Alley Cropping of Maize with Nine Leguminous Trees

A maize-leguminous tree alley cropping system was studied on an N-deficient Vertic Haplustoll in Hawaii. Nine tree species were evaluated for green manure (GM) and intercropped maize yields. They included: Calliandra calothvrsus, Caianus caian, Cassia siamea, Gliricidia sepium, KX1— Leucaena hybrid (L. pallida X L. diversifolia), L. leucocephala. L. pallida. L. salvadorensis, and Sesbania sesban. S. sesban, G. sepium, L. pallida, and KX1 showed high potential for use as a hedge, producing between 5 and 12 dry t/ha GM with N yields between 140 and 275 kg N/ha in 4 prunings. Maize yields responded linearly to nitrogen applied as green manure. Maize yield increased 12 kg for each kg of nitrogen applied. Addition of prunings from hedge rows was able to support maize grain yield at about 1800 kg/ha for two consecutive cropping seasons, while control plot yields averaged less than 600 kg/ha. S. sesban hedges produced the most GM and yielded the highest maize yields. Maize yields reflected the amount of N applied as GM, regardless of tree species from which the N was derived. Green manure at five rates (0, 0.5x, lx, lx + 60 N from urea and 2x the amount produced by the hedge) were applied in the G. sepium and L. pallida plots. The full green manure plus urea treatment was the most efficient in increasing yields. These plots produced significantly more maize, with less total N applied, than the double G. sepium and L. pallida treatments. Significant reductions in maize yields were seen in maize rows near the hedge relative to those in the middle of the alley. Increasing the distance away from the hedge and coppicing the hedge earlier in maize growth significantly improved maize yields in the maize row closest to the trees

Globalization, democratization, and the Arab uprising : the international factor in MENA's failed democratization

What explains the almost negative impact of international factors on post-Uprising democratization prospects? This article compares the utility of rival “diffusionist” and neo-Gramscian political economy frames to explain this. Three international factors deter democratization. The failure of Western democracy promotion is rooted in the contradiction between the dominance of global finance capital and the norm of democratic equality; in the periphery, neo-liberalism is most compatible with hybrid regimes and, at best, “low intensity democracy.” In MENA, neo-liberalism generated a crony capitalism incompatible with democratization; while this also sparked the uprisings, these have failed to address class inequalities. Moreover at the normative level, MENA hosts the most credible counter-hegemonic ideologies; the brief peaking of democratic ideology in the region during the early uprisings soon declined amidst regional discourse wars. Non-democrats—coercive regime remnants and radical charismatic movements--were empowered by the competitive interference of rival powers in Uprising states. The collapse of many Uprising states amidst a struggle for power over the region left an environment uncongenial to democratization.PostprintPeer reviewe

Morality and progress:IR narratives on international revisionism and the status quo

Scholars debate the ambitions and policies of today’s ‘rising powers’ and the extent to which they are revising or upholding the international status quo. While elements of the relevant literature provide valuable insight, this article argues that the concepts of revisionism and the status quo within mainstream International Relations (IR) have always constituted deeply rooted, autobiographical narratives of a traditionally Western-dominated discipline. As ‘ordering narratives’ of morality and progress, they constrain and organize debate so that revisionism is typically conceived not merely as disruption, but as disruption from the non-West amidst a fundamentally moral Western order that represents civilizational progress. This often makes them inherently problematic and unreliable descriptors of the actors and behaviours they are designed to explain. After exploring the formations and development of these concepts throughout the IR tradition, the analysis is directed towards narratives around the contemporary ‘rise’ of China. Both scholarly and wider political narratives typically tell the story of revisionist challenges China presents to a US/Western-led status quo, promoting unduly binary divisions between the West and non-West, and tensions and suspicions in the international realm. The aim must be to develop a new language and logic that recognize the contingent, autobiographical nature of ‘revisionist’ and ‘status quo’ actors and behaviours

Causation, complexity, and the concert: the pragmatics of causal explanation in international relations

A causal explanation provides information about the causal history of whatever is being explained. However, most causal histories extend back almost infinitely and can be described in almost infinite detail. Causal explanations therefore involve choices about which elements of causal histories to pick out. These choices are pragmatic: they reflect our explanatory interests. When adjudicating between competing causal explanations, we must therefore consider not only questions of epistemic adequacy (whether we have good grounds for identifying certain factors as causes) but also questions of pragmatic adequacy (whether the aspects of the causal history picked out are salient to our explanatory interests). Recognizing that causal explanations differ pragmatically as well as epistemically is crucial for identifying what is at stake in competing explanations of the relative peacefulness of the nineteenth-century Concert system. It is also crucial for understanding how explanations of past events can inform policy prescription

Seeing the Lexus for the Olive Trees? Public Opinion, Economic Interdependence, and Interstate Conflict

Many scholars argue that economic interdependence and more extensive economic ties between countries decreases the risk of violent conflict between them. However, despite considerable research on the “capitalist peace” at the macro or dyadic level, there has been less attention to its possible individual-level microfoundations or underpinnings. We argue that public perceptions about economic ties with other states and the costs of conflict should influence the expected constraints on the use of force for leaders. Actual high interdependence and potential economic costs may not suffice to create political constraints on the use of force if people are unaware of the degree of interdependence or fail to understand the benefits of trade and the likely economic costs of disruptive conflict. We examine the linkages between individual perceptions about economic interdependence and their views on conflict and peace through a survey experiment, where we ask respondents in Japan about approval for belligerent actions in a territorial dispute with China and varying information about economic ties. Our findings indicate that greater knowledge and information about economic interdependence affects attitudes about territorial disputes and increases support for peaceful solutions with China