The ethics of doing human enhancement ethics

Human enhancement is one of the leading research topics in contemporary applied ethics. Interestingly, the widespread attention to the ethical aspects of future enhancement applications has generated misgivings. Are researchers who spend their time investigating the ethics of futuristic human enhancement scenarios acting in an ethically suboptimal manner? Are the methods they use to analyze future technological developments appropriate? Are institutions wasting resources by funding such research? In this article, I address the ethics of doing human enhancement ethics focusing on two main concerns. The Methodological Problem refers to the question of how we should methodologically address the moral aspects of future enhancement applications. The Normative Problem refers to what is the normative justification for investigating and funding the research on the ethical aspects of future human enhancement. This article aims to give a satisfactory response to both meta-questions in order to ethically justify the inquiry into the ethical aspects of emerging enhancement technologies.INPhINIT Retaining Fellowship of the La Caixa Foundation (grant number LCF/BQ/DR20/ 11790005)Research projects funded by the State Research Agency of the Spanish Government (PID2019-104943RB-I00 and PID2022-137953OB-I00)FEDER Junta de Andalucía (B-HUM-64-UGR20)BBVA Foundation (DESASTRE project from the call “Proyectos de Investigación Científica 2021”)Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (421523/2022-0

Genetic enhancement, human extinction, and the best interests of posthumanity

The cumulative impact of enhancement technologies may alter the human species in the very long‐term future. In this article, I will start showing how radical genetic enhancements may accelerate the conversion into a novel species. I will also clarify the concepts of ‘biological species’, ‘transhuman’ and ‘posthuman’. Then, I will summarize some ethical arguments for creating a transhuman or posthuman species with a substantially higher level of well‐being than the human one. In particular, I will present what I shall call the Principle of the Best Interests of Posthumanity, which states that the enhancement of the human and transhuman species must be directed towards the creation of a posthuman existence that is substantially more valuable than its predecessors. I suggestthathuman extinction maybe considered, within that principle, as one of the best interests of posthumanity. Finally, I will develop three objections that make that principle unattractive and that show that pursuing a full‐blown programme of posthuman evolution is ethically flawed.This research is funded by an INPhINIT Retaining Fellowship of the La Caixa Foundation (Grant number LCF/BQ/DR20/11790005). Funding for open access charge provided by Universidad de Granada/CBUA

“Just” accuracy? Procedural fairness demands explainability in AI‑based medical resource allocations

Funding for open access publishing: Universidad de Granada/ CBUA. This research is funded by the project “Detección y eliminación de sesgos en algoritmos de triaje y localización para la COVID-19” of the call Ayudas Fundación BBVA a Equipos de Investigación Científica SARS-CoV-2 y COVID-19, en el área de Humanidades. JR also thanks a La Caixa Foundation INPhINIT Retaining Fellowship (LCF/BQ/ DR20/11790005). DR-A thanks the funding of the Spanish Research Agency (codes FFI2017-88913-P and PID2020-118729RB-I00). IPJ also thanks the funding of the Spanish Research Agency (code PID2019-105422GB-I00).The increasing application of artificial intelligence (AI) to healthcare raises both hope and ethical concerns. Some advanced machine learning methods provide accurate clinical predictions at the expense of a significant lack of explainability. Alex John London has defended that accuracy is a more important value than explainability in AI medicine. In this article, we locate the trade-off between accurate performance and explainable algorithms in the context of distributive justice. We acknowledge that accuracy is cardinal from outcome-oriented justice because it helps to maximize patients’ benefits and optimizes limited resources. However, we claim that the opaqueness of the algorithmic black box and its absence of explainability threatens core commitments of procedural fairness such as accountability, avoidance of bias, and transparency. To illustrate this, we discuss liver transplantation as a case of critical medical resources in which the lack of explainability in AI-based allocation algorithms is procedurally unfair. Finally, we provide a number of ethical recommendations for when considering the use of unexplainable algorithms in the distribution of health-related resources.Funding for open access publishing: Universidad de Granada/ CBUAProject “Detección y eliminación de sesgos en algoritmos de triaje y localización para la COVID-19” of the call Ayudas Fundación BBVA a Equipos de Investigación Científica SARS-CoV-2 y COVID-19, en el área de HumanidadesLa Caixa Foundation INPhINIT Retaining Fellowship (LCF/BQ/ DR20/11790005)Spanish Research Agency (codes FFI2017-88913-P and PID2020-118729RB-I00)Spanish Research Agency (code PID2019-105422GB-I00

From Transhumanist’s Morphological Freedom to Posthuman Corporeality: Convergences and Divergences

