Long-Term Potentiation: One Kind or Many?

Do neurobiologists aim to discover natural kinds? I address this question in this chapter via a critical analysis of classification practices operative across the 43-year history of research on long-term potentiation (LTP). I argue that this 43-year history supports the idea that the structure of scientific practice surrounding LTP research has remained an obstacle to the discovery of natural kinds

Potentiality in Biology

We take the potentialities that are studied in the biological sciences (e.g., totipotency) to be an important subtype of biological dispositions. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, we want to provide a detailed understanding of what biological dispositions are. We claim that two features are essential for dispositions in biology: the importance of the manifestation process and the diversity of conditions that need to be satisfied for the disposition to be manifest. Second, we demonstrate that the concept of a disposition (or potentiality) is a very useful tool for the analysis of the explanatory practice in the biological sciences. On the one hand it allows an in-depth analysis of the nature and diversity of the conditions under which biological systems display specific behaviors. On the other hand the concept of a disposition may serve a unificatory role in the philosophy of the natural sciences since it captures not only the explanatory practice of biology, but of all natural sciences. Towards the end we will briefly come back to the notion of a potentiality in biology

What can polysemy tell us about theories of explanation?

Philosophical accounts of scientific explanation are broadly divided into ontic and epistemic views. This paper explores the idea that the lexical ambiguity of the verb to explain and its nominalisation supports an ontic conception of explanation. I analyse one argument which challenges this strategy by criticising the claim that explanatory talk is lexically ambiguous, 375–394, 2012). I propose that the linguistic mechanism of transfer of meaning, 109–132, 1995) provides a better account of the lexical alternations that figure in the systematic polysemy of explanatory talk, and evaluate the implications of this proposal for the debate between ontic and epistemic conceptions of scientific explanation

Parity nonconserving observables in thermal neutron capture on a proton

We calculate parity nonconserving observables in the processes where a neutron is captured on a proton at the threshold energy radiating a photon. Various potential models such as Paris, Bonn and Argonne $v18$ are used for the strong interactions, and the meson-exchange description is employed for the weak interactions between hadrons. The photon polarization $P_\gamma$ in the unpolarized neutron capture process and photon asymmetry $A_\gamma$ in the polarized neutron capture process are obtained in terms of the weak meson-nucleon coupling constants. $A_\gamma$ turns out to be basically insensitive to the employed strong interaction models and thus can be uniquely determined in terms of the weak coupling constants, but $P_\gamma$ depends significantly on the strong interaction models.Comment: 13 pages, 11 eps figure

Temporal Construal Effects Are Independent of Episodic Future Thought

Human thought is prone to biases. Some biases serve as beneficial heuristics to free up limited cognitive resources or improve well-being, but their neurocognitive basis is unclear. One such bias is a tendency to construe events in the distant future in abstract, general terms and events in the near future in concrete, detailed terms. Temporal construal may rely on our capacity to orient toward and/or imagine context-rich future events. We tested 21 individuals with impaired episodic future thinking resulting from lesions to the hippocampus or ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and 57 control participants (aged 45-76 years) from Canada and Italy on measures sensitive to temporal construal. We found that temporal construal persisted in most patients, even those with impaired episodic future thinking, but was abolished in some vmPFC cases, possibly in relation to difficulties forming and maintaining future intentions. The results confirm the fractionation of future thinking and that parts of vmPFC might critically support our ability to flexibly conceive and orient ourselves toward future events

Prediction and Topological Models in Neuroscience

In the last two decades, philosophy of neuroscience has predominantly focused on explanation. Indeed, it has been argued that mechanistic models are the standards of explanatory success in neuroscience over, among other things, topological models. However, explanatory power is only one virtue of a scientific model. Another is its predictive power. Unfortunately, the notion of prediction has received comparatively little attention in the philosophy of neuroscience, in part because predictions seem disconnected from interventions. In contrast, we argue that topological predictions can and do guide interventions in science, both inside and outside of neuroscience. Topological models allow researchers to predict many phenomena, including diseases, treatment outcomes, aging, and cognition, among others. Moreover, we argue that these predictions also offer strategies for useful interventions. Topology-based predictions play this role regardless of whether they do or can receive a mechanistic interpretation. We conclude by making a case for philosophers to focus on prediction in neuroscience in addition to explanation alone

Compare and Contrast: How to Assess the Completeness of Mechanistic Explanation

Opponents of the new mechanistic account of scientific explanation argue that the new mechanists are committed to a ‘More Details Are Better’ claim: adding details about the mechanism always improves an explanation. Due to this commitment, the mechanistic account cannot be descriptively adequate as actual scientific explanations usually leave out details about the mechanism. In reply to this objection, defenders of the new mechanistic account have highlighted that only adding relevant mechanistic details improves an explanation and that relevance is to be determined relative to the phenomenon-to-be-explained. Craver and Kaplan (B J Philos Sci 71:287–319, 2020) provide a thorough reply along these lines specifying that the phenomena at issue are contrasts. In this paper, we will discuss Craver and Kaplan’s reply. We will argue that it needs to be modified in order to avoid three problems, i.e., what we will call the Odd Ontology Problem, the Multiplication of Mechanisms Problem, and the Ontic Completeness Problem. However, even this modification is confronted with two challenges: First, it remains unclear how explanatory relevance is to be determined for contrastive explananda within the mechanistic framework. Second, it remains to be shown as to how the new mechanistic account can avoid what we will call the ‘Vertical More Details are Better’ objection. We will provide answers to both challenges