16 research outputs found

    making sense of concepts, research frameworks and results

    Get PDF
    Transnational public-private partnerships have become a popular theme in International Relations (IR) research. Such partnerships constitute a hybrid type of governance, in which non-state actors co-govern along with state actors for the provision of public goods, and thereby adopt governance functions that have formerly been the sole authority of sovereign states. Their recent proliferation is an expression of the contemporary reconfiguration of authority in world politics that poses essential questions on the effectiveness and the legitimacy of global governance. Significant issues are at stake concerning whether transnational public-private partnerships can in fact deliver public goods in an effective and legitimate way. This article surveys the literature with regard to three central issues: It addresses the questions why transnational public-private partnerships emerge, under which conditions they are effective, and under which conditions they are legitimate governance instruments. The article demonstrates that, at present, research on transnational public-private partnerships is theoretically under-informed and suffers from poor research designs. As is pointed out in the course of the article, future research on transnational public-private partnerships could benefit from well-known IR theories on international institutions, from compliance theories in particular. Applying these IR theories to partnerships opens up the possibility for the systematic comparative research that is necessary to obtain conclusive knowledge about transnational public-private partnerships

    Financing Maternal and Child Health—What Are the Limitations in Estimating Donor Flows and Resource Needs?

    Get PDF
    Marco Schäferhoff and colleagues critique funding estimates for the maternal and child health Millennium Development Goals, and make recommendations for improving the tracking of financing flows and estimating the costs of scaling up interventions for mothers and children

    Estimates of aid for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health: findings from application of the Muskoka2 method, 2002-17.

    Get PDF
    BACKGROUND: Four methods have previously been used to track aid for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health (RMNCH). At a meeting of donors and stakeholders in May, 2018, a single, agreed method was requested to produce accurate, predictable, transparent, and up-to-date estimates that could be used for analyses from both donor and recipient perspectives. Muskoka2 was developed to meet these needs. We describe Muskoka2 and present estimates of levels and trends in aid for RMNCH in 2002-17, with a focus on the latest estimates for 2017. METHODS: Muskoka2 is an automated algorithm that generates disaggregated estimates of aid for reproductive health, maternal and newborn health, and child health at the global, donor, and recipient-country levels. We applied Muskoka2 to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Creditor Reporting System (CRS) aid activities database to generate estimates of RMNCH disbursements in 2002-17. The percentage of disbursements that benefit RMNCH was determined using CRS purpose codes for all donors except Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; the UN Population Fund; and UNICEF; for which fixed percentages of aid were considered to benefit RMNCH. We analysed funding by donor for the 20 largest donors, by recipient-country income group, and by recipient for the 16 countries with the greatest RMNCH need, defined as the countries with the worst levels in 2015 on each of seven health indicators. FINDINGS: After 3 years of stagnation, reported aid for RMNCH reached 159billionin2017,thehighestamounteverreported.Amongdonorsreportinginboth2016and2017,aidincreasedby1015·9 billion in 2017, the highest amount ever reported. Among donors reporting in both 2016 and 2017, aid increased by 10% (1·4 billion) to 154billionbetween2016and2017.ChildhealthreceivedalmosthalfofRMNCHdisbursementsin2017(4615·4 billion between 2016 and 2017. Child health received almost half of RMNCH disbursements in 2017 (46%, 7·4 billion), followed by reproductive health (34%, 54billion),andmaternalandnewbornhealth(195·4 billion), and maternal and newborn health (19%, 3·1 billion). The USA (58billion)andtheUK(5·8 billion) and the UK (1·6 billion) were the largest bilateral donors, disbursing 46% of all RMNCH funding in 2017 (including shares of their core contributions to multilaterals). The Global Fund and Gavi were the largest multilateral donors, disbursing 17billionand1·7 billion and 1·5 billion, respectively, for RMNCH from their core budgets. The proportion of aid for RMNCH received by low-income countries increased from 31% in 2002 to 52% in 2017. Nigeria received 7% (11billion)ofallaidforRMNCHin2017,followedbyEthiopia(61·1 billion) of all aid for RMNCH in 2017, followed by Ethiopia (6%, 876 million), Kenya (5%, 754million),andTanzania(5754 million), and Tanzania (5%, 751 million). INTERPRETATION: Muskoka2 retains the speed, transparency, and donor buy-in of the G8's previous Muskoka approach and incorporates eight innovations to improve precision. Although aid for RMNCH increased in 2017, low-income and middle-income countries still experience substantial funding gaps and threats to future funding. Maternal and newborn health receives considerably less funding than reproductive health or child health, which is a persistent issue requiring urgent attention. FUNDING: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; Partnership for Maternal, Newborn & Child Health

    Financing of International Collective Action for Epidemic and Pandemic Preparedness.

