An Open Context for Near Eastern Archaeology

The common use by archaeologists of ubiquitous technologies such as computers and digital cameras means that archaeological research projects now produce huge amounts of diverse, digital documentation. However, while the technology is available to collect this documentation, we still largely lack community-accepted dissemination channels appropriate for such torrents of data. Open Context aims to help fill this gap by providing open access data publication services for archaeology. Open Context has a flexible and generalized technical architecture that can accommodate most archaeological datasets, despite the lack of common recording systems or other documentation standards. It includes a variety of tools to make data dissemination easier and more worthwhile. Authorship is clearly identified through citation tools, including web-based publication systems that enable individuals to upload their own data for review, and collaboration is facilitated through easy download and "tagging" features. Near Eastern archaeologists will benefit from Open Context's flexibility to share a variety of content from diverse projects, no matter how large or small. This article was originally published in Near Eastern Archaeology (ISSN 1094-2076), Volume 70, Number 4, December 2007

High-Valent Organometallic Palladium and Nickel Complexes and their Roles in Carbon-Carbon and Carbon-Heteroatom Bond Formation Reactions

The development of palladium catalysis has been influential in a wide range of organic transformations, in particular C-C coupling, C-Heteroatom coupling and C-H functionalization reactions. These catalytic transformations normally proceed through the Pd0/II catalytic cycle. These reactions are remarkably useful, however, they suffer from two major problems: -hydride elimination and palladium black deposition. To circumvent these problems, recent reports have been focused on developing novel organic transformations proceeding through high-valent palladium and nickel catalytic cycles. To this point, we recently reported the isolation and characterization of various mononuclear PdIII complexes using the tetradentate ligands, N,N-di-alkyl-2,11-diaza[3.3](2,6)pyridinophane (RN4, R = tBu, iPr, Me). As a result, the ligand effects on the stability and reactivity of the corresponding high-valent palladium complexes were studied. Herein, we report our continued effects to improve our overall understanding of these high-valent complexes and the roles they may play in catalytic transformations. First, we investigated the synthesis and utilization of an asymmetric N4 ligand, resulting in the destabilization of the ensuing PdIII complexes. Then we synthesized a series of arene-substituted nickel complexes to study the effect of altering the electronics and sterics of the ligand on the nickel complexes stability and reactivity. The synthesis and reactivity of the first reported dialkyl NiIII complexes was investigated next. These studies along with additional synthesis and characterization of a NiIV complex provided strong evidence for the involvement of NiIV intermediates during nickel catalyzed cross-coupling reactions. Lastly, we investigated the deprotonation of the N4 ligand system in hopes of facilitating various C-H activation reactions. All told, these studies gave us valuable insights into high-valent palladium and nickel complexes relevant to C-C coupling, C-Heteroatom coupling and C-H functionalization reactions. By continuing to improve our understanding of these valuable organic transformations, we can continue to develop more effective catalytic systems

Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms

The rise of “Big Data” analytics in the private sector poses new challenges for privacy advocates. Through its reliance on existing data and predictive analysis to create detailed individual profiles, Big Data has exploded the scope of personally identifiable information (“PII”). It has also effectively marginalized regulatory schema by evading current privacy protections with its novel methodology. Furthermore, poor execution of Big Data methodology may create additional harms by rendering inaccurate profiles that nonetheless impact an individual’s life and livelihood. To respond to Big Data’s evolving practices, this Article examines several existing privacy regimes and explains why these approaches inadequately address current Big Data challenges. This Article then proposes a new approach to mitigating predictive privacy harms—that of a right to procedural data due process. Although current privacy regimes offer limited nominal due process-like mechanisms, a more rigorous framework is needed to address their shortcomings. By examining due process’s role in the Anglo-American legal system and building on previous scholarship about due process for public administrative computer systems, this Article argues that individuals affected by Big Data should have similar rights to those in the legal system with respect to how their personal data is used in such adjudications. Using these principles, this Article analogizes a system of regulation that would provide such rights against private Big Data actors

