Neural dynamics of social tie formation in economic decision-making.

The disposition for prosocial conduct, which contributes to cooperation as arising during social interaction, requires cortical network dynamics responsive to the development of social ties, or care about the interests of specific interaction partners. Here, we formulate a dynamic computational model that accurately predicted how tie formation, driven by the interaction history, influences decisions to contribute in a public good game. We used model-driven functional MRI to test the hypothesis that brain regions key to social interactions keep track of dynamics in tie strength. Activation in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex tracked the individual's public good contributions. Activation in the bilateral posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), and temporo-parietal junction was modulated parametrically by the dynamically developing social tie-as estimated by our model-supporting a role of these regions in social tie formation. Activity in these two regions further reflected inter-individual differences in tie persistence and sensitivity to behavior of the interaction partner. Functional connectivity between pSTS and mPFC activations indicated that the representation of social ties is integrated in the decision process. These data reveal the brain mechanisms underlying the integration of interaction dynamics into a social tie representation which in turn influenced the individual's prosocial decisions

When the Choice Is Ours: Context and Agency Modulate the Neural Bases of Decision-Making

The option to choose between several courses of action is often associated with the feeling of being in control. Yet, in certain situations, one may prefer to decline such agency and instead leave the choice to others. In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we provide evidence that the neural processes involved in decision-making are modulated not only by who controls our choice options (agency), but also by whether we have a say in who is in control (context). The fMRI results are noteworthy in that they reveal specific contributions of the anterior frontomedian cortex (viz. BA 10) and the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) in decision-making processes. The RCZ is engaged when conditions clearly present us with the most choice options. BA 10 is engaged in particular when the choice is completely ours, as well as when it is completely up to others to choose for us which in turn gives rise to an attribution of control to oneself or someone else, respectively. After all, it does not only matter whether we have any options to choose from, but also who decides on that

How a co-actor’s task affects monitoring of own errors: evidence from a social event-related potential study

Efficient flexible behavior requires continuous monitoring of performance for possible deviations from the intended goal of an action. This also holds for joint action. When jointly performing a task, one needs to not only know the other’s goals and intentions but also generate behavioral adjustments that are dependent on the other person’s task. Previous studies have shown that in joint action people not only represent their own task but also the task of their co-actor. The current study investigated whether these so-called shared representations affect error monitoring as reflected in the response-locked error-related negativity (Ne/ERN) following own errors. Sixteen pairs of participants performed a social go/no-go task, while EEG and behavioral data were obtained. Responses were compatible or incompatible relative to the go/no-go action of the co-actor. Erroneous responses on no-go stimuli were examined. The results demonstrated increased Ne/ERN amplitudes and longer reaction times following errors on compatible compared to incompatible no-go stimuli. Thus, Ne/ERNs were larger after errors on trials that did not require a response from the co-actor either compared to errors on trials that did require a response from the co-actor. As the task of the other person is the only difference between these two types of errors, these findings show that people also represent their co-actor’s task during error monitoring in joint action. An extension of existing models on performance monitoring in individual action is put forward to explain the current findings in joint action. Importantly, we propose that inclusion of a co-actor’s task in performance monitoring may facilitate adaptive behavior in social interactions enabling fast anticipatory and corrective actions

Embodied Emotion Modulates Neural Signature of Performance Monitoring

BACKGROUND:Recent research on the "embodiment of emotion" implies that experiencing an emotion may involve perceptual, somatovisceral, and motor feedback aspects. For example, manipulations of facial expression and posture appear to induce emotional states and influence how affective information is processed. The present study investigates whether performance monitoring, a cognitive process known to be under heavy control of the dopaminergic system, is modulated by induced facial expressions. In particular, we focused on the error-related negativity, an electrophysiological correlate of performance monitoring. METHODS/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS:During a choice reaction task, participants held a Chinese chop stick either horizontally between the teeth ("smile" condition) or, in different runs, vertically ("no smile") with the upper lip. In a third control condition, no chop stick was used ("no stick"). It could be shown on a separate sample that the facial feedback procedure is feasible to induce mild changes in positive affect. In the ERP sample, the smile condition, hypothesized to lead to an increase in dopaminergic activity, was associated with a decrease of ERN amplitude relative to "no smile" and "no stick" conditions. CONCLUSION:Embodying emotions by induced facial expressions leads to a changes in the neural correlates of error detection. We suggest that this is due to the joint influence of the dopaminergic system on positive affect and performance monitoring

Lifespan development of stimulus-response conflict cost: similarities and differences between maturation and senescence

Age gradient of the mechanism of stimulus-response conflict cost was investigated in a population-based representative sample of 291 individuals, covering the age range from 6 to 89 years. Stimulus-response conflict cost, indicated by the amount of additional processing time required when there is a conflict between stimulus and response options, follows a U-shaped function across the lifespan. Lifespan age gradient of conflict cost parallels closely those of processing fluctuation and fluid intelligence. Individuals at both ends of the lifespan displayed a greater amount of processing fluctuation and at the same time a larger amount of conflict cost and a lower level of fluid intelligence. After controlling for chronological age and baseline processing speed, conflict cost continues to correlate significantly with fluid intelligence in adulthood and old age and with processing fluctuation in old age. The relation between processing fluctuation and conflict cost in old age lends further support for the neuromodulation of neuronal noise theory of cognitive aging as well as for theories of dopaminergic modulation of conflict monitoring