Agradezco los comentarios de Belén Liedo y Pablo García-Barranquero a una versión previa del manuscrito, así como a los revisores anónimos de la revista Isegoría y al público de Valencia, Santiago de Compostela y Málaga por sus aportaciones.Tanto el transhumanismo como el posthumanismo filosófico han prestado una atención especial a la corporalidad humana en relación al avance tecnológico. En el presente artículo, se comienza señalando cómo ambos movimientos difieren significativamente respecto a la herencia del humanismo. Posteriormente, se aborda la noción transhumanista de la ‘libertad morfológica’ de la mano de More, Sandberg y Bostrom. A continuación, se presentan casos paradigmáticos de modificaciones corporales mediante implantes cibernéticos. En último lugar, se problematizan las cuestiones de la identidad, la corporalidad y el desencuentro entre ambas corrientes respecto al ‘volcado de la mente’.Transhumanism and philosophical posthumanism have paid special attention to human corporeality in relation to technological breakthroughs. This article begins by pointing out how the two movements differ significantly about the inheritance of humanism. Subsequently, the transhumanist notion of ‘morphological freedom’ is addressed from the proposals of More, Sandberg, and Bostrom. Then, paradigmatic cases of body modifications through cybernetic implants are considered. Finally, the issues of identity, corporeality, and the disagreement between the two currents regarding ‘mind uploading’ are problematized.Proyecto Inteligencia artificial y biotecnología de la mejora moral. Aspectos éticos (FFI2016-79000-P), financiado por el Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad del Gobierno de Españ

Artificial moral experts: asking for ethical advice to artificial intelligent assistants

In most domains of human life, we are willing to accept that there are experts with greater knowledge and competencies that distinguish them from non-experts or laypeople. Despite this fact, the very recognition of expertise curiously becomes more controversial in the case of “moral experts”. Do moral experts exist? And, if they indeed do, are there ethical reasons for us to follow their advice? Likewise, can emerging technological developments broaden our very concept of moral expertise? In this article, we begin by arguing that the objections that have tried to deny the existence (and convenience) of moral expertise are unsatisfactory. After that, we show that people have ethical reasons to ask for a piece of moral advice in daily life situations. Then, we argue that some Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems can play an increasing role in human morality by becoming moral experts. Some AI-based moral assistants can qualify as artificial moral experts and we would have good ethical reasons to use them.This article is part of the research project EthAI+3 (Digital Ethics. Moral Enhancement through an Interactive Use of Artificial Intelligence), funded by the State Research Agency of the Spanish Government (PID2019-104943RB-I00) and the project SOCRAI3 (Moral Enhancement and Artificial Intelligence. Ethical aspects of a virtual Socratic assistant), funded by FEDER Junta de Andalucía (B-HUM-64-UGR20). Jon Rueda thanks the funding of an INPhINIT Retaining Fellowship of the La Caixa Foundation (Grant number LCF/BQ/DR20/11790005)

In Defense of Posthuman Vulnerability

We are indebted to Michael Hauskeller for his helpful remarks on a previous version of the manuscript. We also thank the comments made by Txetxu Ausin, Janet Delgado, Pablo Garcia-Barranquero, Francisco Lara, David Martin, Daniel Rueda, and the two anonymous reviewers of Scientia et Fides. Belen Liedo thanks the funding of the Spanish Ministry of Universities for the Training of University Professors (FPU), grant number: FPU19/06027. Jon Rueda thanks the funding of an INPhINIT Retaining Fellowship of the La Caixa Foundation (grant number LCF/BQ/DR20/11790005).Transhumanism is a challenging movement that invites us to rethink what defines humanity, including what we value and regret the most about our existence. Vulnerability is a key concept that require thorough philosophical scrutiny concerning transhumanist proposals. Vulnerability can refer to a universal condition of human life (ontological vulnerability) or, rather, to the specific exposure to certain harms due to particular situations (social vulnerability). Even if we are all vulnerable in the first sense, there are also different sources and levels of vulnerability depending on concrete social circumstances. Recently, Michael Hauskeller (2019) argued about a fundamental incompatibility between transhumanism and vulnerability. He understands vulnerability as an existential category, linked to woundability and mortality. This idea is akin to ontological vulnerability, but it does not notice some important features of social vulnerability. On the other side, transhumanism is a complex and non-homogeneous movement. Here we distinguish between a strong and a weak version of transhumanism. We will propose that the salience of vulnerability is only diminished in the radical one, while a moderate version can reconcile vulnerability with human enhancement. Thus, vulnerability, a concept that has recently gained much importance as an anthropological category in contemporary ethics, is not necessarily at odds with any transhumanist project.Spanish Ministry of Universities for the Training of University Professors (FPU) FPU19/06027INPhINIT Retaining Fellowship of the La Caixa Foundation LCF/BQ/DR20/1179000

