95 research outputs found
La mejor versiĂłn de nosotros mismos
Una cuestiĂłn importante que ha sido discutida en los Ășltimos años es la de en base a quĂ© podemos decir que estamos justificados a afirmar la verdad de un enunciado. Tanto los pragmatistas americanos como los wittgeusteinianos han sembrado dudas sobre la existencia de criterios trascendentes para determinar cuĂĄndo un enunciado estĂĄ garantizado. En este artĂculo desarrollarĂ© la polĂ©mica que en la Ășltima dĂ©cada han protagonizado Putnam y Rorty. PresentarĂ© dudas y razones para cuestionar las soluciones propuestas por ambos autores
Book Review - Happiness in Kantâs Practical Philosophy: Morality, Indirect Duties, and Welfare Rights by Alice Pinheiro Walla (Lexington Books, 2022)
Kantian forgiveness: fallibility, guilt and the need to become a better person: reply to Blöser
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Springer in Philosophia on 10/03/2020, available online: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00188-4
The accepted version of the publication may differ from the final published version.In âHuman Fallibility and the Need for Forgivenessâ, Claudia Blöser (Philosophia 47:1-19, 2019) has proposed a Kantian account of our reasons to forgive that situates our moral fallibility as their ultimate ground. Blöser argues that Kantâs duty to be forgiving is grounded on the need to be relieved from the burden of our moral failure (guilt), a need that we all have in virtue of our moral fallible nature, regardless of whether or not we have repented. Blöser claims that Kantâs proposal yields a plausible account of the normative status of forgiveness. Kant classifies the duty to be forgiving as a wide (imperfect) duty of virtue, and according to Blöser, this means that Kantian forgiveness is elective in the sense that forgiveness is good in general (i.e. an attitude that we have moral reason to adopt) but without being obligatory in each particular case. In the course of presenting her own reconstruction of Kantâs account, Blöser also objects to some aspects of an interpretation of Kantâs theory of forgiveness which I had previously defended in my paper âForgiveness and Moral Developmentâ (Philosophia 44:1029â1055, 2016). Although there are a lot of points of agreement between our interpretations, the aim of this article is to highlight four key points of disagreement. These issues are worth discussing because they have implications not only for a plausible interpretation of a recognisable Kantian account of forgiveness but also for wider debates in the contemporary literature on forgiveness. First, I show that Kant is not committed to a form of weak situationism as suggested by Blöser and that Kantâs grounding of the duty to be forgiving does not appeal to moral luck. Second, I argue that although Kantâs duty to be forgiving is elective in one sense of the term, it is not elective in another important sense of the term, and that it is in fact better not to interpret Kantian imperfect duties as being elective. Third, I show that awareness of moral fallibility per se does not provide a morally appropriate ground for forgiveness and offer an alternative reconstruction of Kantâs account- in which fallibility plays a role, but it is not the main reason to forgive. Finally, I argue that Blöserâs account of the need to be forgiven is not recognisable Kantian because, from a Kantian perspective, repentance is a necessary condition for the desirability and, in fact, the very possibility of ameliorating our own guilt.Published onlin
Reliability of Motivation and the Moral Value of Actions
Kant famously made a distinction between actions from duty and actions in conformity with duty claiming that only the former are morally worthy. Kantâs argument in support of this thesis is taken to rest on the claim that only the motive of duty leads non-accidentally or reliably to moral actions. However, many critics of Kant have claimed that other motives such as sympathy and benevolence can also lead to moral actions reliably, and that Kantâs thesis is false. In addition, many readers of Kant find the claim that we should deny moral worth to a dutiful action performed from friendly inclination highly counterintuitive. Moreover, Kantian commentators disagree about the status of actions in conformity with duty, some claim that these can be taken as equally morally worthy as those performed from duty, while others argue that they are not even permissible.
It has also been claimed that Kantâs theory of moral worth should be related to the theory of the Gesinnung developed in the Religion. Thus, some authors claim that, in order for an action to possess moral worth, the agent has to be unconditionally committed to morality, that is, the agent must possess a virtuous character or good fundamental maxim (i.e. a good Gesinnung). However, according to Kantâs radical evil thesis (that is, the thesis that man is evil by nature ), the default position for man is to possess an evil Gesinnung, i.e. a Gesinnung which is only conditionally committed to morality insofar as morality does not demand a great sacrifice of our own happiness. So, an unwelcome consequence of this line of interpretation is that in Kantian ethics morally worthy actions become very rare indeed.
