Defending Standards Contextualism

It has become more common recently for epistemologists to advocate the pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, the claim that the appropriateness ofknowledge ascriptions is dependent on the relevant practical circumstances. Advocacy of practicalism in epistemology has come at the expense of contextualism, the view that knowledge ascriptions are independent of pragmatic factors and depend alternatively on distinctively epistemological, semantic factors with the result that knowledge ascriptions express different knowledge properties on different occasions of use. Overall, my goal here is to defend a particular version of contextualism drawn from work by Peter Ludlow, called ‘standards contextualism.’ My strategy will be to elaborate on this form of contextualism by defending it from various objections raised by the practicalists Jason Stanley, Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath. In showing how standards contextualism can effectively repel these criticisms I hope to establish that standards contextualism is a viable alternative to practicalism

Stock predictability and preceding stock price changes - Evidence from central and Eastern European markets

This paper extends the empirical evidence on stock returns after preceding price innovations using data from Central and Eastern European (CEE) markets. In contrast to many previous papers, we find no evidence of either overreaction effects or rational adjustments to increased risk after large preceding price movements. We do, however, see strong evidence of trends in the data with price falls(rises) of all sizes being followed by subsequent price falls(rises)

A synthesis of the role of media reports and elections in Nigerian democracy

This paper examines the interplay between the media and the elections in Nigeria, and discusses some of the relevant communication models that could assist the media in effectively reporting future elections in the country. This study has employed a historical approach, and argues that since Nigeria attained its political independence in 1960; conducting free and fair elections has been the major political problem in the country. The paper observed that the June 12 1993 Presidential Elections resulted in a stalemate, while the 2007 Elections were flawed with cases of electoral irregularities. Many of the results of the elections that were approved earlier by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) were later cancelled by the Nigerian Judiciary, a confirmation that the elections were rigged as confirmed by most of the internal and the external observers that monitored the elections. As a part of the solutions to the problem of elections in Nigeria, this paper recommends the establishment of an Inter-Party Central Committee (ICPP), made up of the national executives of the registered political parties, to work in collaboration with the media as the committee supports the electoral commission to conduct free and fair elections in the country

New Media and the Arab Spring of 2011

About media and the Arab sprin

Carnap and ‘Ecosystem’

How one defines the term ‘ecosystem’ is of central importance in arriving at good policy decisions regarding ecosystem management, so guidelines are needed on how to adequately introduce the term ‘ecosystem’ in scientific and policy discourse.  My goal in this paper is to outline how one might approach this matter from the perspective of Rudolf Carnap’s ‘principle of tolerance’.  I begin by outlining two interpretations of what Carnap means by being tolerant in introducing a scientific term – what I call ‘conditional’ and ‘absolute’ interpretations – and then apply these interpretations to the case of introducing the term ‘ecosystem’.  Specifically, I reconstruct the development of the ecosystem concept, starting from notions of a biotic community proposed in the mid-19th century, and working up to Eugene Odum’s present-day authoritative definition of an ‘ecosystem’.  Reflection on this developmental history of the ecosystem concept reveals a number of empirical obstacles in arriving at an adequate definition of ‘ecosystem’, obstacles that have led some ecosystem scientists to resort to pragmatic approaches in defining ecosystems.  What I show is that this presumed reliance on pragmatics is best handled if one interprets the introduction of the term ‘ecosystem’ along the lines of a conditional approach to Carnapian tolerance

Carnap and ‘Ecosystem’

How one defines the term ‘ecosystem’ is of central importance in arriving at good policy decisions regarding ecosystem management, so guidelines are needed on how to adequately introduce the term ‘ecosystem’ in scientific and policy discourse.  My goal in this paper is to outline how one might approach this matter from the perspective of Rudolf Carnap’s ‘principle of tolerance’.  I begin by outlining two interpretations of what Carnap means by being tolerant in introducing a scientific term – what I call ‘conditional’ and ‘absolute’ interpretations – and then apply these interpretations to the case of introducing the term ‘ecosystem’.  Specifically, I reconstruct the development of the ecosystem concept, starting from notions of a biotic community proposed in the mid-19th century, and working up to Eugene Odum’s present-day authoritative definition of an ‘ecosystem’.  Reflection on this developmental history of the ecosystem concept reveals a number of empirical obstacles in arriving at an adequate definition of ‘ecosystem’, obstacles that have led some ecosystem scientists to resort to pragmatic approaches in defining ecosystems.  What I show is that this presumed reliance on pragmatics is best handled if one interprets the introduction of the term ‘ecosystem’ along the lines of a conditional approach to Carnapian tolerance