Bias in algorithms of AI systems developed for COVID-19: A scoping review

To analyze which ethically relevant biases have been identified by academic literature in artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms developed either for patient risk prediction and triage, or for contact tracing to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, to specifically investigate whether the role of social determinants of health (SDOH) have been considered in these AI developments or not. We conducted a scoping review of the literature, which covered publications from March 2020 to April 2021. Studies mentioning biases on AI algorithms developed for contact tracing and medical triage or risk prediction regarding COVID-19 were included. From 1054 identified articles, 20 studies were finally included. We propose a typology of biases identified in the literature based on bias, limitations and other ethical issues in both areas of analysis. Results on health disparities and SDOH were classified into five categories: racial disparities, biased data, socioeconomic disparities, unequal accessibility and workforce, and information communication. SDOH needs to be considered in the clinical context, where they still seem underestimated. Epidemiological conditions depend on geographic location, so the use of local data in studies to develop international solutions may increase some biases. Gender bias was not specifically addressed in the articles included. The main biases are related to data collection and management. Ethical problems related to privacy, consent, and lack of regulation have been identified in contact tracing while some biasrelated health inequalities have been highlighted. There is a need for further research focusing on SDOH and these specific AI apps.Universitat Autonoma de BarcelonaBBVA Foundatio

Immunity Passports, Fundamental Rights and Public Health Hazards: a Reply to Brown et al

In their recent article, Brownet alanalyse several ethical aspects around immunity passports and put forward some recommendations for implementing them. Although they offer a comprehensive perspective, they overlook two essential aspects. First, while the authors consider the possibility that immunological passports may appear to discriminate against those who do not possess them, the opposite viewpoint of immune people is underdeveloped. We argue that if a person has been tested positive for and recovered from COVID-19, becoming immune to it, she cannot be considered a hazard to public health and, therefore, the curtailment of her fundamental rights (eg, the right to freedom of movement) is not legitimate. Second, they omit that vaccine distribution will create similar problems related to immunity-based licenses. Vaccine certificates will de facto generate a sort of immunity passport. In the next phases of the pandemic, different immunity statuses will be at stake, because the need to identify who can spread COVID-19 is unavoidable. If a person does not pose a threat to public health because she cannot spread the infection, then her right to freedom of movement should be respected, regardless of how she acquired that immunity.European Commission (H2020 SWAFS Programme, PANELFIT Project, research grant number 788039), Eusko Jaurlaritza (Ayudas a Grupos de Investigacion IT-1066-16), Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacion (BIOethAI+, grant number: FFI201679000-P) and La Caixa Foundation (LCF/BQ/DR20/11790005)

Digital Covid Certificates as Immunity Passports: An Analysis of Their Main Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues

Digital COVID certificates are a novel public health policy to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic. These immunity certificates aim to incentivize vaccination and to deny international travel or access to essential spaces to those who are unable to prove that they are not infectious. In this article, we start by describing immunity certificates and highlighting their differences from vaccination certificates. Then, we focus on the ethical, legal, and social issues involved in their use, namely autonomy and consent, data protection, equity, and international mobility from a global fairness perspective. The main conclusion of our analysis is that digital COVID certificates are only acceptable if they meet certain conditions: that they should not process personal data beyond what is strictly necessary for the aimed goals, that equal access to them should be guaranteed, and that they should not restrict people’s autonomy to access places where contagion is unlikely. We conclude that, if such conditions are guaranteed, digital COVID certificates could contribute to mitigating some of the most severe socioeconomic consequences of the pandemic.Funding for open access charge: Universidad de Granada / CBUA European Commission (H2020 SWAFS Programme, PANELFIT Project, research grant number 788039), Eusko Jaurlaritza (Ayudas a Grupos de Investigación IT-106616), and La Caixa Foundation (LCF/BQ/ DR20/11790005)

Digital Covid Certificates as Immunity Passports: An Analysis of Their Main Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues

Digital COVID certificates are a novel public health policy to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic. These immunity certificates aim to incentivize vaccination and to deny international travel or access to essential spaces to those who are unable to prove that they are not infectious. In this article, we start by describing immunity certificates and highlighting their differences from vaccination certificates. Then, we focus on the ethical, legal, and social issues involved in their use, namely autonomy and consent, data protection, equity, and international mobility from a global fairness perspective. The main conclusion of our analysis is that digital COVID certificates are only acceptable if they meet certain conditions: that they should not process personal data beyond what is strictly necessary for the aimed goals, that equal access to them should be guaranteed, and that they should not restrict people’s autonomy to access places where contagion is unlikely.We conclude that, if such conditions are guaranteed, digital COVID certificates could contribute to mitigating some of the most severe socioeconomic consequences of the pandemic.Universidad de Granada/CBUA European Commission 788039La Caixa Foundation LCF/BQ/DR20/11790005Ayudas a Grupos de Investigacion IT-10661