The paper is divided in two parts. The first part aims to clarify why Kant thought that only actions from duty are morally worthy, replying to some common objections against Kantâs view. I argue that Kantâs non-accidental condition should not be understood in terms of reliability because such interpretation is incompatible with Kantâs theory of motivation and rational agency. I propose an alternative interpretation which supports Kantâ s claim that only the motive of duty leads nonaccidently to dutiful actions, and thus only actions from duty possess moral worth. I end by showing that although actions in conformity with duty are worthless from the moral point of view, they are not (in many cases) impermissible. The first part concludes that the criterion for the permissibility of actions is different to the criterion for the ascription of moral worth. Thus, rightness, which pertains to actions performed on maxims that can be willed as universal laws, and moral worth, which pertains to actions performed from a sense of duty, should be understood as two different levels of moral assessment.
The second part of the paper examines Kantâs conception of virtue with the aim of showing that although only agents with a virtuous character (good Gesinnung) will reliably act from duty, a person with an evil character (evil Gesinnung) could on frequent occasions act from duty. I argue that we should not deny moral worth to actions performed from duty even when the agent has an evil Gesinnung. Goodness of Gesinnung is not a necessary condition of the action of an agent possessing moral worth; reliability of motivation is necessary for the ascription of virtue but not for the ascription of moral worth. It follows that virtue, which refers to the agentâs character or fundamental maxim (i.e. the agentâs Gesinnung), and moral worth are also two different levels of moral assessment. The paper concludes that three levels of moral assessment can be distinguished in Kantâs ethical system: (i) rightness, (ii) moral worth and (iii) moral virtue. Moral virtue is the highest level of moral perfection for a human being. Striving towards virtue requires constant progress and effort and ultimately a ârevolution of the heart.â The important point is that even when we are still striving to achieve virtue (i.e. an unconditional commitment to morality), we can ascribe moral worth to actions performed by a genuine sense of duty. It turns out that, contrary to many influential interpretations, Kantian ethics is not merely concerned with the rightness or wrongness of particular actions nor is Kantian ethics primarily an ethic of virtue. Instead, Kantâs ethical system is complex and allows for different levels of moral assessment in which both an action-centred and agent-centred perspective can be integrated
Interactive expertise in solo and joint musical performance
The paper presents two empirical cases of expert musicians-a classical string quartet and a solo, free improvisation saxophonist-to analyze the explanatory power and reach of theories in the field of expertise studies and joint action. We argue that neither the positions stressing top-down capacities of prediction, planning or perspective-taking, nor those emphasizing bottom-up embodied processes of entrainment, motor-responses and emotional sharing can do justice to the empirical material. We then turn to hybrid theories in the expertise debate and interactionist accounts of cognition. Attempting to strengthen and extend them, we offer \u27Arch\u27: an overarching conception of musical interaction as an externalized, cognitive scaffold that encompasses high and low-level cognition, internal and external processes, as well as the shared normative space including the musical materials in which the musicians perform. In other words, \u27Arch\u27 proposes interaction as a multivariate multimodal overarching scaffold necessary to explain not only cases of joint performance, but equally of solo improvisation
Las prĂĄcticas de hablar, nombrar e interpretar: Observaciones sobre el interpretacionismo de Alberto Moretti
In this paper I argue that the notion of interpretation presented by Alberto Moretti in âLa unidad proposicionalâ (and other texts) poses some philosophical and metaphilosophical problems. After presenting the key ideas that characterize the interpretative practice as Moretti describes it, I criticize its incompatibility with naturalism âone that understands interpretational practices in terms of natural capacities with phylogenetic and ontogenetic historiesâ and Morettiâs commitment to ineffabilism regarding the foundations of interpretative practices. I argue that if we abandon the idea that intentional capacities always involve conceptual content, a central commitment of Morettiâs interpretationist strategy, we can make room for a soft naturalistic understanding of interpretational capacities that is also pluralistic about the conditions for a practice to be linguistic and non-ineffabilist about its origins.En este texto se argumenta que la nociĂłn de interpretaciĂłn desarrollada por Alberto Moretti en âLa unidad proposicionalâ (y otros textos) presenta algunos problemas filosĂłficos y metafilosĂłficos. DespuĂ©s de presentar las ideas centrales de la prĂĄctica interpretativa que defiende Moretti, se cuestionan en particular su incompatibilidad con un tratamiento naturalista de las capacidades de hablar e interpretar, que las entiende como capacidades naturales con historias filo y ontogenĂ©ticas, y el hecho de que se compromete con una posiciĂłn inefabilista acerca de los fundamentos de dicha prĂĄctica. Se argumenta que el abandono de la idea de que las capacidades intencionales siempre presuponen la manipulaciĂłn de contenidos conceptuales, como postula la estrategia interpretativa, abre las puertas para un naturalismo acerca de las capacidades de hablar, nombrar e interpretar. Este naturalismo es ademĂĄs, pluralista respecto de los rasgos necesarios y/o suficientes que hacen de una prĂĄctica una prĂĄctica lingĂŒĂstica, y no inefabilista acerca de su fundamento
