Informalidad empresarial en Colombia: alternativas para impulsar la productividd, el empleo y los ingresos

Este documento estudia los determinantes de la informalidad empresarial en Colombia. El análisis se realiza tanto cuantitativa, como cualitativamente. El primero se desarrolla con base en el Censo Empresarial de Cali y Yumbo - 2005, el cual permite estudiar por primera vez la incidencia y los determinantes de la informalidad en empresas de cualquier tamaño. Los resultados indican que, en las microempresas, la informalidad es un fenómeno generalizado y que, en muchos casos, tiende a desvanecerse con el crecimiento de las empresas. Por otra parte, dentro del grupo de empresas grandes y medianas la informalidad obedece a otro tipo de factores, entre los que se destacan los altos costos de la formalidad y el desconocimiento de los beneficios a operar formalmente. Por otro lado, el análisis cualitativo se desarrolla con base a sesiones de grupo dirigidas a empresarios formales e informales, lo cual facilita estudiar aspectos que no pueden ser identificados sólo con análisis de cifras y estadísticas. Con base a los resultados de estos ejercicios, combinados con un análisis exhaustivo de los incentivos gubernamentales y una descripción de la experiencia internacional en torno a este fenómeno, se formula un grupo de recomendaciones de política dirigidas a aumentar los niveles de productividad empresarial en el país y, por esta vía, incrementar los niveles de empleo formal y de ingresos de los trabajadores y de sus familias. Éstas están orientadas principalmente a aumentar los beneficios netos de la formalidad.Abstract: This document studies the determinants of firm informality in Colombia based both on a quantitative and a qualitative approach. The former is carried out using the Cali and Yumbo Enterprise Census for the year 2005, which allowed, for the first time, to analyze informality over firms of any size. Estimations show that incidence of informality among of small firms (microempresas") is strikingly large and, many times, tends to disappear with its growth. Informality in larger firms, on the other hand, is associated to other factors, such as high formality costs and lack of knowledge about the benefits of being formal. The qualitative analysis was carried out based on a series of focus groups directed to informal and formal employers. These sessions facilitated the identification of their perceptions around this phenomenon, providing important "unobserved" clues as to why are they formal or informal. Based on the results of these exercises, plus the analyses of international experience and some governmental incentives related to informality, some policy recommendations were formulated to increase the pace of productivity growth in Colombia and, through this channel, to increase formal employment and labor incomes. These recommendations seek to raise the net benefits of formality in Colombia."Informalidad, informalidad empresarial, Colombia, costo-beneficio.Informality, firm informality, Colombia, cost-benefit.

La informalidad empresarial y sus consecuencias: ¿Son los CAE una solución?

Este documento estudia las consecuencias de la informalidad tanto sobre las empresas informales como sobre las formales y analiza el impacto de los Centros de Atención Empresarial (CAE) sobre la creación de empresas en las seis ciudades principales de Colombia. El análisis se desarrolla con base en datos de la Encuesta 123 realizada en el año 2001, el Censo Empresarial de Cali y Yumbo de 2005, la Encuesta de Clima de Inversión realizada en el 2007 por el Banco Mundial, y las series de matrículas mercantiles. Los resultados permiten ver que las empresas informales tienen en promedio menor acceso al crédito y a programas de capacitación, mayores problemas con el servicio técnico y menores utilidades por trabajador que las empresas formales con características similares. Asimismo, se encuentra que la introducción de los CAE incrementó el registro de empresas formales en 5,2%. Abstract: This document studies the consequences of informality over informal and formal firms as well as the impact of the new program for firms´ registration -CAEs- created recently in the six principal cities of Colombia. The analysis uses data from the 2001 Encuesta 123, the 2005 Enterprise Census of Cali and Yumbo, the 2007 Investment Climate Survey and firms´ registration data from the Chambers of Commerce (matrículas mercantiles"). Estimations show that informal firms face on average loweraccess to credit and training programs, higher problems with technical service and lower profits per worker than formal firms. In addition, formal registration of new firms increased by 5.2 percent after the introduction of CAE."Informalidad, informalidad empresarial, Colombia.Informality, firms´ informality, Colombia.

Replication Data for: "Is Murder Bad for Business? Evidence From Colombia"

