No evidence of inequality aversion in the investment game

We report experimental evidence on second-movers’ behavior in the investment game (also known as the trust game) when there exists endowment heterogeneity. Using a within-subject analysis, we investigate whether or not second-movers exhibit some taste for inequality aversion by returning a larger (smaller) share of the available funds to first-movers who are initially endowed with a lesser (larger) endowment, respectively. Our data suggest that second-movers do not take into consideration the level of endowments when making their decisions as their behavior is consistent across distribution of endowments; i.e., they return the same proportion of the available funds regardless of the endowments. We indeed find that some second-movers have a tendency to return what they have received from firstmovers. In our data, there is also a substantial proportion of second-movers who are selfish and return nothing

An experimental study of gender differences in distributive justice

This paper shows that women are more likely than men to employ the fair allocation that most benefits their financial payoff. The experimental evidence is gleaned from a dictator game with production, in which subjects first solve a quiz to accumulate earnings and then divide the surplus by choosing one over five different allocations, some of which represent a fairness ideal. The data also suggest that women are more sensitive to the context as their allocation choices depend on whether they have accumulated more or less money than their counterparts. This is not the case for men’s allocation choices (JEL Codes:C91, D30, D64, J16) Keywords: gender differences, distributive justice, fairness ideals, self-serving choices, experimental economics, dictator game with production

Equity and bargaining power in ultimatum games

This paper studies the extent to which offers and demands in ultimatum games are consistent with equity theory when there is a joint endowment to be distributed. Using a within-subject design, we also investigate the importance of the bargaining power by comparing the subjects' behavior in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game, which differ in the possible cost of responders rejecting the proposers' offer. Our findings suggest that proposers are willing to reward responders for their contribution to the joint endowment in any of the two games. As for responders, their behavior is consistent with equity theory only in the no-veto-cost game (in which a rejection is costless for them) when the game is first played. When the no-veto-cost game is played after the ultimatum game, we observe that the responders' demands usually exceed their contribution to the endowment. Finally, this paper reports evidence that the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game differ in terms of efficiency and rejection rates

Are you a Good Employee or Simply a Good Guy? Infl?uence Costs and Contract Design.

We develop a principal-agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft signal (the supervision signal) about the agent?s level of effort. We show that the agent?'s ability to manipulate the soft signal increases the cost of implementing the effcient equilibrium, leading to wage compression when the infl?uence cost is privately incurred by the agent. When manipulation activities negatively affect the agent?s productivity through the level of output, the design of infl?uence-free contracts that deter manipulation may lead to high-powered incentives. This result implies that high-productivity workers face incentive schemes that are more sensitive to hard evidence than those faced by their low-productivity counterparts. In that context, the principal will tolerate infl?uence for low-productivity workers but not for high-productivity workers. We also fi?nd that in the case of productivity-based costs, it may be optimal for the principal not to supervise the agent, even if supervision is costless.principal-agent model with supervision, contract design, in?uence activities, manipulation, productivity-based influence costs, power of incentives

No evidence of inequality aversion in the investment game

We report experimental evidence on second-movers’ behavior in the investment game (also known as the trust game) when there exists endowment heterogeneity. Using a within-subject analysis, we investigate whether or not second-movers exhibit some taste for inequality aversion by returning a larger (smaller) share of the available funds to first-movers who are initially endowed with a lesser (larger) endowment, respectively. Our data suggest that second-movers do not take into consideration the level of endowments when making their decisions as their behavior is consistent across distribution of endowments; i.e., they return the same proportion of the available funds regardless of the endowments. We indeed find that some second-movers have a tendency to return what they have received from firstmovers. In our data, there is also a substantial proportion of second-movers who are selfish and return nothing

Are you a good employee or simply a good guy? influence costs and contract design