Copyright Exhaustion and the Personal Use Dilemma

Copyright law struggles to provide a coherent framework for analyzing personal uses. Although there is widespread agreement that at least some such uses are non-infringing, the doctrinal basis for that conclusion remains unclear. In particular, the prevailing explanations of fair use and implied license are both flawed in important respects. This Article proposes a new explanation for the favored status of certain personal uses. Drawing on the principle of copyright exhaustion - the notion that once the copyright holder parts with a particular copy of a work, its power to control the use and disposition of that copy is constrained - we argue that many personal uses are rendered lawful by virtue of the simple fact of copy ownership. Owning copies entitles consumers to make certain uses of those copies and the works embodied in them, even in ways that may appear inconsistent with the rights of copyright holders. Under exhaustion, any copy owner has the right to reproduce, modify, and distribute her copy in order to fully realize its value qua copy. In a variety of personal use cases, courts have been swayed by arguments that highlight the defendant’s purchase or rightful ownership of a copy. But the prevailing approaches to personal use take copy ownership into account inconsistently and awkwardly, forcing courts to shoehorn their intuitions about ownership into doctrines designed to address very different questions. In contrast, exhaustion places copy ownership at the center of the digital personal use debate. And it helps us reconcile our intuitions about the proper scope of consumer control over copies they own with our formal legal articulations of the scope of infringement liability

The Legal Imitation Game: Generative AI’s Incompatibility with Clinical Legal Education

In this Essay, we briefly describe key aspects of [generative artificial intelligence] that are particularly relevant to, and raise particular risks for, its potential use by lawyers and law students. We then identify three foundational goals of clinical legal education that provide useful frameworks for evaluating technological tools like GenAI: (1) practice readiness, (2) justice readiness, and (3) client-centered lawyering. First is “practice readiness,” which is about ensuring that students have the baseline abilities, knowledge, and skills to practice law upon graduation. Second is “justice readiness,” a concept proposed by Professor Jane Aiken, which is about teaching law students to critically assess the social and political implications of legal work and the legal system, as well as making space for students to confront systemic injustices and the role of lawyers in perpetuating them. Third is “client centered lawyering,” which at its root is about client empowerment and autonomy, teaching students to recognize the power imbalances present in the attorney-client relationship and the importance of ensuring client agency in decision-making. Although these are by no means the only goals of clinical education, they provide key perspectives and criteria for GenAI assessment. Finally, we examine whether GenAI is pedagogically compatible with each of these three goals. We conclude that although GenAI does present some de minimis learning opportunities for practice readiness, it is largely incompatible with justice readiness and client-centered lawyering, especially when considering the serious concerns that the development, deployment, and use of GenAI raise for those clinical programs with public interest missions

The End of Ownership

An argument for retaining the notion of personal property in the products we “buy” in the digital marketplace. If you buy a book at the bookstore, you own it. You can take it home, scribble in the margins, put in on the shelf, lend it to a friend, sell it at a garage sale. But is the same thing true for the ebooks or other digital goods you buy? Retailers and copyright holders argue that you don't own those purchases, you merely license them. That means your ebook vendor can delete the book from your device without warning or explanation—as Amazon deleted Orwell's 1984 from the Kindles of surprised readers several years ago. These readers thought they owned their copies of 1984. Until, it turned out, they didn't. In The End of Ownership, Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz explore how notions of ownership have shifted in the digital marketplace, and make an argument for the benefits of personal property. Of course, ebooks, cloud storage, streaming, and other digital goods offer users convenience and flexibility. But, Perzanowski and Schultz warn, consumers should be aware of the tradeoffs involving user constraints, permanence, and privacy. The rights of private property are clear, but few people manage to read their end user agreements. Perzanowski and Schultz argue that introducing aspects of private property and ownership into the digital marketplace would offer both legal and economic benefits. But, most important, it would affirm our sense of self-direction and autonomy. If we own our purchases, we are free to make whatever lawful use of them we please. Technology need not constrain our freedom; it can also empower us

