Neuro-cognitive factors contributing to paranormal beliefs : core knowledge violations, cognitive inhibition, and the social brain

The present thesis consists of six studies that investigate different cognitive factors that contribute to believing and unbelieving in paranormal, superstitious, magical, and supernatural (commonly referred to as paranormal beliefs). Earlier studies have found several factors reaching from personality factors to cognitive factors to cultural factors that contribute to believing. However, the research has neglected the important factor of what sets paranormal beliefs apart from other beliefs. In addition, although we know a lot about demographical and personality features that contribute to differences in paranormal beliefs, neuro-cognitive differences are still not well known or empirically tested. One explanation that takes into account the difference between paranormal beliefs and other beliefs is that paranormal beliefs stem from core knowledge confusions about the ontological properties of mental, physical, and biological phenomena. The first study of the thesis tried to gain insight into the neural basis of core knowledge confusions in an event-related electroencephalography study. The next two studies tested the possibility that cognitive inhibition, the ability to flexibly switch between thinking modes and if needed, to inhibit unwanted or irrelevant thoughts, could contribute to believing and unbelieving. In these two studies group differences between paranormal believers and skeptics were first compared by using tests of cognitive inhibition and secondly by using brain imaging. Brain imaging was done during a task that invoked paranormal interpretations. The last three studies of the thesis examined the role of the social information processing differences between paranormal believers and skeptics. Methods included brain imagining, behavioral experiments, and self-report measurements. In the first study, we tested how conceptions about the mind are related to beliefs and core knowledge confusions. In the second and third of these studies, we tested group differences between paranormal believers and skeptics by using brain imaging and a behavioral test. We investigated if the groups differ in attribution of intentions to randomly moving objects and in tendency for illusory face perception. The results suggest that core knowledge confusions are based on intuitive world knowledge and that this intuitive world knowledge is less categorized among paranormal believers than among skeptics. Cognitive inhibition was also found to contribute to paranormal beliefs: strong cognitive inhibition downplays paranormal beliefs. Social information processing was connected to paranormal beliefs in several ways. First, understanding mind and its properties in a Cartesian dualistic way was associated with paranormal beliefs and ontological confusions preceded them. Second, believers when compared to skeptics assigned more intentions to randomly moving objects. This was associated with activation of the mentalizing system at the brain level. Finally, we found out that paranormal believers were more prone to illusory face perception than skeptics were. The results underline that if one seeks to understand believing and especially unbelieving, which both are complex phenomena, individual differences in cognitive processing must be taken into account.Tämä väitöskirja koostuu kuudesta tutkimuksesta. Näissä tutkimuksissa tarkastellaan erilaisten kognitiivisten tekijöiden vaikutusta siihen, uskooko ihminen yliluonnolliseen ilmiöihin vai ei. Aiemmissa tutkimuksissa on löydetty useita tekijöitä, jotka vaikuttavat uskomiseen tai uskomattomuuteen. Uskomiseen ja uskomattomuuteen vaikuttavat esimerkiksi persoonallisuuden ominaisuudet, kulttuuriset tekijät ja tietyt kognitiiviset tekijät. Nämä tutkimukset eivät kuitenkaan yleensä ole ottaneet kantaa olennaiseen kysymykseen: mikä erottaa yliluonnolliset uskomukset muista uskomuksista? Lisäksi kokonaisuudessaan yliluonnollisten uskomusten kognitiivisista tekijöistä tiedetään edelleen melko vähä, vaikka erilaisia osaselittäjiä ilmiölle on löytynyt. Yksi määritelmä, jolla yliluonnolliset ja taikauskoiset uskomukset eroavat muista uskomuksista on, että ne ovat erilaisia ydintiedon sekaannuksia. Toisin sanoen yliluonnollisissa uskomuksissa sekoitetaan keskenään psyykkisten, fysikaalisten ja biologisten olioiden fundamentaalisia ydinominaisuuksia ja juuri näiden ydinominaisuuksien sekoittaminen on määrittelevää yliluonnollisille uskomuksille suhteessa muihin uskomuksiin. Väitöskirjan ensimmäisessä tutkimuksessa testattiin ydintiedon ominaisuuksien sekaannusten prosessoinnin aivokorrelaatteja aivosähkökäyrämittausta hyödyntäen. Seuraavissa kahdessa tutkimuksessa vertailtiin kognitiivisen inhibition vaikutusta taikauskoon skeptikkojen ja taikauskoisten välillä. Kognitiivinen inhibitio tarkoittaa kykyä muuttaa joustavasti ajattelutapoja ja ajattelun kohteita sekä kykyä työntää tarvittaessa asioita pois mielestä. Ryhmiä verrattiin ensin yleisesti käytetyillä kognitiivisen inhibition testeillä ja toisessa tutkimuksessa aivokuvantamista hyödyntäen tehtävässä, joka pyrki herättämään yliluonnollisia tulkintoja. Viimeisissä kolmessa tutkimuksessa tutkittiin sosiaalisen tiedonkäsittelyn eroja yliluonnolliseen uskovien ja skeptikkojen välillä kokeellisin menetelmin, aivokuvantamismenetelmin ja itse-arviointikyselyin. Näistä ensimmäisessä testattiin miten käsitys mielen (ja sen prosessien) ja ruumiin yhteydestä (niin sanottu "mieli-ruumis-ongelma") on yhteydessä yliluonnollisiin uskomuksiin ja ydintiedon sekaannuksiin. Toisessa tutkimuksessa testattiin ryhmäeroja yliluonnolliseen uskovien ja skeptikkojen välillä tehtävällä, joka tehtiin aivokuvantamisen aikana. Tehtävässä tutkittiin tavoitteellisen ja tarkoituksellisen toiminnan näkemisessä satunnaisesti ja tarkoituksellisesti liikkuvissa kuvioissa. Kolmannessa tutkimuksessa tutkittiin ryhmäeroja skeptikkojen ja taikauskoisten välillä herkkyydessä nähdä kasvoja erilaisissa esineissä ja luonnon muodostelemissa. Tulokset antavat tukea väitteelle, että ydintiedon sekaannukset perustuvat intuitiiviseen tietoon maailmasta ja että tähän liittyvä kategorinen tieto on heikommin rajautunutta taikauskoisilla kuin skeptikoilla. Kognitiivisen inhibition havaittiin olevan yhteydessä yliluonnollisiin ilmiöihin uskoviin siten, että tehokkaampi kognitiivinen inhibitio heikensi taikauskomuksia. Sosiaalisen tiedon käsittelyn osalta tulokset osoittivat, että taikauskoiset suhtautuvat mieleen ja sen ominaisuuksiin dualistisesti ja että tämä oli voimakkaasti yhteydessä taikauskoon. Dualistinen ajattelu voitiin myös tulosten valossa tulkita ydintiedon sekaannuksen muodoksi. Lisäksi taikauskoiset liittivät enemmän intentioita satunnaisesti liikkuviin kappaleisiin kuin skeptikot, ja tämä oli yhteydessä sosiaalista informaatiota käsittelevän aivoverkoston aktivaatioon aivotasolla. Taikauskoiset olivat myös alttiimpia huomaamaan kasvojen kaltaisia piirteitä erilaisissa esineissä ja luonnon muodostelemissa. Kokonaisuudessaan tulokset korostavat yksilöllisten kognitiivisten erojen huomioimista, kun monisyisiä ilmiöitä kuten yliluonnolliseen uskomista tai siihen uskomattomuutta yritetään selittää