Remembrance beyond forgiveness
© 2022 The Author. This is an open access book chapter available under a Creative Commons licence, published by Springer in Satne, P., Scheiter, K.M. (eds.) Conflict and Resolution: The Ethics of Forgiveness, Revenge, and Punishment: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77807-1_16I argue that political forgiveness is sometimes, but not always, compatible with public commemoration of politically motivated wrongdoing. I start by endorsing the claim that commemorating serious past wrongdoing has moral value and imposes moral demands on key actors within post-conflict societies. I am concerned with active commemoration, that is, the deliberate acts of bringing victims and the wrong done to them to public attention. The main issue is whether political forgiveness requires forgetting and conversely whether remembrance can be an impediment to political forgiveness. The notion of political forgiveness, its definition, very possibility and desirability are contentious issues in the contemporary literature. I develop a multidimensional account of political forgiveness with a core element. The core element of political forgiveness involves taking a non-adversarial stance towards perpetrators in the sense of committing to stop holding their wrongdoing against them. The core element of forgiveness is usually combined with other attitudes and practices, which are appropriate depending on the circumstances. This is due to the fact that there are different ways of holding a wrong against an offender. I argue that forgiving perpetrators is not compatible with continue to punishing them, refusing to reconcile with them, and/or reminding them of their misdeed if perpetrators refuse to accept punishment, deny the importance of commemorating the past or wish to reconcile against the victimâs desires. I show that some forms of political forgiveness are not morally legitimate because they conflict with moral demands to punish perpetrators, commemorate atrocities and respect victims. This conclusion is less alarming than it might initially seem because the refusal to forgive politically motivated wrongdoing does not necessarily lead to the perpetuation of violence and conflict. I briefly draw on the example of Argentina in order to show how some forms of political un-forgiveness can be morally legitimate and effective ways for victims to uphold these demands.Published versio
Forgiveness and punishment in Kant's moral system
This is an accepted manuscript of a book chapter published by University of Wales Press in Kantâs Doctrine of Right in the Twenty-first Century edited by Larry Krasnoff, Nuria Sanchez Madrid, Paula Satne. For re-use please see the publisher's terms and conditions
Forgiveness and Punishment in Kant's Moral System
Forgiveness as a positive response to wrongdoing is a widespread phenomenon that plays a role in the moral lives of most persons. Surprisingly, Kant has very little to say on the matter. Although Kant dedicates considerable space to discussing punishment, wrongdoing and grace, he addresses the issues of human forgiveness directly only in some short passages in the Lectures on Ethics and in one passage of the Metaphysics of Morals. As noted by Sussman, the TL passage, however, betrays some ambivalence. Kant establishes a duty of virtue to be forgiving (TL, 6:460), yet he immediately warns against its excess: meek toleration of recurrent wrongs could manifest a lack of self-respect and a violation of a duty to oneself (TL, 6:461). Sussman claims that this ambivalence ultimately arises from the fact that forgiveness sits uncomfortably in Kantâs moral thought. First, forgiveness has an âineluctably elective aspectâ that makes it, to a certain extent, arbitrary and dependent on particular features of the forgiverâs psychology and, as such, in tension with Kantâs central claims that human beings are autonomous agents capable of determining their own moral status. Second, according to Sussman, Kantâs moral retributivism, i.e. âthe particular moral position that every moral wrong against another deserves punishment of the wrongdoerâ seems to be in tension with the possibility of a âtruly redemptive forgivenessâ. Moreover, forgiveness also seems to be in tension with a passage of the Religion in which Kant argues that the moral guilt from our original evil disposition cannot be understood as a debt or liability that can be compensated, erased, transferred or otherwise wiped out by others (Rel, 6:72). Thus, to the extent that forgiveness might be thought to involve the forgoing of moral guilt, it seems incompatible with Kantâs views on culpability and punishment.
