The Equifinality of Archaeological Networks: an Agent-Based Exploratory Lab Approach

When we find an archaeological network, how can we explore the necessary versus contingent processes at play in the formation of that archaeological network? Given a set of circumstances or processes, what other possible network shapes could have emerged? This is the problem of equifinality, where many different means could potentially arrive at the same end result: the networks that we observe. This paper outlines how agent-based modelling can be used as a laboratory for exploring different processes of archaeological network formation. We begin by describing our best guess about how the (ancient) world worked, given our target materials (here, the networks of production and patronage surrounding the Roman brick industry in the hinterland of Rome). We then develop an agent-based model of the Roman extractive economy which generates different kinds of networks under various assumptions about how that economy works. The rules of the simulation are built upon the work of Bang (2006; 2008) who describes a model of the Roman economy which he calls the ‘imperial Bazaar’. The agents are allowed to interact, and the investigators compare the kinds of networks this description generates over an entire landscape of economic possibilities. By rigorously exploring this landscape, and comparing the resultant networks with those observed in the archaeological materials, the investigators will be able to employ the principle of equifinality to work out the representativeness of the archaeological network and thus the underlying processes

Economic-demographic interactions in long-run growth

Cliometrics confirms that Malthus’ model of the pre-industrial economy, in which increases in productivity raise population but higher population drives down wages, is a good description for much of demographic/economic history. A contributor to the Malthusian equilibrium was the Western European Marriage Pattern, the late age of female first marriage, which promised to retard the fall of living standards by restricting fertility. The demographic transition and the transition from Malthusian economies to modern economic growth attracted many Cliometric models surveyed here. A popular model component is that lower levels of mortality over many centuries increased the returns to, or preference for, human capital investment so that technical progress eventually accelerated. This initially boosted birth rates and population growth accelerated. Fertility decline was earliest and most striking in late eighteenth century France. By the 1830s the fall in French marital fertility is consistent with a response to the rising opportunity cost of children. The rest of Europe did not begin to follow until end of the nineteenth century. Interactions between the economy and migration have been modelled with Cliometric structures closely related to those of natural increase and the economy. Wages were driven up by emigration from Europe and reduced in the economies receiving immigrants

A virtual water network of the Roman world

The Romans were perhaps the most impressive exponents of water resource management in preindustrial times with irrigation and virtual water trade facilitating unprecedented urbanisation and socioeconomic stability for hundreds of years in a region of highly variable climate. To understand Roman water resource management in response to urbanisation and climate variability, a Virtual Water Network of the Roman World was developed. Using this network we find that irrigation and virtual water trade increased Roman resilience to climate variability in the short term. However, urbanisation arising from virtual water trade likely pushed the Empire closer to the boundary of its water resources, led to an increase in import costs, and reduced its resilience to climate variability in the long-term. In addition to improving our understanding of Roman water resource management, our cost-distance based analysis illuminates how increases in import costs arising from climatic and population pressures are likely to be distributed in the future global virtual water network

Revisiting the ‘Great Levelling’: the limits of Piketty’s Capital and Ideology for understanding the rise of late 20th century inequality

In Capital and Ideology, Thomas Piketty returns to questions of historical inequality, not merely to fill in the gaps in the earlier, widely circulated and impactful Capital in the 21st Century, but to undertake a far more ambitious and nuanced project. Critics (Bhambra and Holmwood 2017; Moeller 2015) pointed out that in the previous book, Piketty’s consideration of the role of high concentrations wealth on inequality focused largely on a handful of relatively wealthy countries (the US, UK, France, Germany and Japan). More importantly, it did not consider the political and economic relationships, forged by European colonization and the trans-Atlantic slave trade, that helped create lasting inequalities in wealth, status, education and life expectancy around the globe. These oversights corresponded to significant methodological gaps, in which inequalities defined by social status and identity, including gender, race and caste, were largely left out of considerations that centred around economic and material disparities. Yet these different forms of inequalities are intimately connected, as gender wage gaps and racial wealth gaps in different parts of the world attest

The coming of the Greeks to Provence and Corsica: Y-chromosome models of archaic Greek colonization of the western Mediterranean

