Experimenting with (Conditional) Perfection

Conditional perfection is the phenomenon in which conditionals are strengthened to biconditionals. In some contexts, “If A, B” is understood as if it meant “A if and only if B.” We present and discuss a series of experiments designed to test one of the most promising pragmatic accounts of conditional perfection. This is the idea that conditional perfection is a form of exhaustification—that is a strengthening to an exhaustive reading, triggered by a question that the conditional answers. If a speaker is asked how B comes about, then the answer “If A, B” is interpreted exhaustively to meaning that A is the only way to bring about B. Hence, “A if and only if B.” We uncover evidence that conditional perfection is a form of exhaustification, but not that it is triggered by a relationship to a salient question

Explanation and Evidence in Informal Reasoning

planation and evidence play important and non?interchangeable roles in argument. However, previous research has shown that subjects often confuse explanation and evidence (Kuhn, 1991). This study investigates the circumstances under which this confusion occurs. In Experiment 1, subjects generated arguments about issues of popular interest such as problems in schools and drug abuse. In Experiments 2 and 3, subjects rated the strength of evidence presented to them. The results of the protocol analyses and ratings tasks suggest that subjects tend to overestimate the strength of explanations when they lack sufficient knowledge of the domain or when they are unable to generate alternatives to the hypotheses presented to them. W e consider reasons why relying on explanations in these circumstances might be a valuable heuristi

Claim Strength and Burden of Proof

In this paper, we report results from experiments in which people read conversational arguments and then judge (a) the convincingness of each claim and (b) the individual speakers\u27 burden of proof. The results showed an anti-primacy effect: People judge the speaker who makes the first claim as having greater burden of proof. This effect persists even when each speaker\u27s claims are rated equally convincing. We also find that people rate claims less convincing when they appear in the first part of an argument than when they appear in isolation

The Permeability of Fictional Worlds

Real people sometimes appear in fiction, for example,Napoleon in War and Peace. Readers may also believe that aperson who never actually appears in a novel couldpotentially appear there. In two experiments, we find evidencethat readers think that a real person could appear in specificnovels and physically interact with a character. This effect ismagnified when the person and character share spatial andtemporal elements of their setting

Good decisions, good causes: Optimality as a constraint on attribution of causal responsibility

How do we assign causal responsibility for others’ decisions? The present experiments examine the possibility that an optimality constraint is used in these attributions, with agents considered less responsible for outcomes when the decisions that led to those outcomes were suboptimal. Our first two experiments investigate scenarios in which agents are choosing among multiple options, varying the efficacy of the forsaken alternatives to examine the role of optimality in attributing responsibility. Experiment 3 tests whether optimality considerations also play a role in attribution of causality more generally. Taken together, these studies indicate that optimality constraints are used in lay decision theory and in causal judgment

How similar are objects and events?

Semanticists often assume an ontology for natural language that includes not only ordinary objects, but also events, and other sorts of entities. We link this ontology to how speakers represent static and dynamic entities. Specifically, we test how speakers determine whether an entity counts as “atomic” by using count vs. mass (e.g., some gleebs, some gleeb) and distributive vs. non-distributive descriptions (e.g., gleeb every second or so, gleeb around a little). We then seek evidence for atomic representation in a non-linguistic task. Ultimately we suggest that natural language ontology reveals properties of language-independent conceptualization

Good decisions, good causes: Optimality as a constraint on attribution of causal responsibility

How do we assign causal responsibility for others’ decisions? The present experiments examine the possibility that an optimality constraint is used in these attributions, with agents considered less responsible for outcomes when the decisions that led to those outcomes were suboptimal. Our first two experiments investigate scenarios in which agents are choosing among multiple options, varying the efficacy of the forsaken alternatives to examine the role of optimality in attributing responsibility. Experiment 3 tests whether optimality considerations also play a role in attribution of causality more generally. Taken together, these studies indicate that optimality constraints are used in lay decision theory and in causal judgment

How do we regard fictional people? How do they regard us?

Readers assume that commonplace properties of the real world also hold in realistic fiction. They believe, for example, that the usual physical laws continue to apply. But controversy exists in theories of fiction about whether real individuals exist in the story’s world. Does Queen Victoria exist in the world of Jane Eyre, even though Victoria is not mentioned in it? The experiments we report here find that when participants are prompted to consider the world of a fictional individual (“Consider the world of Jane Eyre…”), they are willing to say that a real individual (e.g., Queen Victoria) can exist in the same world. But when participants are prompted to consider the world of a real individual, they are less willing to say that a fictional individual can exist in that world. The asymmetry occurs when we ask participants both if a real person is in the character’s world and if the person would appear there. However, the effect is subject to spatial and temporal constraints. When the person and the character share spatial and temporal settings, interchange is more likely to occur. These results shed light on the author’s implicit contract with the reader, which can license the reader to augment a fictional world with features that the author only implicates as part of the work’s background