Reconciling Intellectual and Personal Property

This Article examines both the forces undermining copy ownership and the important functions it serves within the copyright system in order to construct a workable notion of consumer property rights in digital media. Part I begins by examining the relationship between intellectual and personal property. Sometimes courts have treated those rights as inseparable, as if transfer of a copy entails transfer of the intangible right, or retention of the copyright entails ongoing control over particular copies. But Congress and most courts have recognized personal and intellectual property as interests that can be transferred separately. Although the better view, this approach frequently overstates the independence of copyrights and rights in copies. Those interests interact; each helps to define the boundary of the other. The exhaustion principle, though historically associated with a clear distinction between copy and copyright, is in fact the primary tool in copyright law for mediating the somewhat indistinct line separating the copy and the work. Part II begins to outline the breakdown of this once stable equilibrium, focusing on the erosion of the notion of consumer ownership. In recent decades, courts have created two distinct regimes for resolving questions of copy ownership: one that applies to software and one that applies to everything else. The software regime endorses rightsholders’ efforts to “license” particular copies of their works, in contrast to the general skepticism with which courts regard such efforts. This dichotomy is driven in part by software exceptionalism—the notion that for a variety of reasons software should be treated differently. But the growing acceptance of the licensing model also reflects changing views of property. Those shifts opened the door to the substitution of statutory property rights with unilateral contract terms. As the line separating software from other media becomes increasingly blurred, the thinking reflected in the software cases suggests a creeping erosion of copy ownership. But as Part III details, the erosion of ownership is only half of the problem. The copy, once the uncontroversial locus of consumer property rights, has transformed as well. Copies were once persistent, valuable, readily identifiable, and easily accounted. But the days of the unitary copy are numbered. Today, copies are discarnate, ephemeral, ubiquitous, and of little value in themselves. In part these changes reflect shifting consumer demand. But more importantly, they signal the increasing disconnect between copyright law’s conception of the copy and today’s technological reality. We are witnessing a blurring of the formerly clear distinction between the intangible work and the tangible copy, a distinction that has been central to copyright law’s approach to balancing intellectual and personal property rights. In light of the challenge of squaring the existing doctrinal framework for exhaustion with these developments, we turn in Part IV to an examination of the functions served by copy ownership. With a better understanding of the role of copy ownership within the copyright system, we will be better positioned to craft an approach to consumer property rights in the post-copy era. We identify three primary functions of copy ownership. First, locating consumer rights in a particular copy helps preserve the rivalry that distinguishes real property from intellectual property, thus preventing consumer rights from unduly interfering with the ability of the copyright holder’s to exploit the work. Second, copy ownership encourages consumers to participate in copyright markets rather than rely on unauthorized sources of content. Third, a stable and reliable notion of copy ownership reduces information cost externalities by eliminating idiosyncratic transfers of rights in copies. Part V argues that while these three functions historically have been bound up in the single, unitary copy that defined distribution in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the copy is not essential to achieving those goals. Instead, the copy served as a token, signaling that each of the three functional concerns at the heart of exhaustion was satisfied. With this new understanding of the place of the copy, we outline the structure of a new exhaustion doctrine that more carefully and transparently interrogates exhaustion’s underlying policy concerns, rather than using the unitary copy as a proxy for consumer rights