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The process of Greek colonization of the central and western Mediterranean during the Archaic and Classical Eras has been understudied from the perspective of population genetics. To investigate the Y chromosomal demography of Greek colonization in the western Mediterranean, Y-chromosome data consisting of 29 YSNPs and 37 YSTRs were compared from 51 subjects from Provence, 58 subjects from Smyrna and 31 subjects whose paternal ancestry derives from Asia Minor Phokaia, the ancestral embarkation port to the 6^thcentury BCE Greek colonies of Massalia (Marseilles) and Alalie (Aleria, Corsica).</p> <p>Results</p> <p>19% of the Phokaian and 12% of the Smyrnian representatives were derived for haplogroup E-V13, characteristic of the Greek and Balkan mainland, while 4% of the Provencal, 4.6% of East Corsican and 1.6% of West Corsican samples were derived for E-V13. An admixture analysis estimated that 17% of the Y-chromosomes of Provence may be attributed to Greek colonization. Using the following putative Neolithic Anatolian lineages: J2a-DYS445 = 6, G2a-M406 and J2a1b1-M92, the data predict a 0% Neolithic contribution to Provence from Anatolia. Estimates of colonial Greek vs. indigenous Celto-Ligurian demography predict a maximum of a 10% Greek contribution, suggesting a Greek male elite-dominant input into the Iron Age Provence population.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Given the origin of viniculture in Provence is ascribed to Massalia, these results suggest that E-V13 may trace the demographic and socio-cultural impact of Greek colonization in Mediterranean Europe, a contribution that appears to be considerably larger than that of a Neolithic pioneer colonization.</p

The Economic Archaeology of Roman Economic Performance

Recent years have witnessed a paradigm shift in the study of the Roman economy. Methodologically modern economic analysis is now far more acceptable than it once was, and archaeology has become the major source of empirical data for many questions. On the substantive side there is now a far clearer appreciation of the major changes that the Roman economy underwent, with substantial growth of population and aggregate production and even some improvements in standard of living, but followed by equally dramatic decline. This economic success was not limited to the imperial core, but also extended to the provinces

