On freedom, lack of information and the preference for easy choices

This paper is devoted to the study of opportunity sets comparisons when the sets may contain options whose characteristics are not completely known. We propose a suitable environment in which this problem can be approached, and provide axiomatic characterizations of several rules for ranking sets in such a context.freedom of choice, lack of information, extended opportunity sets, easy choices

Dichotomous Preferences and Power Set Extensions

This paper is devoted to the study of how to extend a dichotomous partition of a universal set X into good and bad objects to an ordering on the power set of X. We introduce a family of rules that naturally take into account the number of good objects and the number of bad objects, and provide axiomatic characterizations of two rules for ranking sets in such a context

Dichotomous Preferences and Power Set Extensions

This paper is devoted to the study of how to extend a dichotomous partition of a universal set X into good and bad objects to an ordering on the power set of X. We introduce a family of rules that naturally take into account the number of good objects and the number of bad objects, and provide axiomatic characterizations of two rules for ranking sets in such a context.dichotomy; objects; set extensions; ranking sets

League competitions and fairness

We formulate two fairness principles and characterize the league competition systems that satisfy them. The first principle requires that all players should have the same chance of being the final winner if all players are equally strong, while the second states that the league competition should not favor weaker players. We apply these requirements to a class of systems which includes round-robin tournaments as a particular case

On freedom, lack of information and the preference for easy choices

Arlegi R, Dimitrov D. On freedom, lack of information and the preference for easy choices. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 364. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2005.This paper is devoted to the study of opportunity sets comparisons when the sets may contain options whose characteristics are not completely known. We propose a suitable environment in which this problem can be approached, and provide axiomatic characterizations of several rules for ranking sets in such a context

A note on Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu's “Choice under complete uncertainty: axiomatic characterization of some decision rules”

Recent work by Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu provides axiomatic characterizations of some decision rules for individual decision making under complete uncertainty. This note shows that, in the case of two of these rules, they do not satisfy one of the axioms used for their characterization. A counterexample illustrating this fact is provided, as well as an alternative way to characterize the two rules under consideration, mantaining as far as possible the original axioms proposed by Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003Keywords and Phrases: Complete uncertainty, Nonprobabilistic decision rules., JEL Classification Numbers: D81.,

A Note on Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu’s “Choice Under Complete Uncertainty: Axiomatic Characterization of Some Decision Rules”

Recent work by Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu provides axiomatic characterizations ofs ome decision rules for individual decision making under complete uncertainty. This note shows that, in the case oft wo of these rules, they do not satisfy one of the axioms used for their characterization. A counterexample illustrating this fact is provided, as well as an alternative way to characterize the two rules under consideration, mantaining as far as possible the original axioms proposed by Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu.Complete uncertainty. Nonprobabilistic Decision Rules

Rational Evaluation of Actions Under Complete Uncertainty

This work analyzes the problem of individual choice of actions under complete uncertainty. In this context, each action consists of a set of dierent possible outcomes with no probability distribution associated with them. The work examines and de nes a class of choice procedures in which: a): the evaluation of sets (actions) is element- induced; and b): certain assumption of rationality, which is an adaptation of Sen's condition, is satis ed. Some results of characterization show that different well-known rules can be reinterpreted as particular cases within the de ned class, each of them responding to dierent attitudes towards uncertainty by the agent.Choice Under Complete Uncertainty. Element-induced Rules

On Procedural Freedom of Choice

Numerous works in the last decade have analyzed the question of how to compare opportunity sets as a way to measure and evaluate individual freedom of choice. This paper defends that, in many contexts, external procedural aspects that are associated to an opportunity set should be taken into account when making judgements about the freedom of choice an agent enjoys. We propose criteria for comparing procedure-based opportunity sets that are consistent with both the procedural aspect of freedom and most of the standard theories of ranking opportunity sets.freedom of choice, opportunity sets, procedure-based opportunity sets.

Conflicts in Decision Making

OSInternational audienceFollowing Nick Baigent’s argument that one must go “behind the veil of preference” (Baigent, Jpn Econ Rev 46(1):88–101, 1995) to be able to develop a satisfactory theory of rational behaviour, we propose to analyse potential intrapersonal conflicts caused by different reasons, goals or motivations to choose one option over another, which may make the development of a coherent preference impossible. We do this by presenting an extensive, but certainly not exhaustive overview of psychological research on intrapersonal conflict, its influence on preference reversal (and hence on incoherent behaviour), on psychological well-being and on motivational and behavioural changes over time. We then briefly describe our own theory of choice under conflicting motivations (Arlegi and Teschl, Working Papers of the Department of Economics DT 1208, Public University of Navarre, 2012), which is a first attempt at putting psychological insights into intrapersonal conflict into an axiomatic economic context