Waiting for Merkron: The Franco-German Relationship and Eurozone Reform after the Elections. College of Europe Policy Brief #8.17, October 2017

Executive Summary. France and Germany have fundamentally different interests concerning the Eurozone. Contrary to prevailing sentiment, the recent elections in both countries will therefore not necessarily reignite the Franco-German motor to bring about the pending Eurozone reform. > Although Merkel did not refuse Macron’s recent Euro reform plans, the ostensible agreement is owed to the fact that both sides mean different things when referring to an EU Finance Minister or a fiscal capacity to stabilize Eurozone economies. > Disagreement extends to strengthening the Eurozone’s social dimension and the revived idea of a European unemployment protection scheme. By contrast, France and Germany agree on protecting their labour markets. > Macron frames problems in innovative ways and exhibits a cooperative style. Despite differences, a renewed tandem may therefore be able to reform the Eurozone if certain conditions are met: External drivers, such as, the ‘refugee crisis’ and security concerns may facilitate cross-sectoral package deals; at the EU level, a rekindling of the Euro crisis could increase pressure on the tandem to make concessions; domestically, reform may be required as a continued ‘muddling through’ could further strengthen right-wing populists. > Not in the least, any Franco-German entente will need to respect the preferences of other member states, promote the Eurozone’s social dimension, and strengthen its democratic legitimation

Managing constraint : frugal opposition to European fiscal solidarity

Published online: 24 March 2024The management of the COVID-19 crisis and, in particular, the Next Generation EU fund have shown that European leaders can find integrationist policy solutions despite increasing politicisation at home where democratic constraints may lead to a feared ‘multilevel politics trap’. Therefore, we ask whether and how national governments can manage such constraints and thus spring or avoid the trap. Theoretically, we argue that the agency of governments is a crucial factor for understanding the varying dynamics of politicisation in regional integration, as governments can raise or lower domestic audience costs by strategically interacting with their parliament or media. Empirically, we probe the plausibility of our theoretical propositions by examining constraint management and position-taking in Austria and the Netherlands in the context of European fiscal solidarity. Our results show that there is no inevitably self-reinforcing multilevel politics trap but that the effects of domestic constraint are, to a considerable extent, contingent on the agency of national governments.This paper is based on support from the European Research Council (ERC) grant entitled ‘Wellbeing Returns on Social Investment Recalibration’ (WellSIRe) [grant number 882276]

The European Parliament as a driving force of constitutionalisation

Study for the AFCO CommiteeThis report analyses the increasing role played by the European Parliament (EP) in the EU decision-making process. In the first part (Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5), it describes how the EP acquired more power in legislation, comitology, in the appointment of the European Commission and in the budgetary field. In the second part (Sections 6 and 7), the report illustrates the EP’s role in two relevant policy fields: economic governance and external trade agreements. The report demonstrates that EP’s formal and informal powers in legislation, comitology, Commission investiture, the budgetary process, economic governance and international agreements have increased strikingly since the Treaty of Rome. This empowerment is partially explained by the concern for democratic legitimacy on the part of some member states’ (and the Commission). To another important part the empowerment may be explained by the fact that treaties frequently contain ambiguous provisions and thus allow room for informal rules to emerge through bargaining specifying the details of treaty provisions

High Temperature Conductance of the Single Electron Transistor

The linear conductance of the single electron transistor is determined in the high temperature limit. Electron tunneling is treated nonperturbatively by means of a path integral formulation and the conductance is obtained from Kubo's formula. The theoretical predictions are valid for arbitrary conductance and found to explain recent experimental data.Comment: 4 pages, 2 figure

Providing political leadership? : three case studies on Germany's ambiguous role in the eurozone crisis

Published online: 29 Mar 2016Throughout the eurozone crisis, observers called upon Germany to assume leadership. Yet, Germany has not emerged as the hoped-for leader. According to the issue at stake, we observe three different outcomes: firstly, Germany refused to lead; secondly, Germany assumed leadership, but failed to deliver; thirdly, Germany acted as a successful leader. This article examines the reasons for this variance by analysing and comparing one case for each outcome: the first financial assistance to Greece; the failed attempt to establish a ‘super-commissioner'; and the shaping of the Fiscal Compact. The analysis includes original data, gathered through interviews in Brussels, Frankfurt and Berlin. The variance in Germany's behaviour can be explained by employing a rational institutionalist model of leadership. Germany's emergence as a leader depends on the expected costs and benefits of leading. Its impact, in contrast, depends on its power, the distribution of preferences among the actors involved and institutional constraints

Leadership in the Eurozone : the role of Germany and EU institutions

Leadership of powerful states and organizations is crucial for the success of regional integration projects. This book offers a theoretical model explaining such leadership. By applying the model to eurozone governance and reform, the book combines innovative theorizing on leadership in regional and international affairs with original research on Economic and Monetary Union politics. Six in-depth case studies analyze the (non-)leadership of Germany and EU institutions in eurozone crisis management. Moreover, the book evaluates the eurozone’s leadership record since the outbreak of its crisis and helps readers understand the leadership of collective actors, and the extent to which they can contribute to overcoming crisis and fostering European integration. In particular, the book investigates the under-researched questions of who provided leadership in the eurozone crisis and why, and which conditions are required to achieve successful leadership in the EU-- Front Matter 1 Introduction: Explaining Leadership in the Eurozone 2 Conceptualizing Leadership: What It Is and Why It Matters 3 Theorizing Leadership: Emergence and Impact 4 Analysing Leadership I: Germany in the Eurozone Crisis 5 Analysing Leadership II: The EU Institutions in the Eurozone Crisis 6 Evaluating Leadership: The Hard Case of the Eurozone 7 Conclusions -- Back MatterPublished version of EUI PhD thesis, 201