Are moral norms rooted in instincts? The sibling incest taboo as a case study

1. Are Moral Norms Rooted in Instincts? The Sibling Incest Taboo as a Case Study According to Westermarck's widely accepted explanation of the incest taboo, cultural prohibitions on sibling sex are rooted in an evolved biological disposition to feel sexual aversion toward our childhood coresidents. Bernard Williams posed the "representation problem" for Westermarck's theory: the content of the hypothesized instinct (avoid sex with childhood coresidents) is different from the content of the incest taboo (avoid sex with siblings)—thus the former cannot be causally responsible for the latter. Arthur Wolf posed the related "moralization problem": the instinct concerns personal behavior whereas the prohibition concerns everyone. This paper reviews possible ways of defending Westermarck's theory from the representation and moralization problems, and concludes that the theory is untenable. A recent study purports to support Westermarck's account by showing that unrelated children raised in the same peer groups on kibbutzim feel sexual aversion toward each other and morally oppose third-party intra-peer-group sex, but this study has been misinterpreted. I argue that the representation and moralization problems are general problems that could potentially undermine many popular evolutionary explanations of social/moral norms. The cultural evolution of morality is not tightly constrained by our biological endowment in the way some philosophers and evolutionary psychologists believe. 2. Power in Cultural Evolution and the Spread of Prosocial Norms According to cultural evolutionary theory in the tradition of Boyd and Richerson, cultural evolution is driven by individuals' learning biases, natural selection, and random forces. Learning biases lead people to preferentially acquire cultural variants with certain contents or in certain contexts. Natural selection favors individuals or groups with fitness-promoting variants. Durham (1991) argued that Boyd and Richerson's approach is based on a "radical individualism" that fails to recognize that cultural variants are often "imposed" on people regardless of their individual decisions. Fracchia and Lewontin (2005) raised a similar challenge, suggesting that the success of a variant is often determined by the degree of power backing it. With power, a ruler can impose beliefs or practices on a whole population by diktat, rendering all of the forces represented in cultural evolutionary models irrelevant. It is argued here, based on work by Boehm (1999, 2012), that, from at least the time of the early Middle Paleolithic, human bands were controlled by powerful coalitions of the majority that deliberately guided the development of moral norms to promote the common good. Cultural evolutionary models of the evolution of morality have been based on false premises. However, Durham (1991) and Fracchia and Lewontin's (2005) challenge does not undermine cultural evolutionary modeling in nonmoral domains. 3. A Debunking Explanation for Moral Progress According to "debunking arguments," our moral beliefs are explained by evolutionary and cultural processes that do not track objective, mind-independent moral truth. Therefore (the debunkers say) we ought to be skeptics about moral realism. Huemer counters that "moral progress"—the cross-cultural convergence on liberalism—cannot be explained by debunking arguments. According to him, the best explanation for this phenomenon is that people have come to recognize the objective correctness of liberalism. Although Huemer may be the first philosopher to make this explicit empirical argument for moral realism, the idea that societies will eventually converge on the same moral beliefs is a notable theme in realist thinking. Antirealists, on the other hand, often point to seemingly intractable cross-cultural moral disagreement as evidence against realism (the "argument from disagreement"). This paper argues that the trend toward liberalism is susceptible to a debunking explanation, being driven by two related non-truth-tracking processes. First, large numbers of people gravitate to liberal values for reasons of self-interest. Second, as societies become more prosperous and advanced, they become more effective at suppressing violence, and they create conditions where people are more likely to empathize with others, which encourages liberalism. The latter process is not truth tracking (or so this paper argues) because empathy-based moral beliefs are themselves susceptible to an evolutionary debunking argument. Cross-cultural convergence on liberalism per se does not support either realism or antirealism. 4. Realist Social Selection: How Gene–Culture Coevolution Can (but Probably Did Not) Track Mind-Independent Moral Truth Standard evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) in metaethics target moral beliefs by attributing them to natural selection. According to the debunkers, natural selection does not track mind-independent moral truth, so the discovery that our moral beliefs (realistically construed) were caused by natural selection renders them unjustified. I argue that our innate moral faculty is likely not the product of natural selection, but rather social selection. Social selection is a kind of gene–culture coevolution driven by the enforcement of collectively agreed-upon rules. Unlike natural selection, social selection is teleological and could potentially track mind-independent moral truth by a process that I term realist social selection: early humans could have acquired moral knowledge via reason and enforced rules based on that knowledge, thereby creating selection pressures that drove the evolution of our innate moral faculty. Given anthropological evidence that early humans designed rules with the conscious aim of preserving individual autonomy and advancing their collective interests, realist social selection appears to be an attractive theory for moral realists. However, I propose a new EDA to show that realist social selection is unlikely to have occurred. 5. A Debunking How-Possibly Explanation for the Principle of Universal Benevolence According to Street's evolutionary debunking argument (EDA), evolutionary biology provides "powerful" explanations of our "basic evaluative judgements." The discovery that our moral beliefs (realistically construed) are "saturated with evolutionary influence" renders them unjustified, since natural selection does not track mind-independent moral truth. De Lazari-Radek and Singer agree that most of our commonsense moral beliefs are debunked in the way Street claims, but they argue that belief in Sidgwick's principle of universal benevolence cannot be explained by natural selection and is therefore immune from EDAs. I argue that Street oversold the power of her evolutionary explanations, thus leaving an opening for realists to claim that moral beliefs with less powerful evolutionary explanations can escape debunking. In fact, all naturalistic theories of morality—including those invoked by Street and de Lazari-Radek and Singer—are speculative "how-possibly" explanations. If how-possibly explanations are not debunking, then both Street's (global) and de Lazari-Radek and Singer's (selective) debunking arguments fail. If how-possibly explanations are debunking, then selective debunkers must show that there is no plausible way that naturalistic forces could have produced the beliefs they want to defend. I argue that naturalistic how-possibly explanations can debunk moral beliefs by appealing to ontological parsimony, and provide a debunking how-possibly explanation for belief in the principle of universal benevolence