Introduction to Interpersonal Acceptance-Rejection Theory (IPARTheory) and Evidence

Interpersonal acceptance-rejection theory (IPARTheory) is an evidence-based theory of socialization and lifespan development. It is composed of three subtheories, each of which deals with a separate but interrelated set of issues. IPARTheory’s personality subtheory – which is the most highly developed component of the theory – deals primarily with the pancultural nature and effects of interpersonal acceptance and rejection. Coping subtheory explores the fact that some individuals are better able to cope with experiences of perceived rejection than are other individuals. Finally, IPARTheory’s sociocultural systems subtheory attempts to predict and explain major causes and sociocultural correlates of interpersonal acceptance-rejection worldwide. Empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports the theory’s major postulates and predictions, especially postulates and predictions in personality subtheory. Emerging evidence about the neurobiological and biochemical risks posed for the development, structure, and function of the human brain are beginning to help explain why these postulates and predictions are so consistently confirmed panculturally

Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War

We examine how natural resource location, rent sharing and fighting capacities of different groups matter for ethnic conflict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple types of potential con.icts (and hence multiple threat points) is identified. The theory predicts conflict to be more likely when the geographical distribution of natural resources is uneven and when a minority group has better chances to win a secessionist rather than a centrist con.ict. For sharing rents, resource proportionality is salient in avoiding secessions and strength proportionality in avoiding centrist civil wars. We present empirical evidence that is consistent with the model.Natural Resources, Conflict, Strength Proportionality, Resource Proportionality, Secession, Bargaining Failure.

Full Hydrodynamic Simulation of GaAs MESFETs

A finite difference upwind discretization scheme in two dimensions is presented in detail for the transient simulation of the highly coupled non-linear partial differential equations of the full hydrodynamic model, providing thereby a practical engineering tool for improved charge carrier transport simulations at high electric fields and frequencies. The discretization scheme preserves the conservation and transportive properties of the equations. The hydrodynamic model is able to describe inertia effects which play an increasing role in different fields of micro- and optoelectronics, where simplified charge transport models like the drift-diffusion model and the energy balance model are no longer applicable. Results of extensive numerical simulations are shown for a two-dimensional MESFET device. A comparison of the hydrodynamic model to the commonly used energy balance model is given and the accuracy of the results is discussed.Comment: 18 pages, LATE

Knowledge is Power - A Theory of Information, Income, and Welfare Spending

No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but better educated and richer voters are on average better informed than others. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters, and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the preferences of rich voters. In US election survey data, we find that income is more important in affecting voting behavior for more informed voters than for less informed voters, as predicted by the model. Further, in a panel of US states we find that when there is a strong correlation between income and political information, Congress representatives vote more conservatively, which is also in line with our theory.redistribution, welfare spending, information, income, voting, political economics

The Effects of Conflict on the Structure of the Economy

The presence of conflict affects peoples economic incentives. Some sectors of activity flourish, while others suffer. For understanding structural problems in developing countries and designing appropriate post-conflict reconstruction policies, it is essential to understand in what ways conflict affects the structure of the economy. We develop a simple model of conflict and multiple sectors of activity, where conflict efforts, the allocation of factor endowments and the production outputs are endogenous. We predict that for moderately destructive conflicts labor-intensive sectors are most affected by fighting, while for highly destructive conflicts capital-intensive sectors suffer most. In the latter case, under some conditions it is also possible that in the presence of endogenous conflict - an increase in the price of the capital-intensive commodity reduces the output of this same good. The model further predicts that export-sectors and sectors that require inter-temporal investments are particularly exposed to conflict activity. In the empirical part of the paper, we study the impact of various forms of conflict, separately and as an aggregate conflict index constructed with principal component analysis. We present some basic stylized facts about the effect of conflict on the productive structure of the economy. Conflict reduces the share of the manufacturing sector in the GDP, increases the exploitation of some simple natural resources (i.e. forestry) and reduces the production of crops. Using industrial level data for developing countries we study the channels through which conflict affects the manufacturing sector. As expected, we find that industries that are more institutional/transaction intensive are the ones that suffer most in conflictive societies. Laborintensive sectors are also negatively affected by conflict. It is also found that exporting industries and sectors requiring external financing suffer more during conflict. Our results are robust to sensitivity analysis. --Conflict,Production Structure,Resource Curse,Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The impact of wakeup schedule distribution in synchronous power save protocols on the performance of multihop wireless networks

