 0.71 TeV, respectively.Comment: Submitted to PRL, 7 pages 4 figures/Revision includes 5 figure