Politics and the Constitutional Tribunal. The Constitution – the last line of defence against politics

Przedmiotem artykułu jest ‒ w pierwszej części ‒ próba odpowiedzi na pytanie, w jakim stopniu fakt powoływania sędziów Trybunału Konstytucyjnego przez organ polityczny, tj. Sejm RP, determinuje polityczny charakter samego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego. Autor wskazuje m.in. na podstawie swoich własnych doświadczeń sędziego TK, że poszukiwanie iunctim pomiędzy aktem politycznego wyboru sędziów a ich aktywnością orzeczniczą nie znajduje uzasadnienia, co wyraźnie potwierdzają przykłady konkretnych rozstrzygnięć sądu konstytucyjnego w tzw. hard cases. Sędziowie wyposażeni w bardzo silne gwarancje niezawisłości potrafią zachować obiektywizm ocen i niezależność także od swoich własnych przekonań politycznych. Prawdziwym zagrożeniem niezależności Trybunału Konstytucyjnego jest natomiast presja polityczna wywierana przez rządzących, której przejawem jest np. bezpośrednia personalna krytyka sędziów TK lub odmowa wykonywania orzeczeń sądu konstytucyjnego. Szczególnie niebezpiecznym instrumentem jest próba ingerowania ustawodawcy w sprawy wewnętrznej autonomii proceduralnej TK, zmierzająca m.in. do narzucenia kolejności rozpatrywanych spraw, wprowadzenia większości kwalifikowanej 2/3 przy podejmowaniu orzeczeń w pełnym składzie czy określenia quorum na takim poziomie, który może paraliżować funkcjonowanie sądu konstytucyjnego. W drugiej części artykułu podjęto próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy Trybunał może zbadać konstytucyjność procedur wprowadzonych nową ustawą o TK, zanim przystąpi do stosowania tych procedur. Autor udziela odpowiedzi twierdzącej na to pytanie, przytaczając argumenty na rzecz bezpośredniego stosowania Konstytucji, która w takich wypadkach staje się jedynym punktem odniesienia oceny nowych regulacji proceduralnych.In the first part of this paper an attempt is made to answer the question to what extent the fact that judges of the Constitutional Tribunal are appointed by a political organ (the Seym of the Republic of Poland) determines the political character of the Tribunal itself. Based, among otherthings, on his own experience, the author, a retired judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, states that the search for a iunctim between the political appointment of constitutional judges and their adjudicating activity is unjustified, as can be seen from the example of particular judgments delivered by the Constitutional Tribunal in what might be termed hard cases. Judges endowed with very strong guarantees of independence are capable of remaining impartial in their judgments and making decisions independently of their personal beliefs. The real threat to the independenceof the Constitutional Tribunal is political pressure exercised by government, which manifests itself in, for example, direct and personal criticism of Constitutional Tribunal judges or a refusal to implement judicial decisions issued by the Constitutional Tribunal. A particularly dangerous situation arises when a legislator attempts to intervene in the internal procedural autonomy of the Constitutional Tribunal with a view to determining the order in which the matters before the Tribunal should be dealt with, setting a 2/3 qualified majority for decisions ‘when sitting as a full court’ or determining the required quorum at a level which may paralyse the work of the Constitutional Tribunal altogether. In the second part of the paper the question is asked whether the Constitutional Tribunal may examine the constitutionality of the procedures being introduced by a new law on the Constitutional Tribunal before it proceeds to apply them. The answer to this question is in the affirmative, followed by arguments calling for the direct application of the Constitution which in such cases becomes the only point of reference when new procedural regulations are to be evaluated

Fields of application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and constitutional dialogues in the European Union

This article is an extended version of a speech delivered during the Conference on Judicial Cooperation Techniques for the Protection of European Fundamental Rights: Past and Future Prospectives held in EUI on 9-10 May 2014. It deals with the possibility of maintaining coexisting national and Charter standards of fundamental rights and with the importance of cooperation between the ECJ and the national courts when fundamental rights protection is at stake. In this article, possible approaches to the relation between the constitutional and Charter standards of fundamental rights are discussed, and the implications of the approach adopted by the ECJ are examined. Furthermore, the current and potential importance of the constitutional identity of the Member States is analyzed

Areas of Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Fields of conflict?