Brain Circuitries Involved in Semantic Interference by Demands of Emotional and Non-Emotional Distractors

BACKGROUND: Previous studies have indicated that the processes leading to the resolution of emotional and non-emotional interference conflicts are unrelated, involving separate networks. It is also known that conflict resolution itself suggests a considerable overlap of the networks. Our study is an attempt to examine how these findings may be related. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to study neural responses of 24 healthy subjects to emotional and non-emotional conflict paradigms involving the presentation of congruent and incongruent word-face pairs based on semantic incompatibility between targets and distractors. In the emotional task, the behavioral interference conflict was greater (compared to the non-emotional task) and was paralleled by involvement of the extrastriate visual and posterodorsal medial frontal cortices. In both tasks, we also observed a common network including the dorsal anterior cingulate, the supplemental motor area, the anterior insula and the inferior prefrontal cortex, indicating that these brain structures are markers of experienced conflict. However, the emotional task involved conflict-triggered networks to a considerably higher degree. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: Our findings indicate that responses to emotional and non-emotional distractors involve the same systems, which are capable of flexible adjustments based on conflict demands. The function of systems related to conflict resolution is likely to be adjusted on the basis of an evaluation process that primarily involves the extrastriate visual cortex, with target playing a significant role

Mistakes that affect others: An fMRI study on processing of own errors in a social context

In social contexts, errors have a special significance and often bear consequences for others. Thinking about others and drawing social inferences in interpersonal games engages the mentalizing system. We used neuroimaging to investigate the differences in brain activations between errors that affect only agents themselves and errors that additionally influence the payoffs of interaction partners. Activation in posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC) and bilateral insula was increased for all errors, whereas errors that implied consequences for others specifically activated medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), an important part of the mentalizing system. The results demonstrate that performance monitoring in social contexts involves additional processes and brain structures compared with individual performance monitoring where errors only have consequences for the person committing them. Taking into account how one’s behavior may affect others is particularly crucial for adapting behavior in interpersonal interactions and joint action

The Flexible Nature of Unconscious Cognition

The cognitive signature of unconscious processes is hotly debated recently. Generally, consciousness is thought to mediate flexible, adaptive and goal-directed behavior, but in the last decade unconscious processing has rapidly gained ground on traditional conscious territory. In this study we demonstrate that the scope and impact of unconscious information on behavior and brain activity can be modulated dynamically on a trial-by-trial basis. Participants performed a Go/No-Go experiment in which an unconscious (masked) stimulus preceding a conscious target could be associated with either a Go or No-Go response. Importantly, the mapping of stimuli onto these actions varied on a trial-by-trial basis, preventing the formation of stable associations and hence the possibility that unconscious stimuli automatically activate these control actions. By eliminating stimulus-response associations established through practice we demonstrate that unconscious information can be processed in a flexible and adaptive manner. In this experiment we show that the same unconscious stimulus can have a substantially different effect on behavior and (prefrontal) brain activity depending on the rapidly changing task context in which it is presented. This work suggests that unconscious information processing shares many sophisticated characteristics (including flexibility and context-specificity) with its conscious counterpart

Conscious perception of errors and its relation to the anterior insula

To detect erroneous action outcomes is necessary for flexible adjustments and therefore a prerequisite of adaptive, goal-directed behavior. While performance monitoring has been studied intensively over two decades and a vast amount of knowledge on its functional neuroanatomy has been gathered, much less is known about conscious error perception, often referred to as error awareness. Here, we review and discuss the conditions under which error awareness occurs, its neural correlates and underlying functional neuroanatomy. We focus specifically on the anterior insula, which has been shown to be (a) reliably activated during performance monitoring and (b) modulated by error awareness. Anterior insular activity appears to be closely related to autonomic responses associated with consciously perceived errors, although the causality and directions of these relationships still needs to be unraveled. We discuss the role of the anterior insula in generating versus perceiving autonomic responses and as a key player in balancing effortful task-related and resting-state activity. We suggest that errors elicit reactions highly reminiscent of an orienting response and may thus induce the autonomic arousal needed to recruit the required mental and physical resources. We discuss the role of norepinephrine activity in eliciting sufficiently strong central and autonomic nervous responses enabling the necessary adaptation as well as conscious error perception

Transient and sustained incentive effects on electrophysiological indices of cognitive control in younger and older adults

Preparing for upcoming events, separating task-relevant from task-irrelevant information and efficiently responding to stimuli all require cognitive control. The adaptive recruitment of cognitive control depends on activity in the dopaminergic reward system as well as the frontoparietal control network. In healthy aging, dopaminergic neuromodulation is reduced, resulting in altered incentive-based recruitment of control mechanisms. In the present study, younger adults (18–28 years) and healthy older adults (66–89 years) completed an incentivized flanker task that included gain, loss, and neutral trials. Event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded at the time of incentive cue and target presentation. We examined the contingent negative variation (CNV), implicated in stimulus anticipation and response preparation, as well as the P3, which is involved in the evaluation of visual stimuli. Both younger and older adults showed transient incentive-based modulation of CNV. Critically, cue-locked and target-locked P3s were influenced by transient and sustained effects of incentives in younger adults, while such modulation was limited to a sustained effect of gain incentives on cue-P3 in older adults. Overall, these findings are in line with an age-related reduction in the flexible recruitment of preparatory and target-related cognitive control processes in the presence of motivational incentives