Empathizers and systemizers process social information differently

Using the empathizing-systemizing theory as our framework, we investigated how people with high self-reported empathizing (having good social skills and being interested in people) and systemizing (being interested in physical things and processes) differ in the social information processing of emotionally negative photographs of people during “spontaneous watching” and emotional and cognitive empathy tasks. Empathizers evaluated the pictures as more emotionally touching and the reactions in the photographs more understandable than the systemizers. Compared to the empathizers, systemizers had stronger activations in the posterior cingulate cortex, an area related to cognitive empathy, as well as in the left superior temporal gyrus and middle frontal gyrus when watching emotional photographs spontaneously. During guided emotional and cognitive empathy tasks, these differences disappeared. However, during the emotional empathy task, higher systemizing was associated with weaker activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus /insula. Furthermore, during emotional and cognitive empathy tasks, empathizing was related to increased activations of the amygdala which were in turn related to higher behavioral ratings of emotional and cognitive empathy. The results suggest that empathizers and systemizers engage in social information processing differently: systemizers in more cognitive terms and empathizers with stronger automatic emotional reactions.Peer reviewe

Searching for the Cognitive Basis of Anti-Vaccination Attitudes

Peer reviewe

Intuitive physics ability in systemizers relies on differential use of the internalizing system and long-term spatial representations