We develop a principal–agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft behavioral signal (the supervision signal) about the agent's level of effort. In our model, the agent can initiate influence activities and manipulate the behavioral signal. These activities are costly for the principal as they detract the agent from the productive task. We show that the agent's ability to manipulate the behavioral signal leads to low-powered incentives and increases the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium as a result. Interestingly, the fact that manipulation activities entail productivity losses may lead to the design of influence-free contracts that deter manipulation and lead to high-powered incentives. This result implies that the optimal contract (and whether manipulation is tolerated in equilibrium or not) depends on the magnitude of the productivity-based influence costs. We show that it may be optimal for the principal not to supervise the agent, even if the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low

Social motives vs social influence: an experiment on interdependent time preferences

We report experimental evidence on the effects of social preferences on intertemporal decisions. To this aim, we design an intertemporal Dictator Game to test whether Dictators modify their discounting behavior when their own decision is imposed on their matched Recipients. We run four different treatments to identify the effect of payoffs externalities from those related to information and beliefs. Our descriptive statistics show that heterogeneous social time preferences and information about others’ time preferences are significant determinants of choices: Dictators display a marked propensity to account for the intertemporal preferences of Recipients, both in the presence of externalities (social motives) and/or when they know about the decisions of their matched partners (social influence). We also perform a structural estimation exercise to control for heterogeneity in risk attitudes. As for individual behavior, our estimates confirm previous studies in that high risk aversion is associated with low discounting. As for social behavior, we find that social motives outweigh social influence, especially when we restrict our sample to pairs of Dictators and Recipients who satisfy minimal consistency conditions

Heterogeneity in the Relationship between Disinfection By-Products in Drinking Water and Cancer: A Systematic Review.

The epidemiological evidence demonstrating the effect of disinfection by-products (DBPs) from drinking water on colon and rectal cancers is well documented. However, no systematic assessment has been conducted to assess the potential effect measure modification (EMM) in the relationship between DBPs and cancer. The objective of this paper is to conduct a systematic literature review to determine the extent to which EMM has been assessed in the relationship between DBPs in drinking water in past epidemiological studies. Selected articles (n = 19) were reviewed, and effect estimates and covariates that could have been used in an EMM assessment were gathered. Approximately half of the studies assess EMM (n = 10), but the majority of studies only estimate it relative to sex subgroups (n = 6 for bladder cancer and n = 2 both for rectal and colon cancers). Although EMM is rarely assessed, several variables that could have a potential modification effect are routinely collected in these studies, such as socioeconomic status or age. The role of environmental exposures through drinking water can play an important role and contribute to cancer disparities. We encourage a systematic use of subgroup analysis to understand which populations or territories are more vulnerable to the health impacts of DBPs

Professional Development Principles for Teachers of English Language Learners

Since effective professional development is logically embedded in the reality of schools and teachers‘ work, it stands to reason that the principal would consider that reality for teachers of English language learners (ELL). Certainly, in general, professional development would incorporate principles of adult learning as reported by Knowles (1980): (1) adult learners need to be self-directed; (2) they display readiness to learn when they have a perceived need; and (3) they desire immediate application of new skills and knowledge. Based on adult learning theory, then, principals would provide teachers of ELLs professional development that addresses a need for self-direction, that addresses their particular needs, and that addresses the desire to apply what is learned. Time and created situations whereby teachers can dialogue with other teachers and principals can dialogue with other principals is critical for the effective application of the knowledge gained in professional development sessions and afterward as well

Do negative random shocks affect trust and trustworthiness?

We report data from a variation of the trust game aimed at determining whether (and how) inequality and random shocks that affect wealth influence the levels of trust and trustworthiness. To tease apart the effect of the shock and the inequality, we compare behavior in a trust game where the inequality is initially given and one where it is the result of a random shock that reduces the second mover’s endowment. We find that first-movers send less to second-movers but only when the inequality results from a random shock. As for the amount returned, second-movers return less when they are endowed less than first-movers, regardless of whether the difference in endowments was initially given or occurred after a random shock