This chapter seeks to clarify Kantâs views on forgiveness in order to show that, although not often appreciated, personal forgiveness plays an important role in the lives of ordinary human agents as understood by Kant. In particular, I aim to show there is a conception of forgiveness available to Kant that is not incompatible with Kantâs views of punishment and culpability. In Section 1, I argue that, for Kant, far from being merely âelective,â forgiveness is, under certain conditions, morally required. I provide a brief summary of an interpretation of Kantâs theory of forgiveness that I have defended in recently published work , in order to argue that Kantâs duty to be forgiving should be understood as an imperfect duty of virtue which is conditional on repentance. Kant is not ambivalent about this duty because he maintains that when the relevant conditions are not met, we have a perfect duty to ourselves not to forgive unrepentant wrongdoers. The TL passage thus identifies two different duties. In Section 2, I show that forgiveness, as conceptualised by Kant, does not require the forgoing of punishment or the overcoming of moral guilt and that this could, in fact, be seen as an attractive feature of Kantâs position. I end by offering a very brief assessment of Kantâs views
Reliability of motivation and the moral value of actions
Kant is often interpreted as meaning that (a) only actions performed out of duty have moral worth, while (b) actions in conformity with duty are evil or morally inadmissible. Furthermore, it is often claimed that c) having a good Gesinnung (that is, a virtuous character) is the necessary condition for the action of an agent has moral worth. This means that only deeds of duty performed by a virtuous agent can be considered to have moral value. This article argues that this influential interpretation is not correct, showing that Kant is committed to (a) but not to (b) or (c). It is shown that such actions can be right without having moral value, and actions can have moral value, even if the agent does not have a virtuous character. It follows from this that, in Kant's system, one can distinguish three forms of moral appreciation: (i) virtue that is reserved for agents who have good character, or Gesinnung, (ii) moral value that belongs to action. actions performed out of a conscience of duty, and (iii) correction which pertains to actions performed on the basis of maxims that can be willed to be universal laws. This means that Kantian ethics is not only concerned with the correctness or incorrectness of certain actions, nor that it is, above all, an ethics of virtue. Rather, Kant's system is complex and allows for different forms of moral appreciation, in which both an action-centered and an agent-centered perspective can be integrated. or Gesinnung, (ii) moral value that pertains to actions performed out of a conscience of duty, and (iii) correctness that pertains to actions performed on the basis of maxims that can be expected to be laws universal. This means that Kantian ethics is not only concerned with the correctness or incorrectness of certain actions, nor that it is, above all, an ethics of virtue. Rather, Kant's system is complex and allows for different forms of moral appreciation, in which both an action-centered and an agent-centered perspective can be integrated. or Gesinnung, (ii) moral value that pertains to actions performed out of a conscience of duty, and (iii) correctness that pertains to actions performed on the basis of maxims that can be expected to be laws universal. This means that Kantian ethics is not only concerned with the correctness or incorrectness of certain actions, nor that it is, above all, an ethics of virtue. Rather, Kant's system is complex and allows for different forms of moral appreciation, in which both an action-centered and an agent-centered perspective can be integrated. This means that Kantian ethics is not only concerned with the correctness or incorrectness of certain actions, nor that it is, above all, an ethics of virtue. Rather, Kant's system is complex and allows for different forms of moral appreciation, in which both an action-centered and an agent-centered perspective can be integrated. This means that Kantian ethics is not only concerned with the correctness or incorrectness of certain actions, nor that it is, above all, an ethics of virtue. Rather, Kant's system is complex and allows for different forms of moral appreciation, in which both an action-centered and an agent-centered perspective can be integrated
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