Although the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has already became a fully binding act of primary EU law, the controversies concerning the area of Charter's application do not seem to cease. Nevertheless, this phenomenon should not surprise since the core of this discussion rests upon the fundamental rules of the functioning of the European Union. While the uniform stand concerning the scope of application of the Charter vis-à-vis national legislation has not yet been elaborated upon, an analysis of the trends emerging in the ECJ case-law seems to be useful. The discussion is still open and two approaches - strict (formal) and flexible (liberal) - compete. Recent case-law of the ECJ proves the existence of specific "gear mechanisms" or "legal connectors" which serve the purpose of determination of the field of the Charter's application on the areas traditionally not covered by the EU law. The case-law at hand also determines the framework in which the existing jurisprudence concerning the general principles of EU law can be applied for delineating the field of the Charter's application. The questions mentioned above are being explored in light of the prospective ratification of the European Convention of Human Rights by the European Union and discussion about the degree of influence of a Member State's constitutional traditions on interpretation and application of the Charter

Justice Transitionnelle: L’Exemple Polonais, le Cas de la Lustration

This article deals with transitional justice as illustrated by the lustration cases in post-communist countries. In their tansformative process towards democracy, these latter have faced the challenge of finding a balance between different and competing rationals for lustration. The first one is an extensive approach in dealing with the totalitarian past, by prosecuting on a large scale the largest number of persons that collaborated with the communist regime, and by imposing harsh penalties. It represents a radical, revolutionary approach trying to impose the extraordinary means adequate to the transitory period, and hence it stresses the dominance of public interest over individual rights. The second approach necessitates the respect of the new democratic values and standards and imposes the compliance with fundamental principles of human rights. The author emphasizes the role of the constitutional judge in imposing the limits of the lustration procedure and in forming a new axiology of the transition society, based on the proporionnality methodology. The author concludes that only such a very well balanced attitude manifested by the series of the judgments of the constitutional court would allow a real revolutionary and radical breach of the totalitarian past.Cet article traite la question de la justice transitionnelle à travers l’expérience de la "lustration" dans les pays post-communistes. Ces derniers ont du faire face à un choix difficile, dans le processus de transformation vers la démocratie. Le premier choix est celui d’une approche extensive dans la manière de traiter le passé totalitaire, qui se fonde sur la répression d’un grand nombre d’anciens collaborateurs du régime communiste et sur l’imposition de peines lourdes (interdiction de travailler par exemple). Il s’agit d’une approche radicale et révolutionnaire, qui voudrait imposer des méthodes extraordinaires adaptées à la période transitoire. C’est pourquoi elle insiste sur la prédominance de l’intéret public sur les droits individuels. La deuxième approche insiste davantage sur le respect des nouvelles valeurs et critères démocratiques et met en avant l’importance du respect des droits fondamentaux de l’homme. L’auteur insiste sur le role du juge constitutionnel dans la détermination des limites de la procédure de lustration et dans la création d’une nouvelle axiologie de la société en transition, basée sur la recherche d’une proportionnalité et d’un équilibre nécessaires entre les intérets de l’Etat et les droits de l’individu. Ainsi, seule une attitude bien équilibrée comme celle exprimée dans les séries de jugements des Cours constitutionnelles peut permettre une révolution réelle et radicale par rapport au passé totalitaire

Trybunał Konstytucyjny po trzydziestu latach – doświadczenie i przyszłość

This article tries to answer three different questions: Did we create a stable and strong constitutional culture in Poland after collapse of the communist system? Has the model of constitutional review enshrined in the Polish Constitution confirmed itself over the 30 years of its application by the Constitutional Tribunal, notably considering the alternative model to the Tribunal’s concentrated review, i.e. the so-called dispersed constitutional review exercised directly by the common courts? As a third topic, the article deals with the perspectives of the constitutional review and necessary changes in that regard. It could serve as an instrument for the future improvement of constitutional culture as well as ensure a more effective influence of the basic constitutional values and principles on the entire legal order in Poland, notably through a stronger presence of the constitutional axiology in the judicial practice. The conclusion of the first part of the article is that Polish constitutional culture is not sufficiently enrooted in the tradition and awareness of the Polish society – this concerns average citizens, as well as members of the political elite. This is one of the essential reasons why the Polish constitutional system, founded on a good institutional framework for the state ruled by law, has become so fragile with regard to the recent political and legal changes, which have an extremely negative impact on the legal order and which undermine the basic democratic principles, starting with the independence of the judiciary. This conclusion draws upon the author’s postulate that the constitutional legal order of the democratic state ruled by law must necessarily be strengthened by a well-organized civil society and by a good constitutional practice shaped in compliance with fundamental rights, basic values and principles. The second part of the article presents arguments in favor of the centralized (concentrated) constitutional review model, which could in principle be maintained in the future. This model is better adapted to the Polish legal traditions and to the structure of the Polish judiciary, whereas the opposite model of decentralized judicial review could seriously weaken the principle of legal certainty. However, it is argued that this approach should not be understood as a categorical refusal of a direct application of constitutional norms, principles and values by common judges. On the contrary - the modern concept of judicial interpretation and application of law requires an openness towards the larger context of the legal order, including the constitutional, supranational and international texts, and presupposes observance of the basic rights and values which are guaranteed by these texts and universally recognized. However, the definitive elimination of legal provisions from the legal order should in principle be a prerogative of the constitutional court in conformity with the logic of the model of centralized constitutional review. At the present time, which sees the model of constitutional review paralyzed by prolonged constitutional crisis, and a clear violation of the independence of the constitutional justice by the parliamentary and governmental majority, the necessity of striving for a specific instrument to effectively apply the constitutional guarantees in the legal order must not be ignored. The author argues that this exceptional situation justifies a temporary replacement of the concentrated model of constitutional review by concrete judicial review, which means that the ordinary judges can refuse the application of statutory legal rules in specific cases if they do not comply with the constitution. In the final part of this publication, focusing on the future perspectives, the author discusses necessary improvements of the constitutional review, in line with a more flexible approach allowing common judges to refuse in some situations the application of non-constitutional rules without referring a question of law to the constitutional court. The author also posits the necessity of introducing some modifications to the model of constitutional complaint and argues for an enlargement of the competences of the constitutional court, covering not only the review of the constitutionality of norms, but also the review of conformity with fundamental rights in their application