Leadership by Default: The ECB and the Announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions

Starting from the striking effect of the ECB"s announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions, this paper examines why and how the ECB emerged as a leader in fighting the Eurozone crisis. Based on a rational institutionalist approach to political leadership, the paper argues that the ECB emerged as a leader because the benefits of preserving the common currency and thus its own existence outweighed the high costs of its politicization. Against the backdrop of superior power resources, homogeneous preferences, and a low institutional constraint, the ECB provided leadership by combining two strategies – namely the provision of common knowledge and unilateral action – which provided it with a first-mover advantage. As a result, the paper argues that the ECB acted as a „leader by default" rather than a power-maximizer. Instead of engaging in a competition about political influence with member states, the ECB refrained from taking the lead as long as possible because it shied away from the high costs that were connected to it. Only once it became clear that it would not be possible to free-ride on the leadership of any other actor, the ECB finally stepped in and assumed leadership

Explaining political leadership : the role of Germany and the EU institutions in Eurozone crisis management

Defence date: 17 October 2016Examining Board: Professor Adrienne Héritier, European University Institute (Supervisor) ; Professor Ulrich Krotz, European University Institute / RSCAS (Co-Supervisor) ; Professor Amy Verdun, University of Victoria ; Professor Lucia Quaglia, University of YorkWhy and how do composite actors such as states or international institutions emerge as political leaders? Moreover, once in charge, how do they influence policy or institutional change? What are the conditions for successful leadership? These questions become particularly relevant in times of crisis. However, there is no political science theory that explains the emergence and the impact of leadership when exercised by composite actors. In the context of the Eurozone crisis, we observe that neither Germany, which is the actor most frequently called upon to assume leadership, nor any of the EU’s institutional actors have emerged as leader under all circumstances. Instead, we find three different outcomes: no leadership, failed leadership, and successful leadership. This thesis develops a theoretical model to explain this variation and to address the stated gap in the literature. Building on rational-institutionalist assumptions, it argues that leaders can help a group to enhance collective action when there are no, or only incomplete, institutional rules to do so. Thus, especially in times of crisis, leaders can act as drivers of policy or institutional change. However, they emerge only if the expected benefits of leading exceed the costs of it, and if the potential followers suffer high status quo costs. A leader’s impact on the outcomes, by contrast, depends on its power resources, the distribution of preferences, and the institutional constraint. The model is applied to Germany’s role in the first financial assistance to Greece, the proposal to establish a so-called ‘super-commissioner’, and the shaping of the Fiscal Compact. Moreover, the attitude of the European Commission and the European Parliament towards the issue of Eurobonds as well as the European Central Bank’s launch of the Outright Monetary Transactions are analysed on the basis of congruence tests and rigorous process-tracing. These within-case analyses are complemented by a cross-case comparison in order to enhance the external validity of the results. The analysis draws on 35 semi-structured élite interviews conducted at the German Ministry of Finance, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, and two Permanent Representations in Brussels

Preventing the eurozone budget: issue replacement and small state influence in EMU

When the two most powerful EU member states, Germany and France, proposed a genuine budget for the eurozone, the odds were in favour of a new stabilization instrument. However, no such eurozone budget materialized. Instead, member states agreed on the ‘Budgetary Instrument for Convergence and Competitiveness’ (BICC), a reform delivery tool that lacked the risksharing features envisaged by France and partly conceded by Germany. How can we explain the failure of a eurozone budget to emerge? By introducing the concept of ‘issue replacement’, this article traces how the Netherlands, supported by a small counter-coalition, replaced the eurozone budget proposal with the BICC. The article shows that replacing an issue on the agenda while keeping the original label is an effective strategy for less powerful actors to prevent unwelcome issues from materializing. With regard to EMU politics, the results indicate that smaller ‘creditor states’ can block a Franco-German initiative

Explaining political leadership : Germany's role in shaping the fiscal compact

First published online: 21 September 2015This article examines why and how political leaders emerge and, once in charge, what determines their success or failure. To explore these questions, I present a theory of political leadership that takes into account both the structural and the behavioral aspects of the concept. I argue that the emergence and the impact of leadership represent two different analytical steps. A leader emerges if there is a supply of, and demand for, leadership. While the supply depends on a leader's expected benefits, the demand is determined by the followers’ status quo costs. The second step concerns a leader's impact, which results from the strategies deployed by the leader. While a leader's capacity to employ strategies is determined by the power resources at its disposal, the intensity of strategies needed to influence outcomes depends on the heterogeneity of preferences and on the adaptability of the institutional setting. The theory is applied in the context of the current eurozone crisis by analyzing Germany's role in shaping the European Fiscal Compact