Reconciling Intellectual and Personal Property

This Article examines both the forces undermining copy ownership and the important functions it serves within the copyright system in order to construct a workable notion of consumer property rights in digital media. Part I begins by examining the relationship between intellectual and personal property. Sometimes courts have treated those rights as inseparable, as if transfer of a copy entails transfer of the intangible right, or retention of the copyright entails ongoing control over particular copies. But Congress and most courts have recognized personal and intellectual property as interests that can be transferred separately. Although the better view, this approach frequently overstates the independence of copyrights and rights in copies. Those interests interact; each helps to define the boundary of the other. The exhaustion principle, though historically associated with a clear distinction between copy and copyright, is in fact the primary tool in copyright law for mediating the somewhat indistinct line separating the copy and the work. Part II begins to outline the breakdown of this once stable equilibrium, focusing on the erosion of the notion of consumer ownership. In recent decades, courts have created two distinct regimes for resolving questions of copy ownership: one that applies to software and one that applies to everything else. The software regime endorses rightsholders’ efforts to “license” particular copies of their works, in contrast to the general skepticism with which courts regard such efforts. This dichotomy is driven in part by software exceptionalism—the notion that for a variety of reasons software should be treated differently. But the growing acceptance of the licensing model also reflects changing views of property. Those shifts opened the door to the substitution of statutory property rights with unilateral contract terms. As the line separating software from other media becomes increasingly blurred, the thinking reflected in the software cases suggests a creeping erosion of copy ownership. But as Part III details, the erosion of ownership is only half of the problem. The copy, once the uncontroversial locus of consumer property rights, has transformed as well. Copies were once persistent, valuable, readily identifiable, and easily accounted. But the days of the unitary copy are numbered. Today, copies are discarnate, ephemeral, ubiquitous, and of little value in themselves. In part these changes reflect shifting consumer demand. But more importantly, they signal the increasing disconnect between copyright law’s conception of the copy and today’s technological reality. We are witnessing a blurring of the formerly clear distinction between the intangible work and the tangible copy, a distinction that has been central to copyright law’s approach to balancing intellectual and personal property rights. In light of the challenge of squaring the existing doctrinal framework for exhaustion with these developments, we turn in Part IV to an examination of the functions served by copy ownership. With a better understanding of the role of copy ownership within the copyright system, we will be better positioned to craft an approach to consumer property rights in the post-copy era. We identify three primary functions of copy ownership. First, locating consumer rights in a particular copy helps preserve the rivalry that distinguishes real property from intellectual property, thus preventing consumer rights from unduly interfering with the ability of the copyright holder’s to exploit the work. Second, copy ownership encourages consumers to participate in copyright markets rather than rely on unauthorized sources of content. Third, a stable and reliable notion of copy ownership reduces information cost externalities by eliminating idiosyncratic transfers of rights in copies. Part V argues that while these three functions historically have been bound up in the single, unitary copy that defined distribution in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the copy is not essential to achieving those goals. Instead, the copy served as a token, signaling that each of the three functional concerns at the heart of exhaustion was satisfied. With this new understanding of the place of the copy, we outline the structure of a new exhaustion doctrine that more carefully and transparently interrogates exhaustion’s underlying policy concerns, rather than using the unitary copy as a proxy for consumer rights

The End of Ownership: Personal Property in the Digital Economy

An argument for retaining the notion of personal property in the products we “buy” in the digital marketplace. The open access edition of this book was made possible by generous funding from Arcadia – a charitable fund of Lisbet Rausing and Peter Baldwin. If you buy a book at the bookstore, you own it. You can take it home, scribble in the margins, put in on the shelf, lend it to a friend, sell it at a garage sale. But is the same thing true for the ebooks or other digital goods you buy? Retailers and copyright holders argue that you don\u27t own those purchases, you merely license them. That means your ebook vendor can delete the book from your device without warning or explanation—as Amazon deleted Orwell\u27s 1984 from the Kindles of surprised readers several years ago. These readers thought they owned their copies of 1984. Until, it turned out, they didn\u27t. In The End of Ownership, Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz explore how notions of ownership have shifted in the digital marketplace, and make an argument for the benefits of personal property. Of course, ebooks, cloud storage, streaming, and other digital goods offer users convenience and flexibility. But, Perzanowski and Schultz warn, consumers should be aware of the tradeoffs involving user constraints, permanence, and privacy. The rights of private property are clear, but few people manage to read their end user agreements. Perzanowski and Schultz argue that introducing aspects of private property and ownership into the digital marketplace would offer both legal and economic benefits. But, most important, it would affirm our sense of self-direction and autonomy. If we own our purchases, we are free to make whatever lawful use of them we please. Technology need not constrain our freedom; it can also empower us.https://repository.law.umich.edu/books/1114/thumbnail.jp