Market Power and Collusion on Interconnection Phone Market in Tunisia : What Lessons from International Experiences

We try in this paper to characterize the state of mobile phone market in Tunisia. Our study is based on a survey of foreign experience (Europe) in detecting collusive behavior and a comparison of the critical threshold of collusion between operators in developing countries like Tunisia. The market power is estimated based on the work of Parker Roller (1997) and the assumption of "Balanced Calling Pattern". We use then the model of Friedman (1971) to compare the critical threshold of collusion. We show that the "conduct parameter" measuring the intensity of competition is not null during the period 1993-2011. Results show also that collusion is easier on the Tunisian market that on the Algerian, Jordanian, or Moroccan one

Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique

National audienc

Que peut bien apporter l'analyse économique à l'application du droit de la concurrence ?

National audienc

Antonio Ros and Rabah Souam

Introduction. Consider a smooth and compact convex body B in R 3 . Let @B and int B denote its boundary and its interior respectively. We are interested in embedded constant mean curvature surfaces M in R 3 with non empty boundary such that int M ae int B and @M ae @B and which intersect @B at a constant angle fl 2 (0; ß). Such surfaces, called capillary surfaces, are critical points of an energy functional under some constraints. The energy functional is defined as follows: the surface M separates B into two bodies, consider among these two bodies the one inside which the angle fl is measured and call\Omega the part of its boundary that lies on @B. Denote by A<F59.5

Antitrust policy: the impact of revenue penalties on price

The paper examines the impact on a firm’s price when it faces the possibility of an antitrust investigation and associated potential revenue penalty. As well as presenting a general model of antitrust intervention, an illustrative example reflecting the provisions of the 1998 UK Competition Act is offered, the example being developed to explore the implications of the probability of antitrust intervention and punishment increasing non-linearly as a firm’s profit rises