Subsidizing Religious Participation through Groups: A Model of the “Megachurch” Strategy for Growth

Either despite or because of their non-traditional approach, megachurches have grown significantly in the United States since 1980. This paper models religious participation as an imperfect public good which, absent intervention, yields suboptimal participation by members from the church’s perspective. Megachurches address this problem in part by employing secular-based group activities to subsidize religious participation that then translates into an increase in the attendees’ religious investment. This strategy not only allows megachurches to attract and retain new members when many traditional churches are losing members but also results in higher levels of an individual’s religious capital. As a result, the megachurch may raise expectations of members’ levels of commitment and faith practices. Data from the FACT2000 survey provide evidence that megachurches employ groups more extensively than other churches, and this approach is consistent with a strategy to use groups to help subsidize individuals’ religious investment. Religious capital rises among members of megachurches relative to members of non-megachurches as a result of this strategy

Equity as a Prerequisite for Stability of Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision

Analysing cooperative provision of a global public good such as climate protection, we explore the relationship between equitable burden sharing on the one hand and core stability on the other. To assess the size of the burden which a public good contribution entails for a country, we make use of a specific measure based on Moulin (Econometrica 55:963-977, 1987). In particular, we show that a Pareto optimal allocation which is not in the core can always be blocked by a group of countries with the highest Moulin sacrifices. In this sense, it is the 'overburdening' and thus 'unfair' treatment of some countries that provides the reason for core instability. By contrast, a Pareto optimal allocation is in the core if the public good contributions are fairly equally distributed according to their Moulin sacrifices. The potential implications of our theoretical analysis for global climate policy are also discussed

The Company You Keep : Qualitative Uncertainty in Providing a Club Good

Clubs are typically experience goods. Potential members cannot ascertain precisely beforehand their quality (dependent endogenously on the club's facility investment and number of users, itself dependent on its prices). Members with unsatisfactory initial experiences discontinue visits. We show that a monopoly profit maximizer never offers a free trial period for such goods. For quality functions homogeneous of degree of at least minus one, a welfare maximizer, motivated by distributional concerns to mitigate disappointed consumers' losses, always does. We demonstrate the robustness of this finding by showing that (i) without qualitative uncertainty (thus, no disappointed customers), neither welfarist nor monopolist offers free trials; and (ii) if the planner pursues an objective mixing welfare maximization with profit maximization, the likelihood of free trials increases with the weight put on welfare maximization. Regarding club quality and usage, the monopolist provides a socially excessive level of quality to repeat buyers when the quality function is homogeneous of degree zero. With nonhomogeneous quality functions, the monopolist permits too little club usage; quality may or may not be socially excessive

Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy

Several studies found ancillary benefits of environmental policy to be of considerable size. These additional private benefits imply not only higher cooperative but also noncooperative abatement targets. However, beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects, there are qualitative and strategic implications associated with ancillary benefits: climate policy is no longer a pure but an impure public good. In this paper, we investigate these implications in a setting of non-cooperative coalition formation. In particular, we address the following questions. 1) Do ancillary benefits increase participation in international environmental agreements? 2) Do ancillary benefits raise the success of these treaties in welfare terms