Replication Data for: "Is Murder Bad for Business? Evidence From Colombia

Essays on the Economics of Crime

These essays contribute towards our understanding of the consequences of illegal behavior on economic outcomes and of the role of public policy in addressing and containing those consequences more effectively. This dissertation is composed of three chapters. Chapter 1 -- Is murder bad for business and real income? The effects of violent crime on local economic activity: studies the channels through which violence (measured by the homicide rate) impacts economic outcomes, and thus whether investments in violence reduction have significant economic returns. I estimate the effects of violent crime on local wages, prices, and production using unique firm-level panel data and rich information on consumer prices in Colombia. To estimate causal effects, I exploit exogenous reductions in violent crime driven by U.S. international anti-drug expenditures; these resulted in greater violence reductions in municipalities with higher political competition (namely closely contested elections) in the past. I find that higher homicide rates lower housing rents and increase prices. Wages also increase, but only for white-collar workers. Putting all these forces together, real wages fall for both types of worker, but more so for blue-collar workers. These estimates, in combination with a theoretical model, allow me to compute that when homicide rates increase 10%, white- and blue-collar workers' welfare (measured as utility of consumption) is reduced 2.8% and 6.3%, respectively. Consequently, violent crime increases inequality as measured by real incomes or by welfare. Aggregate production also falls 2.1%, mostly because firms reduce production, although there is also a small decrease in the number of firms. Chapter 2-- On the consequences of enforcement on illegal drug production: investigates the effects of the biggest antidrug program ever applied in a drug producing country. I use satellite information on the exact location of coca crops between 2000 and 2010 in Colombia to identify the effects of spraying herbicides on coca production. I exploit the variation created by restrictions to spraying in protected areas (i.e., indigenous territories and natural parks) and the time variation of U.S. international antidrug expenditures to identify the effects of the program. My results suggest that coca cultivation is reduced by 0.07 hectares per additional hectare sprayed. However, spraying induces unintended negative effects on the welfare conditions of the treated areas and spillover effects in neighboring countries. Despite the reduction under coca cultivation, cocaine production remains steady due to a sharp increase on cocaine yields. In sum, the program's costs are by far higher than its potential benefits.Chapter 3 -- On the effects of enforcement on illegal markets: evidence from a quasi-experiment: studies the effects of enforcement on illegal behavior in the context of a large aerial spraying program designed to curb coca cultivation in Colombia. In 2006, Colombia pledged not to spray a 10km band around the frontier with Ecuador due to diplomatic frictions. We exploit this variation to estimate the effect of spraying on cultivation by regression discontinuity around the 10 km threshold and conditional differences in differences, using satellite data. Our results suggest that spraying one hectare reduces coca cultivation by 0.018 to 0.034 hectares, but these effects are too small to make spraying a cost-effective policy

Essays on the Economics of Crime

These essays contribute towards our understanding of the consequences of illegal behavior on economic outcomes and of the role of public policy in addressing and containing those consequences more effectively. This dissertation is composed of three chapters. Chapter 1 -- Is murder bad for business and real income? The effects of violent crime on local economic activity: studies the channels through which violence (measured by the homicide rate) impacts economic outcomes, and thus whether investments in violence reduction have significant economic returns. I estimate the effects of violent crime on local wages, prices, and production using unique firm-level panel data and rich information on consumer prices in Colombia. To estimate causal effects, I exploit exogenous reductions in violent crime driven by U.S. international anti-drug expenditures; these resulted in greater violence reductions in municipalities with higher political competition (namely closely contested elections) in the past. I find that higher homicide rates lower housing rents and increase prices. Wages also increase, but only for white-collar workers. Putting all these forces together, real wages fall for both types of worker, but more so for blue-collar workers. These estimates, in combination with a theoretical model, allow me to compute that when homicide rates increase 10%, white- and blue-collar workers' welfare (measured as utility of consumption) is reduced 2.8% and 6.3%, respectively. Consequently, violent crime increases inequality as measured by real incomes or by welfare. Aggregate production also falls 2.1%, mostly because firms reduce production, although there is also a small decrease in the number of firms. Chapter 2-- On the consequences of enforcement on illegal drug production: investigates the effects of the biggest antidrug program ever applied in a drug producing country. I use satellite information on the exact location of coca crops between 2000 and 2010 in Colombia to identify the effects of spraying herbicides on coca production. I exploit the variation created by restrictions to spraying in protected areas (i.e., indigenous territories and natural parks) and the time variation of U.S. international antidrug expenditures to identify the effects of the program. My results suggest that coca cultivation is reduced by 0.07 hectares per additional hectare sprayed. However, spraying induces unintended negative effects on the welfare conditions of the treated areas and spillover effects in neighboring countries. Despite the reduction under coca cultivation, cocaine production remains steady due to a sharp increase on cocaine yields. In sum, the program's costs are by far higher than its potential benefits.Chapter 3 -- On the effects of enforcement on illegal markets: evidence from a quasi-experiment: studies the effects of enforcement on illegal behavior in the context of a large aerial spraying program designed to curb coca cultivation in Colombia. In 2006, Colombia pledged not to spray a 10km band around the frontier with Ecuador due to diplomatic frictions. We exploit this variation to estimate the effect of spraying on cultivation by regression discontinuity around the 10 km threshold and conditional differences in differences, using satellite data. Our results suggest that spraying one hectare reduces coca cultivation by 0.018 to 0.034 hectares, but these effects are too small to make spraying a cost-effective policy

New evidence on immigration and crime

This chapter explores recent advances in the economics literature that studies the relationship between immigration and crime. We focus primarily on recent studies employing econometric methods to uncover causal relationships, but we will also cover some earlier, descriptive analyses

Who Does Not Like Migrants? Individual Demographics and Attitudes Towards Migration

We exploit the quasi-random settlement of refugees in Sweden between 1985 and 1994 to examine the characteristics of individuals showing a disproportionate negative response to migration flows andwhether these responses differ when the arrival of refugees occurred concurrently with economic shocks. We document that, on average, migration shocks translate to lower support for immigration. These responses are disproportionately driven by the changes in attitudes of young males, with less wealth, and who work in blue-collar occupations. Also, we find more support for immigration where employment increased and tax collection was lower concurrent with the arrival of refugees

Who Does Not Like Migrants? Individual Demographics and Attitudes Towards Migration

We exploit the quasi-random settlement of refugees in Sweden between 1985 and 1994 to examine the characteristics of individuals showing a disproportionate negative response to migration flows andwhether these responses differ when the arrival of refugees occurred concurrently with economic shocks. We document that, on average, migration shocks translate to lower support for immigration. These responses are disproportionately driven by the changes in attitudes of young males, with less wealth, and who work in blue-collar occupations. Also, we find more support for immigration where employment increased and tax collection was lower concurrent with the arrival of refugees