By definition, the operation of an asynchronous power save protocol permits an arbitrary distribution of nodes' wakeup schedules. This wakeup schedule distribution creates an uncoordinated pattern of times at which nodes will attempt to transmit. Intuitively, we would expect that some patterns will be more (or less) favorable than others for a given traffic pattern. We investigate the impact of this wakeup pattern on network capacity and present simulation data showing that the capacity associated with the best wakeup patterns is significantly larger than that of the worst. This result not only gives insight to the behavior of such protocols, but also acts as a feasibility study showing the potential benefit of mechanisms by which nodes adapt their wakeup schedules to obtain improved performance

War and Natural Resource Exploitation

Although the relationship between natural resources and civil war has received much attention, little is known about the underlying mechanisms. Controversies and contradictions in the stylized facts persist because resource extraction is treated as exogenous while in reality fighting affects extraction. We study endogenous fighting, armament, and extraction method, speed and investment. Rapacious resource exploitation has economic costs, but can nevertheless be preferred to balanced depletion due to lowered incentives for future rebel attacks. With private exploitation, rebels fight more than the government if they can renege on the contract with the mining company, and hence government turnover is larger in this case. Incentive-compatible license fees paid by private companies and mining investment are lower in unstable countries, and increase with the quality of the government army and office rents. This implies that privatised resource exploitation is more attractive for governments who have incentives to fight hard, i.e., in the presence of large office rents and a strong army. With endogenous weapon investments, the government invests more under balanced than under rapacious or private extraction. If the government can commit before mining licenses are auctioned, it will invest more in weapons under private extraction than under balanced and rapacious nationalized extraction.conflict, natural resources, private resource exploitation, mining investment, license fee

Strategic Mass Killings

Since World War II there have been about fifty episodes of large-scale mass killings of civilians and massive forced displacements. They were usually meticulously planned and independent of military goals. We provide a model where conflict onset, conflict intensity and the decision to commit mass killings are all endogenous, with two main goals: (1) to identify the key variables and situations that make mass killings more likely to occur; and (2) to distinguish conditions under which mass killings and military conflict intensity reinforce each other from situations where they are substitute modes of strategic violence. We predict that mass killings are most likely in societies with large natural resources, significant proportionality constraints for rent sharing, low productivity and low state capacity. Further, massacres are more likely in a civil than in an interstate war, as in the latter group sizes matter less for future rents. In non polarized societies there are asymmetric equilibria with only the larger group wanting to engage in massacres. In such settings the smaller group compensates for this by fighting harder in the first place. In this case we can talk of mass killings and fighting efforts to be substitutes. In contrast, in polarized societies either both or none of the groups can be ready to do mass killings in case of victory. Under the "shadow of mass killings" groups fight harder. Hence, in this case massacres and fighting are complements. We also present novel empirical results on the role of natural resources in mass killings and on what kinds of ethnic groups are most likely to be victimized in massacres and forced resettlements, using group level panel data.Mass Killings, Civil War, Natural Resources, Intensity of Conflict, Group Size

War signals: a theory of trade, trust and conflict

We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is inhabitated by two ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one group has to form beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other group. Since conflict disrupts trade, the onset of a conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to trade. Agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time, transmitting them to the next generation. The theory bears a set of testable predictions. First, war is a stochastic process whose frequency depends on the state of endogenous beliefs. Second, the probability of future conflicts increases after each conflict episode. Third, "accidental" conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals can lead to a permanent breakdown of trust, plunging a society into a vicious cycle of recurrent conflicts (a war trap). The incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers, fostering inter-ethnic trade and human capital, and shifting beliefs. Coercive peace policies such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes have instead no persistent effects.Beliefs, civil war, conict, cultural transmission, ethnic fractionalization, human capital investments, learning, matching, peacekeeping, stochastic war, strategic complementarity, trade

Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage

We study incumbency advantage in a dynamic game with incomplete information between an incumbent and a voter. The incumbent knows the true state of the world, e.g., the severity of an economic recession or the level of criminal activities, and can choose the quality of his policy. This quality and the state of the world determine the policy outcome, i.e., the economic growth rate or the number of crimes committed. The voter only observes the policy outcome and then decides whether to reelect the incumbent or not. Her preferences are such that she would reelect the incumbent under full information if and only if the state of the world is above a given threshold level. In equilibrium, the incumbent is reelected in more states of the world than he would be under full information. In particular, he chooses ine±cient policies and generates mediocre policy outcomes whenever the voter's induced belief distribution will be such that her expected utility of reelecting the incumbent exceeds her expected utility of electing the opposition candidate. Hence, there is an incumbency advantage through ine±cient policies. We provide empirical evidence consistent with the prediction that reelection concerns may induce incumbents to generate mediocre outcomes.Elections; Incumbency Advantage; Political Economics