According to the Empathizing-Systemizing theory (E-S Theory), individual differences in how people understand the physical world (systemizing) and the social world (empathizing), are two continuums in the general population with several implications, from vocational interests to skills in the social and physical domains. The underlying mechanisms of intuitive physics performance among individuals with strong systemizing and weak empathizing (systemizers) are, however, unknown. Our results affirm higher intuitive physics skills in healthy adult systemizers (N=36), and further reveal the brain mechanisms that are characteristic for those individuals in carrying out such tasks. When the participants performed intuitive physics tasks during functional magnetic resonance imaging, combined higher systemizing and lower empathizing was associated with stronger activations in parts of the default mode network (DMN, cuneus and posterior cingulate gyrus), middle occipital gyrus, and parahippocampal region. The posterior cingulate gyrus and parahippocampal gyrus were specifically associated with systemizing "brain type" even after controlling for task performance, while especially in the parietal cortex, the activation changes were simply explained by higher task performance. We therefore suggest that utilization of DMN-parahippocampal complex, suggested to play a role in internalizing and activating long-term spatial memory representations, is the factor that distinguishes systemizers from empathizers with the opposite "brain type" in intuitive physics tasks.Peer reviewe

Activation of the motivation-related ventral striatum during delusional experience

Delusion is the most characteristic symptom of psychosis, occurring in almost all first-episode psychosis patients. The motivational salience hypothesis suggests delusion to originate from the experience of abnormal motivational salience. Whether the motivation-related brain circuitries are activated during the actual delusional experience remains, however, unknown. We used a forced-choice answering tree at random intervals during functional magnetic resonance imaging to capture delusional and non-delusional spontaneous experiences in patients with first-episode psychosis (n = 31) or clinical high-risk state (n = 7). The motivation-related brain regions were identified by an automated meta-analysis of 149 studies. Thirteen first-episode patients reported both delusional and non-delusional spontaneous experiences. In these patients, delusional experiences were related to stronger activation of the ventral striatum in both hemispheres. This activation overlapped with the most strongly motivation-related brain regions. These findings provide an empirical link between the actual delusional experience and the motivational salience hypothesis. Further use and development of the present methods in localizing the neurobiological basis of the most characteristic symptoms may be useful in the search for etiopathogenic pathways that result in psychotic disorders.Peer reviewe

Intuitive physics ability in systemizers relies on differential use of the internalizing system and long-term spatial representations

According to the Empathizing-Systemizing theory (E-S Theory), individual differences in how people understand the physical world (systemizing) and the social world (empathizing), are two continuums in the general population with several implications, from vocational interests to skills in the social and physical domains. The underlying mechanisms of intuitive physics performance among individuals with strong systemizing and weak empathizing (systemizers) are, however, unknown. Our results affirm higher intuitive physics skills in healthy adult systemizers (N=36), and further reveal the brain mechanisms that are characteristic for those individuals in carrying out such tasks. When the participants performed intuitive physics tasks during functional magnetic resonance imaging, combined higher systemizing and lower empathizing was associated with stronger activations in parts of the default mode network (DMN, cuneus and posterior cingulate gyrus), middle occipital gyrus, and parahippocampal region. The posterior cingulate gyrus and parahippocampal gyrus were specifically associated with systemizing “brain type” even after controlling for task performance, while especially in the parietal cortex, the activation changes were simply explained by higher task performance. We therefore suggest that utilization of DMN-parahippocampal complex, suggested to play a role in internalizing and activating long-term spatial memory representations, is the factor that distinguishes systemizers from empathizers with the opposite “brain type” in intuitive physics tasks.</p

Analytic atheism : A cross-culturally weak and fickle phenomenon?

Religious belief is a topic of longstanding interest to psychological science, but the psychology of religious disbelief is a relative newcomer. One prominently discussed model is analytic atheism, wherein cognitive reflection, as measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test, overrides religious intuitions and instruction. Consistent with this model, performance-based measures of cognitive reflection predict religious disbelief in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic) samples. However, the generality of analytic atheism remains unknown. Drawing on a large global sample (N = 3461) from 13 religiously, demographically, and culturally diverse societies, we find that analytic atheism as usually assessed is in fact quite fickle cross-culturally, appearing robustly only in aggregate analyses and in three individual countries. The results provide additional evidence for culture's effects on core beliefs.Peer reviewe