The role of financial frictions in the 2007-2008 crisis : an estimated DSGE model

After the banking crises experienced by many countries in the 1990s and in 2008, financial market conditions have turned out to be a relevant factor for economic fluctuations. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether frictions in financial markets are important for business cycles, and whether the recent 2007-2008 crisis has enhanced (or reduced) the size of some shocks and the role played by financial factors in driving economic fluctuations. The analysis is based on both versions of the Smets and Wouters DSGE model (2003, 2007), which are estimated using Bayesian techniques. The two versions differ because the Smets and Wouters (2007) version entails a risk premium shock, which captures that interest rate faced by firms and households might be different from the policy rate because of some unmodelled frictions. Both versions are augmented to include an endogenous financial accelerator mechanism as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), which arises from information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers that create inefficiencies in financial markets. The analysis is based on the same data-set as in the Smets and Wouters model, but extended to 2010. One first set of results suggests that the recent crisis has amplified the relevance of financial factors, as well as unmodelled frictions. Overall, this paper proves that the Smets and Wouters model augmented with a financial accelerator mechanism is suitable to capture much of the historical developments in U.S. financial markets that led to the financial crisis in 2007-2008. In particular, the concomitance of a peak in leverage ratio and the deepening of the recession supports the argument that leverage and credit have an important role to play in shaping the business cycle, in particular the intensity of recessions

Financial frictions and the zero lower bound on interest rates: a DSGE analysis

Recent developments in Canada, the United Kingdom, the euro area, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States have triggered a debate on whether monetary policy is effective when the nominal interest rate is close to zero. In this context, the monetary authority is no longer in a position to pursue a policy of monetary easing by lowering nominal interest rates further. However, some economists have down-played the risk of hitting the zero lower bound, at least for the US economy. In this paper, I assess the implications of the zero lower bound in a DSGE model with financial frictions. The financial accelerator mechanism is formalized as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1995). The paper attempts to address three main issues. First, I evaluate whether the zero lower bound -- by limiting the use of the nominal interest rate as a policy instrument -- might hamper the monetary authority from offsetting the negative effects of an adverse shock. Second, I analyze whether price-level targeting, through the stabilization of private sector expectations, might be a better monetary rule than inflation targeting in order to avoid the "liquidity trap". Third, I investigate the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus (namely, an increase in government expenditure) when financial markets are imperfect and the nominal interest rate is close to its zero lower bound. In this context, two questions will be addressed: first, do financial frictions weaken the effect of a fiscal expansion? Second, how are results affected when the zero lower bound is binding? To address these questions, I introduce a negative demand shock and an adverse financial shock. I find that by adopting a price-level targeting rule, the monetary authority might alleviate the recession generated by the interaction of financial frictions and lower-bounded nominal interest rates. Alternatively, an increase in government expenditure has a positive impact on output, but fiscal multipliers are below one, due to a strong crowding-out effect of private consumption. This effect is muted when the nominal interest rate is lower bounded. In analyzing discretionary fiscal policy, this paper does also focus on two crucial aspects: the duration of the fiscal stimulus and the presence of implementation lags.Optimal monetary policy, financial accelerator, lower bound on nominal interest rates, price-level targeting, fiscal stimulus.

Fiscal Consolidation and Implications of Social Spending for Long-Term Fiscal Sustainability. ESRI Research Bulletin 2014/1/2

During the economic and financial crisis fiscal positions across OECD countries deteriorated sharply. Many countries have already started fiscal consolidations but additional consolidation will be required. Moreover, additional challenges to the sustainability of fiscal balances are posed by population ageing and additional spending requirements on health and pensions, which by European Commission and the OECD projections will drive up public spending in almost all OECD countries over the horizon 2012-2050

Fiscal Forecast Errors: Governments Versus Independent Agencies? ESRI Research Bulletin 2014/1/1

Should the role of preparing budgetary projections be delegated to an independent agency? A debate around this issue has arisen in Europe, given the deterioration of governments’ budget balances in many European countries and the lack of accuracy in fiscal projections. Of particular concern is that planned government deficits turned out to consistently exceed budgetary plans by a significant magnitude in recent years. Explanatory factors for these misalignments include unexpected or unplanned large GDP shocks or fiscal stimulus packages. However beyond this, a lack of both transparency and a realistic account of facts may be at fault