    Get PDF
    The global pandemic response has typically followed cycles of panic followed by neglect. We are now, once again, in a phase of neglect, leaving the world highly vulnerable to massive loss of life and economic shocks from natural or human-made epidemics and pandemics. Quantifying the size of the losses caused by large-scale outbreaks is challenging because the epidemiological and economic research in this field is still at an early stage. Research on the 1918 influenza H1N1 pandemic and recent epidemics and pandemics has shown a range of estimated losses (panel).1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6 ; 7 A limitation in assessing the economic costs of outbreaks is that they only capture the impact on income. Fan and colleagues8 recently addressed this limitation by estimating the “inclusive” cost of pandemics: the sum of the cost in lost income and a dollar valuation of the cost of early death. They found that for Ebola and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the true (“inclusive”) costs are two to three times the income loss. For extremely serious pandemics such as that of influenza in 1918, the inclusive costs are over five times income loss. The inclusive costs of the next severe influenza pandemic could be US570billioneachyearor07570 billion each year or 0·7% of global income (range 0·4–1·0%)8—an economic threat similar to that of global warming, which is expected to cost 0·2–2·0% of global income annually. Given the magnitude of the threat, we call for scaled-up financing of international collective action for epidemic and pandemic preparedness. Two planks of preparedness must be strengthened. The first is public health capacity—including human and animal disease surveillance—as a first line of defence.9 Animal surveillance is important since most emerging infectious diseases with outbreak potential originate in animals. Rigorous external assessment of national capabilities is critical; WHO developed the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool specifically for this purpose.10 Financing for this first plank will largely be through domestic resources, but supplementary donor financing to low-income, high-risk countries is also needed. The second plank is financing global efforts to accelerate research and development (R&D) of vaccines, drugs, and diagnostics for outbreak control, and to strengthen the global and regional outbreak preparedness and response system. These two international collective action activities are underfunded.11 Medical countermeasures against many emerging infectious diseases are currently missing. We need greater investment in development of vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics to prevent potential outbreaks from becoming humanitarian crises. The new Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), which aims to mobilise 1 billion over 5 years, is developing vaccines against known emerging infectious diseases as well as platforms for rapid development of vaccines against outbreaks of unknown origin. The WHO R&D Blueprint for Action to Prevent Epidemics12 is a new mechanism for coordinating and prioritising the development of drugs and diagnostics for emerging infectious diseases. Consolidating and enhancing donor support for these new initiatives would be an efficient way to channel resources aimed at improving global outbreak preparedness and response. Crucial components of the global and regional system for outbreak control include surge capacity (eg, the ability to urgently deploy human resources); providing technical guidance to countries in the event of an outbreak; and establishing a coordinated, interlinked global, regional, and national surveillance system. These activities are the remit of several essential WHO financing envelopes that all face major funding shortfalls. The Contingency Fund for Emergencies finances surge outbreak response for up to 3 months. The fund has a capitalisation target of 100millionofflexiblevoluntarycontributions,whichneedstobereplenishedwithabout100 million of flexible voluntary contributions, which needs to be replenished with about 25–50 million annually, depending on the extent of the outbreak in any given year. However, as of April 30, 2017, only 3765millionhadbeencontributed,withanadditional37·65 million had been contributed, with an additional 4 million in pledges.13 The WHO Health Emergencies and Health Systems Preparedness Programmes face an annual shortfall of 225millioninfundingtheirepidemicandpandemicpreventionandcontrolactivities.14Previoushealthemergencieshaveshownthatitcantaketimetoorganiseglobalcollectiveactionandprovidefinancingtothenationalandlocallevel.Insuchsituations,aglobalmechanismshouldofferarapidinjectionofliquiditytoaffectedcountries.TheWorldBank2˘7sPandemicEmergencyFinancingFacility(PEF)isaproposedglobalinsurancemechanismforpandemicemergencies.15Itaimstoprovidesurgefundingforresponseeffortstohelprespondtorare,highburdendiseaseoutbreaks,preventingthemfrombecomingmoredeadlyandcostlypandemics.ThePEFcurrentlyproposesacoverageof225 million in funding their epidemic and pandemic prevention and control activities.14 Previous health emergencies have shown that it can take time to organise global collective action and provide financing to the national and local level. In such situations, a global mechanism should offer a rapid injection of liquidity to affected countries. The World Bank\u27s Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) is a proposed global insurance mechanism for pandemic emergencies.15 It aims to provide surge funding for response efforts to help respond to rare, high-burden disease outbreaks, preventing them from becoming more deadly and costly pandemics. The PEF currently proposes a coverage of 500 million for the insurance window; increasing the current coverage will require additional donor commitments. In addition, the PEF has a $50–100 million replenishable cash window. As the world\u27s health ministers meet this month for the World Health Assembly, we propose five key ways to help prevent mortality and economic shocks from disease outbreaks. First, to accelerate development of new technologies to control outbreaks, donors should expand their financing for CEPI and support the WHO R&D Blueprint for Action to Prevent Epidemics. Second, funding gaps in the WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies and the WHO Health Emergencies Programme should be urgently filled and the PEF should be fully financed. Third, all nations should support their own and other countries\u27 national preparedness efforts, including committing to the JEE process. Fourth, we believe it would be valuable to create and maintain a regional and country-level pandemic risk and preparedness index. This index could potentially be used as a way to review preparedness in International Monetary Fund article IV consultations (regular country reports by staff to its Board). Finally, we call for a new global effort to develop long-term national, regional, and global investment plans to create a world secure from the threat of devastation from outbreaks. This article summarises the recommendations of a workshop held at the National Academy of Medicine, Washington, DC, USA, co-hosted by the Center for Policy Impact in Global Health at Duke University, Durham, NC, USA and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, Oslo, Norway. Participants\u27 travel and accommodation were supported by the Center for Policy Impact in Global Health. BO is a consultant to Metabiota, a private company engaged in infectious disease risk modelling and analytical services. In this capacity, he has led the development of an index measuring national capacity to respond to epidemic and pandemic disease outbreaks

