Who's Making It: The Academic Achievement of Recent Boston Public School Graduates in the Early College Years

Examines the persistence, progress, and performance of Boston public school graduates in the first two years of college; contributing factors, including academic preparation, colleges' selectivity, and full-time or part-time attendance; and implications

Verbal Reports and "Real' Reasons" : Confabulation and Conflation

This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of a published work that appeared in final form in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice after peer review and technical editing by the publisher. Constantine Sandis, ‘Verbal Reports and “Real” Reasons: Confabulation and Conflation’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 18(2): 267-280, first published online 18 March 2015. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9576-6 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015This paper examines the relation between the various forces which underlie human action and verbal reports about our reasons for acting as we did. I maintain that much of the psychological literature on confabulations rests on a dangerous conflation of the reasons for which people act with a variety of distinct motivational factors. In particular, I argue that subjects frequently give correct answers to questions about the considerations they acted upon while remaining largely unaware of why they take themselves to have such reasons to act. Pari passu, experimental psychologists are wrong to maintain that they have shown our everyday reason talk to be systematically confused. This is significant because our everyday reason-ascriptions affect characterizations of action (in terms of intention, knowledge, foresight, etc.) that are morally and legally relevant. I conclude, more positively, that far from rendering empirical research on confabulations invalid, my account helps to reveal its true insights into human nature.Peer reviewe

Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism

While philosophers have worried about mental causation for centuries, worries about the causal relevance of conscious phenomena are also increasingly featuring in neuroscientific literature. Neuroscientists have regarded the threat of epiphenomenalism as interesting primarily because they have supposed that it entails free will scepticism. However, the steps that get us from a premise about the causal irrelevance of conscious phenomena to a conclusion about free will are not entirely clear. In fact, if we examine popular philosophical accounts of free will, we find, for the most part, nothing to suggest that free will is inconsistent with the presence of unconscious neural precursors to choices. It is only if we adopt highly non-naturalistic assumptions about the mind (e.g. if we embrace Cartesian dualism and locate free choice in the non-physical realm) that it seems plausible to suppose that the neuroscientific data generates a threat to free will