The "Daily Grind": Work, Commuting, and Their Impact on Political Participation

Past research demonstrates that free time is an important resource for political participation. We investigate whether two central drains on citizens? daily time?working and commuting?impact their level of political participation. The prevailing ?resources? model offers a quantity-focused view where additional time spent working or commuting reduces free time and should each separately decrease participation. We contrast this view to a ?commuter?s strain? hypothesis, which emphasizes time spent in transit as a psychologically onerous burden over and above the workday. Using national survey data, we find that time spent working has no effect on participation, while commuting significantly decreases participation. We incorporate this finding into a comprehensive model of the ?daily grind,? which factors in both socioeconomic status and political interest. Our analysis demonstrates that commuting leads to the greatest loss in political interest for low-income Americans, and that this loss serves as a main mechanism through which commuting erodes political participation

What drives political participation? Motivations and Mobilization in a Digital Age

The article provides insights into the driving forces that underpin new forms of political participation. Digital technologies offer opportunities for engaging in a wide range of civically-oriented activities, whether liking or sharing political content, joining online political communities or joining discussions, each can contribute to deeper democratic engagement and, for the individual, act as a pathway towards further civic participation. Conventional acts of political participation, demonstrating, petitioning and voting, are argued to be driven primarily by intrinsic motivations relating to self-efficacy and empowerment as the individual feels they can have influence over decision makers. Little research explores whether similar motivations drive participation in less conventional acts, as well as whether mobilisation attempts via social media by peers or political organisations mediate those motivations. Drawing on data from a survey among a representative sample of the UK electorate, we find the offline and online spheres of agency as still fairly distinct. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations both matter but extrinsic motivations, following norms of behaviour within networks and supporting the activities of peers, have the strongest explanatory power independent of the sphere of activity. The mediating effect of mobilisation tactics has a minimal effect on extrinsic motivations, online or offline, but online intrinsic motivations lose their explanatory power. This finding suggests online political acts are carried out due to mobilisation, although as intrinsic factors offer little explanatory power these acts may lack meaning to the individual. We also found that campaign organisations are the most powerful mobilisers perhaps suggesting social media users are most likely to perform simple acts in support of non-contentious causes

One moment, please: can the speed and quality of political contact affect democratic health

Contact between politicians and their constituents is the cornerstone of democracies globally but an area of scholarship that remains relatively underdeveloped. Political contact can help convey authority, provide legitimacy and facilitate governance. This article goes beyond the assumption that representatives need to communicate more with the public and suggests, instead, that the quality of contact matters. Focusing on four processes by which citizens can contact their representatives (face-to-face, by letter, email or social media), we employ an experimental vignette methodology to test whether the character and timeliness of politicians’ responses to citizen communication affects two indicators of democratic health: (a) the latter’s satisfaction with political contact and (b) their likelihood to re-contact representatives. Our findings provide evidence that personalised communication and to a smaller extent, speed of response, can influence citizen satisfaction and their likelihood of re-engagement. This suggests politicians can improve these indicators of democratic health by adjusting the style of political contact and communication

Third-Party Strategy under Plurality Rule: The British Liberal Democrats and the New Zealand Social Credit Party

This paper examines the strategic options facing small centrist third parties in two-party parliamentary systems operating under the single-member district plurality (SMDP) electoral system. It uses a spatial model to show that centrist third parties are better off targeting the 'safe' districts of a major party rather than marginal districts. Furthermore, it is optimal to target one party's districts, not both, to benefit from tactical and protest voting. The paper also questions the implicit conclusion of the median-legislator theorem that pivotality-seeking is the best strategy for a third party, at least under SMDP, because that would usurp voters' ability to select the executive directly, a key feature of two-partism. Finally, the paper shows that third parties can damage themselves if they 'flip' from opposition to one major party to support for it. Evidence is provided for the British Liberal Democrats and New Zealand?s historic Social Credit Party

It’s Not the Left: Ideology and Protest Participation in Old and New Democracies

Multiple studies in political science consistently hold that left-wing ideology renders individuals more prone to protest behavior. However, the familiar association between left-wing ideology and protesting is not empirically corroborated in all democratic nations. Building on existing theoretical principles and applying them to diverse political contexts, this paper sheds light on puzzling variation in protest behavior across new and old democracies. It argues that it is not the left that engenders protest. Instead, we demonstrate that which political camp engages in protest behavior depends on its historical legacies and cultural liberalism. Historical legacies reflect the ideological configuration at democratization. Protesting tends to be more common in the ideological camp that opposed the pre-democratic political order. Simultaneously, it is culturally liberal individuals that more likely embrace protest participation, independent of their left-right identification. These theoretical expectations are supported through survey data analyses, explaining contrasting inter- and intra-regional variation in European democracies

Opinion climates and immigrant political action: a cross-national study of 25 European democracies

We develop a model of immigrant political action that connects individual motivations to become politically involved with the context in which participation takes place. The article posits that opinion climates in the form of hostility or openness toward immigrants shape the opportunity structure for immigrant political engagement by contributing to the social costs and political benefits of participation. We argue that friendly opinion climates toward immigrants enable political action among immigrants, and facilitate the politicization of political discontent. Using survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) 2002 to 2010 in 25 European democracies, our analyses reveal that more positive opinion climates-at the level of countries and regions-increase immigrant political engagement, especially among immigrants dissatisfied with the political system. However, this effect is limited to uninstitutionalized political action, as opinion climates have no observable impact on participation in institutionalized politics

Trajectories of Solidarities in France Across Fields of Vulnerability

This chapter approaches the study of solidarity in France by comparing three important vulnerable groups, namely, the disabled, the unemployed, and refugees. The way we approach solidarity hinges on an important distinction between two different meanings of solidarity: solidarity understood as an input and solidarity understood as an output. In particular, we distinguish between two main \u201ctrajectories of solidarity\u201d, which helps us to understand the way certain individual variables (such as self-identification and proximity) combine with political variables (like voting, an interest in politics, or the reading of newspapers) in very different ways. Our main finding is the political trajectory of solidarity can have a remarkable potential even when it comes to helping vulnerable people outside the national boundaries of the political community in France