Financial frictions and the zero lower bound on interest rates: a DSGE analysis

Recent developments in Canada, the United Kingdom, the euro area, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States have triggered a debate on whether monetary policy is effective when the nominal interest rate is close to zero. In this context, the monetary authority is no longer in a position to pursue a policy of monetary easing by lowering nominal interest rates further. However, some economists have down-played the risk of hitting the zero lower bound, at least for the US economy. In this paper, I assess the implications of the zero lower bound in a DSGE model with financial frictions. The financial accelerator mechanism is formalized as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1995). The paper attempts to address three main issues. First, I evaluate whether the zero lower bound -- by limiting the use of the nominal interest rate as a policy instrument -- might hamper the monetary authority from offsetting the negative effects of an adverse shock. Second, I analyze whether price-level targeting, through the stabilization of private sector expectations, might be a better monetary rule than inflation targeting in order to avoid the "liquidity trap". Third, I investigate the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus (namely, an increase in government expenditure) when financial markets are imperfect and the nominal interest rate is close to its zero lower bound. In this context, two questions will be addressed: first, do financial frictions weaken the effect of a fiscal expansion? Second, how are results affected when the zero lower bound is binding? To address these questions, I introduce a negative demand shock and an adverse financial shock. I find that by adopting a price-level targeting rule, the monetary authority might alleviate the recession generated by the interaction of financial frictions and lower-bounded nominal interest rates. Alternatively, an increase in government expenditure has a positive impact on output, but fiscal multipliers are below one, due to a strong crowding-out effect of private consumption. This effect is muted when the nominal interest rate is lower bounded. In analyzing discretionary fiscal policy, this paper does also focus on two crucial aspects: the duration of the fiscal stimulus and the presence of implementation lags

Labour market policies for inclusiveness. A literature review with a gap analysis

The COVID-19 pandemic triggered renewed interest in the use of different fiscal spending and transfer programmes to address the worsening conditions and deepening inequalities within the labour markets. This paper reviews the role of specific fiscal spending and transfer programmes in shaping labour market dynamics by disentangling different macroeconomic and microeconomic mechanisms. The paper pre- sents the recent empirical evidence on the topic in an attempt to abstract several empirical regularities and identify research gaps. The analysis also highlights gaps in the literature and suggests how future research could fill these gaps

Financial frictions and the zero lower bound on interest rates: a DSGE analysis

Recent developments in Canada, the United Kingdom, the euro area, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States have triggered a debate on whether monetary policy is effective when the nominal interest rate is close to zero. In this context, the monetary authority is no longer in a position to pursue a policy of monetary easing by lowering nominal interest rates further. However, some economists have down-played the risk of hitting the zero lower bound, at least for the US economy. In this paper, I assess the implications of the zero lower bound in a DSGE model with financial frictions. The financial accelerator mechanism is formalized as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1995). The paper attempts to address three main issues. First, I evaluate whether the zero lower bound -- by limiting the use of the nominal interest rate as a policy instrument -- might hamper the monetary authority from offsetting the negative effects of an adverse shock. Second, I analyze whether price-level targeting, through the stabilization of private sector expectations, might be a better monetary rule than inflation targeting in order to avoid the "liquidity trap". Third, I investigate the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus (namely, an increase in government expenditure) when financial markets are imperfect and the nominal interest rate is close to its zero lower bound. In this context, two questions will be addressed: first, do financial frictions weaken the effect of a fiscal expansion? Second, how are results affected when the zero lower bound is binding? To address these questions, I introduce a negative demand shock and an adverse financial shock. I find that by adopting a price-level targeting rule, the monetary authority might alleviate the recession generated by the interaction of financial frictions and lower-bounded nominal interest rates. Alternatively, an increase in government expenditure has a positive impact on output, but fiscal multipliers are below one, due to a strong crowding-out effect of private consumption. This effect is muted when the nominal interest rate is lower bounded. In analyzing discretionary fiscal policy, this paper does also focus on two crucial aspects: the duration of the fiscal stimulus and the presence of implementation lags