Challenges for the State Governed by the Rule od Law - Expectations and Reality

Celem tego wykładu jest próba częściowej odpowiedzi na pytanie, dlaczego w 20 lat po rewolucji 1989 r. jesteśmy społeczeństwem sfrustrowanym, niewierzącym w swoje szanse i pesymistycznie postrzegającym najbliższą przyszłość. (fragment tekstu

Politics-and Constitutional Courts (Judge’s Personal Perspective)

The paper deals with different forms of political impact on the constitutional justice. The main subject of presentation is the analysis of recent Polish experiences which can help to identify better the threats to the independence of the constitutional justice in democratic space. The first part takes the effort to describe the specific phenomenon of political pressure exerted on the constitutional justice through indirect influence (so called “political mobbing”). The argumentation developed in the paper proves that even such indirect and sometimes subtle interferences from the political elite create the very danger for accountability of constitutional justice and have a negative impact on constitutional awareness of the society. The second part deals with typical reasons (ongoing in all constitutional courts) of inevitable “politization” of the constitutional review, first of all the political procedure of appointments of the judges and the political nature of constitutional cases. The thesis is defended through the analysis of Polish experiences which indicate that the presence of politics, inherent element of the constitutional justice, cannot be automatically identified with lack of the objective and independent judgments issued by the judges. Internal independence and formal external guarantees of it allow us to avoid the pathological impact of politics. Two factors have a particularly great impact on the attitudes of judges and support them in fulfilling their responsibility: the continuity of jurisprudential lines, accumulation of constitutional experience (acquis constitutionnel) and the permanent dialogue between the constitutional courts and the international courts or among the constitutional courts in the European space

LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES DUE TO NORMATIVE LAWLESSNESS

The non-conformity to the Constitution (determined by a superior act of law) is not equivalent to the occurrence of illegality as a prerequisite of ex delicto liability. Normative illegality may specifically concern a precisely defined area for the binding force of a given regulation and not the whole period of the binding force of the normative act (this is clearly acknowledged by the so-called secondary non-constitutionality of the regulation resulting from the new Polish Constitution entering into force). The so-called legislative failure to act (the non-issuing of a normative act) is a specific form of normative illegality (art. 417 § 4). The interpretation of the prerequisites of such liability must respect one of the basic principles of a democratic state ruled by law i.e. the principle of separation and balance between the legislative, executive and judicial powers (Art. 10 Constitution). The interpretation of the term “legislative failure to act” may under no circumstance lead to independent stipulation, by the court examining a claim for damages, of the contents of the not adopted legal regulations. The broad view of ex delicto liability prerequisites, when referring to activities connected with the realisation of the public powers empire, should incline towards the far reaching consideration when interpreting and applying new mechanisms of liability. For it is very easy to cross the boundary in this respect, which may lead not only to overburdening public finances with unpredictable damages but even to the infringement of the principle of balance and division of powers within the state. Therefore, a lot will depend on rational and considerate judicial practice in this area. Additionally. the strong aspiration to maximize claimant’s protection must not lead to a certain threshold of rationalism being exceeded, since in a further perspective this would cause negative consequences to the claimants themselves and the whole society