    Developing new health technologies for neglected diseases: a pipeline portfolio review and cost model [version 1; referees: 1 approved, 2 approved with reservations]

    Get PDF
    Background:  Funding for product development for neglected diseases fell from 2009-2015, other than a short-term injection of Ebola funding. One impediment to mobilizing resources is a lack of information on product candidates, the estimated costs to move them through the pipeline, and the likelihood of specific launches. This study aimed to help fill these information gaps. Methods: We conducted a pipeline portfolio review to identify current candidates for 35 neglected diseases. Using an adapted version of the Portfolio to Impact (P2I) financial modelling tool, we estimated the costs to move these candidates through the pipeline over the next decade and the likely launches. Since the current pipeline is unlikely to yield several critical products, we estimated the costs to develop a set of priority “missing” products. Results: We found 685 product candidates for neglected diseases as of August 31, 2017; 538 candidates met inclusion criteria for input into the model. It would cost about 16.3billion(range16.3 billion (range 13.4-19.8B) to move these candidates through the pipeline, with three-quarters of the costs incurred in the first 5 years, resulting in about 128 (89-160) expected product launches.  Based on the current pipeline, there would be very few launches of complex new chemical entities; launches of highly efficacious vaccines for HIV, tuberculosis, or malaria would be unlikely. Estimated additional costs to launch one of each of 18 key missing products range from 13.6B13.6B-21.8B, depending on product complexity. Over the next 5 years, total estimated costs to move current candidates through the pipeline and develop these 18 missing products would be around 4.55.8B/year.Conclusions:Sincecurrentannualglobalspendingonproductdevelopmentisabout4.5-5.8B/year. Conclusions: Since current annual global spending on product development is about 3B, this study suggests the annual funding gap over the next 5 years is at least $1.5-2.8B, which is probably an underestimate. The current portfolio is not balanced across health needs

    Piloting the Affordable Medicines Facility-malaria: what will success look like?

    No full text
    The Affordable Medicines Facility-malaria is an innovative financing mechanism, managed by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. This initiative aims to increase the use of artemisinin-based combination therapies for treating malaria. A pilot is underway in eight countries to determine whether the mechanism reduces the consumer price of these drugs and increases their availability in public and private outlets, their market share and their use. To evaluate the pilot, an analysis was done to estimate predetermined benchmarks of success at 1 and 2 years. The analysis used a mixed-methods approach, triangulating data from a literature review with information from 33 interviews with experts. A sensitivity analysis and other methods were used to verify the results. Benchmarks used to determine success include an increase in availability of artemisinin-based combination therapies of 40 percentage points from baseline, and an increase in their use of 10-15 percentage points from baseline at year 2. These benchmarks were based on evidence that national public health programmes aimed at increasing the use of a specific health commodity in developing countries have generally achieved only modest changes in use within a 2-year time frame. Evaluation should also take individual country contexts into account
    corecore