Fiscal forecast errors

The fact that the literature tends to find optimistic biases in national fiscal projections has led to a growing recognition in the academic and policy arenas of the need for independent forecasts in the fiscal domain, prepared by independent agencies, such as the European Commission in the case of Europe. Against this background the aim of this paper is to test: (i) whether the forecasting performance of governments is indeed worse than that of international organizations, and (ii) whether fiscal projections prepared by international organizations are free from political economy distortions. The answer to these both questions is no: our results, based on real-time data for 15 European countries over the period 1999- 2007, point to the rejection of the two hypotheses under scrutiny. We motivate the empirical analysis on the basis of a model in which an independent agency tries to minimize the distance to the government forecast. Starting from the assumption that the government’s information set includes private information not available to outside forecasters, we show how such a framework can help in understanding the observed empirical evidence.Las previsiones presupuestarias que preparan las autoridades nacionales tienden a presentar, en promedio, una visión optimista de la senda futura de las finanzas públicas. Este hecho ha sido probado en numerosos trabajos en particular, en el caso de Europa, en la última década. Por ello, se escuchan voces que piden que otras instituciones, independientes de los Gobiernos nacionales, asuman un papel más relevante en el proceso de planificación presupuestaria. En particular, en el caso de Europa, se menciona a la Comisión Europea. En este marco, el objetivo del presente documento es contrastar dos cuestiones muy concretas con respecto a las previsiones presupuestarias preparadas por las instituciones internacionales: i) ¿es la exactitud de dichas proyecciones mucho mejor que la de las preparadas por las autoridades nacionales?, y ii) ¿están libres dichas previsiones de distorsiones derivadas de factores tales como los ciclos electorales? Nuestros resultados, basados en una muestra de datos (previsiones) obtenidos de informes publicados en tiempo real para 15 países europeos en el período 1999-2007, señalan que la respuesta a las dos preguntas es negativa. Además de la evidencia empírica, en el documento se desarrolla un modelo teórico muy estilizado con el que se proporciona una posible explicación de los resultados empíricos. Dicha explicación se basa en la idea de que las autoridades nacionales disponen de más información que los analistas externos en todas las etapas de elaboración y seguimiento de los planes presupuestarios. Así pues, la institución independiente, al tratar de aproximarse lo más posible a la previsión del Gobierno (para reducir el déficit de acceso a la información), puede acabar incorporando en su propia previsión parte del sesgo político habitual en las proyecciones oficiales

Optimal monetary policy in a small open economy with financial frictions

I analyze how the introduction of financial frictions can affect the trade-off between output stabilization and inflation stability and whether, in the presence of financial frictions, the optimal outcome can be realized or approached more closely if monetary policy is allowed to react to aggregate financial variables. Moreover, I explore the issue of whether an inflation targeting cum exchange rate stabilization and a price-level targeting are more suitable rules in minimizing distortions generated by the presence of liabilities defined in foreign currency and in nominal terms. I find that, when the financial accelerator mechanism is working, a price-level targeting rule dominates. One caveat is that the source of the shock plays an important role. Once the financial shock is not operative, the gain from a price-level targeting rule decreases significantly. --Monetary policy,Taylor rule,financial accelerator,price-level targeting,asset prices

Is robotic right colectomy economically sustainable? A multicentre retrospective comparative study and cost analysis

Background Following the Food and Drug Administration approval, robot-assisted colorectal surgery has gained more acceptance among surgeons. One of the open issues about robotic surgery is the economic sustainability. The aim of our study is to evaluate the economic sustainability of robotic as compared to laparoscopic right colectomy for the Italian National Health System. Methods We performed a retrospective multicentre case-matched study including 94 patients for each group from four different Italian surgical departments. An economic evaluation gathered from a real-world data was performed to assess the sustainability of the robotic approach for right colectomy in the Italian National Health System. In particular, a differential cost analysis between the two procedures was performed. Results No statistical differences were found between the two groups for postoperative outcomes. After a careful review of the literature on the cost assessment for the operative room, medical devices and hospital stay according with our data, we estimated the followings: (a) the mean operative room cost for robotic group was 2179 ± 476 € vs. 1376 ± 322 € for laparoscopic group; (b) the mean hospital stay cost for robotic group was 3143 ± 1435 € vs. 3292 ± 1123 € for laparoscopic group; and (c) the mean cost for instruments was 6280 € for robotic group vs. 1504 € for laparoscopic group. The total mean cost of robotic right colectomy was 11,576 ± 1915 € vs. 6196 ± 1444 € for laparoscopic right colectomy. Conclusion In conclusion, to date, robotic right colectomy with intracorporeal anastomosis does not provide any significant clinical advantages, which may justify the additional costs, as compared to its laparoscopic counterpart. Further evolution of robotic technology and experience may lead to a reduction of costs, especially if the robotic platform is used in an appropriate healthcare setting