Quantum loops in radiative decays of the a1a_1 and b1b_1 axial-vector mesons

A previous model where the low-lying axial-vector mesons are dynamically generated, implementing unitarity in coupled channels in the vector-pseudoscalar ($VP$) meson interaction, is applied to evaluate the decay widths of the a_1(1260)$and$b_1(1235)$axial-vector mesons into$\pi\gamma$. Unlike the case of the$a_1$, the$b_1$radiative decay is systematically underestimated at tree level. In this work we evaluate for the first time the loop contribution coming from an initial$VP$vertex. Despite the large superficial divergence of the loops, the convergence of the relevant loops can be established by using arguments of gauge invariance. The partial decay widths obtained agree very well with the experimental values within uncertainties, and show that the loop contribution is crucial in the$b_1$case and also important for the$a_1$ case.Comment: 16 pages, 4 figurs Added extra discussio

Imperfect Imitation Can Enhance Cooperation

The promotion of cooperation on spatial lattices is an important issue in evolutionary game theory. This effect clearly depends on the update rule: it diminishes with stochastic imitative rules whereas it increases with unconditional imitation. To study the transition between both regimes, we propose a new evolutionary rule, which stochastically combines unconditional imitation with another imitative rule. We find that, surprinsingly, in many social dilemmas this rule yields higher cooperative levels than any of the two original ones. This nontrivial effect occurs because the basic rules induce a separation of timescales in the microscopic processes at cluster interfaces. The result is robust in the space of 2x2 symmetric games, on regular lattices and on scale-free networks.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figure

Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics

Evolutionary game dynamics is one of the most fruitful frameworks for studying evolution in different disciplines, from Biology to Economics. Within this context, the approach of choice for many researchers is the so-called replicator equation, that describes mathematically the idea that those individuals performing better have more offspring and thus their frequency in the population grows. While very many interesting results have been obtained with this equation in the three decades elapsed since it was first proposed, it is important to realize the limits of its applicability. One particularly relevant issue in this respect is that of non-mean-field effects, that may arise from temporal fluctuations or from spatial correlations, both neglected in the replicator equation. This review discusses these temporal and spatial effects focusing on the non-trivial modifications they induce when compared to the outcome of replicator dynamics. Alongside this question, the hypothesis of linearity and its relation to the choice of the rule for strategy update is also analyzed. The discussion is presented in terms of the emergence of cooperation, as one of the current key problems in Biology and in other disciplines.Comment: Review, 48 pages, 26 figure

Altruistic behavior pays, or the importance of fluctuations in evolutionary game theory

Human behavior is one of the main problems for evolution, as it is often the case that human actions are disadvantageous for the self and advantageous for other people. Behind this puzzle are our beliefs about rational behavior, based on game theory. Here we show that by going beyond the standard game-theoretical conventions, apparently altruistic behavior can be understood as self-interested. We discuss in detail an example related to the so called Ultimatum game and illustrate the appearance of altruistic behavior induced by fluctuations. In addition, we claim that in general settings, fluctuations play a very relevant role, and we support this claim by considering a completely different example, namely the Stag-Hunt game.Comment: For the proceedings of the 8th Granada Seminar on Computational Physics (AIP Proceedeings Series

Time Scales in Evolutionary Dynamics

Evolutionary game theory has traditionally assumed that all individuals in a population interact with each other between reproduction events. We show that eliminating this restriction by explicitly considering the time scales of interaction and selection leads to dramatic changes in the outcome of evolution. Examples include the selection of the inefficient strategy in the Harmony and Stag-Hunt games, and the disappearance of the coexistence state in the Snowdrift game. Our results hold for any population size and in the presence of a background of fitness.Comment: Final version with minor changes, accepted for publication in Physical Review Letter

The envelope of the power spectra of over a thousand \delta Scuti stars. The Tˉeff\bar{T}_{eff}-νmax\nu_{max} scaling relation

CoRoT and Kepler high-precision photometric data allowed the detection and characterization of the oscillation parameters in stars other than the Sun. Moreover, thanks to the scaling relations, it is possible to estimate masses and radii for thousands of solar-type oscillating stars. Recently, a \Delta\nu - \rho relation has been found for \delta Scuti stars. Now, analyzing several hundreds of this kind of stars observed with CoRoT and Kepler, we present an empiric relation between their frequency at maximum power of their oscillation spectra and their effective temperature. Such a relation can be explained with the help of the \kappa-mechanism and the observed dispersion of the residuals is compatible with they being caused by the gravity-darkening effect