Secular humanism and "scientific psychiatry"

The Council for Secular Humanism identifies Secular Humanism as a "way of thinking and living" committed to rejecting authoritarian beliefs and embracing "individual freedom and responsibility ... and cooperation." The paradigmatic practices of psychiatry are civil commitment and insanity defense, that is, depriving innocent persons of liberty and excusing guilty persons of their crimes: the consequences of both are confinement in institutions ostensibly devoted to the treatment of mental diseases. Black's Law Dictionary states: "Every confinement of the person is an 'imprisonment,' whether it be in a common prison, or in private house, or in the stocks, or even by forcibly detaining one in the public streets." Accordingly, I maintain that Secular Humanism is incompatible with the principles and practices of psychiatry

Hospital Refusal to Release Mental Patient

This paper was intended as a contribution to the study of psychiatry, and especially institutional psychiatry, as a form of social control. More specifically, I have sought to present further evidence in support of the thesis that the relationship between the involuntarily hospitalized mental patient and his psychiatrist (s) is commonly antagonistic rather than cooperative in nature. The conception of a mental illness, as essentially similar to a bodily disease, serves to obscure the many exceedingly significant socio-economic, legal and ethical aspects of forced mental hospitalization.The patient\u27s lawsuit for release, and the psychiatric superintendent\u27s appeal that he be permitted to hold the patient despite a lower court\u27s verdict to set him free, were examined as paradigmatic of many contemporary problems in forensic psychiatry. Two suggestions were offered: first, that the frequent adversary character of the physician-patient relationship in hospital psychiatry be more explicitly recognized; and second, that there is a pressing need for more adequate legal as well as psychiatric representation ( defense ) for the involuntarily hospitalized mental patient

Civil Liberties and the Mentally Ill

Here are two basic ways in which a person may assume the social role of mental patient. First, it may be assumed voluntarily, meaning that the role is self-defined. Second, it may be foisted upon a person against his will. This means that a person may be defined as mentally ill by someone other than himself. This definition, then, if properly implemented, may become generally accepted or socially verified. I shall limit myself here to calling attention to certain ethical and legal aspects of the psychiatrist\u27s involvement with the second class of mentally ill patients

Why the Drug War is Unstoppable

The purpose of this symposium is to search for a breakthrough in drug policy, or, to put it more simply, to stop the War on Drugs

Preferential Myosin Heavy Chain Isoform B Expression May Contribute to the Faster Velocity of Contraction in Veins versus Arteries

Smooth muscle myosin heavy chains occur in 2 isoforms, SMA (slow) and SMB (fast). We hypothesized that the SMB isoform is predominant in the faster-contracting rat vena cava compared to thoracic aorta. We compared the time to half maximal contraction in response to a maximal concentration of endothelin-1 (ET-1; 100 nM), potassium chloride (KCl; 100 mM) and norepinephrine (NE; 10 µM). The time to half maximal contraction was shorter in the vena cava compared to aorta (aorta: ET-1 = 235.8 ± 13.8 s, KCl = 140.0 ± 33.3 s, NE = 19.8 ± 2.7 s; vena cava: ET-1 = 121.8 ± 15.6 s, KCl = 49.5 ± 6.7 s, NE = 9.0 ± 3.3 s). Reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction supported the greater expression of SMB in the vena cava compared to aorta. SMB was expressed to a greater extent than SMA in the vessel wall of the vena cava. Western analysis determined that expression of SMB, relative to total smooth muscle myosin heavy chains, was 12.5 ± 4.9-fold higher in the vena cava compared to aorta, while SMA was 4.9 ± 1.2-fold higher in the aorta than vena cava. Thus, the SMB isoform is the predominant form expressed in rat veins, providing one possible mechanism for the faster response of veins to vasoconstrictors

The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: A pluralogue part 2: Issues of conservatism and pragmatism in psychiatric diagnosis

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article took up the first two questions. Part II will take up the second two questions. Question 3 deals with the question as to whether DSM-V should assume a conservative or assertive posture in making changes from DSM-IV. That question in turn breaks down into discussion of diagnoses that depend on, and aim toward, empirical, scientific validation, and diagnoses that are more value-laden and less amenable to scientific validation. Question 4 takes up the role of pragmatic consideration in a psychiatric nosology, whether the purely empirical considerations need to be tempered by considerations of practical consequence. As in Part 1 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances