Three dimensional lower bound solutions for the stability of plate anchors in sand

Soil anchors are commonly used as foundation systems for structures that require uplift or lateral resistance. These types of structures include transmission towers, sheet pile walls and buried pipelines. Although anchors are typically complex in shape (e.g. drag or helical anchors), many previous analyses idealise the anchor as a continuous strip under plane strain conditions. This assumption provides numerical advantages and the problem can solved in two dimensions. In contrast to recent numerical studies, this paper applies three dimensional numerical limit analysis and axi-symetrical displacement finite element analysis to evaluate the effect of anchor shape on the pullout capacity of horizontal anchors in sand. The anchor is idealised as either square or circular in shape. Results are presented in the familiar form of breakout factors based on various anchor shapes and embedment depths, and are also compared with existing numerical and empirical solutions

The Webb-Pomerene Act at Home and Abroad

For the most prolonged period of time in recent history, American corporations have been experiencing difficulties in dealing with foreign economic competition. Consequently, there has been a growing interest in finding ways to enhance the marketing strength of American firms competing with foreign firms in foreign markets. This is not the first time concern with American firms\u27 competitive strength has been articulated; the Webb- Pomerene Act of 1918 was an attempt by Congress to vitalize American exporting firms. Since 1918, the Webb-Pomerene Act has been the subject of disagreement as to its usefulness and effectiveness in achieving its stated goal. The purpose of this article is to examine the Act\u27s rationale and effectiveness, as well as a newly emerging issue: the status of export associations, formed pursuant to the Act, in the light of freeworld antitrust legislation and enforcement. A determination of that status is important because even if the Act remains unchanged, American export associations operating under it must still consider what antitrust issues must be dealt with abroad. This article is divided into two parts. The first is a discussion of the history of the Act, the reasons advanced for its enactment, and the Act\u27s performance in meeting its ends. The second part of this article will describe briefly some of the antitrust statutes of member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Economic Community (EEC), as well as a study of the recently issued OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. This article will also examine the status of Webb associations under these statutes and guidelines

The Webb-Pomerene Act at Home and Abroad

For the most prolonged period of time in recent history, American corporations have been experiencing difficulties in dealing with foreign economic competition. Consequently, there has been a growing interest in finding ways to enhance the marketing strength of American firms competing with foreign firms in foreign markets. This is not the first time concern with American firms\u27 competitive strength has been articulated; the Webb- Pomerene Act of 1918 was an attempt by Congress to vitalize American exporting firms. Since 1918, the Webb-Pomerene Act has been the subject of disagreement as to its usefulness and effectiveness in achieving its stated goal. The purpose of this article is to examine the Act\u27s rationale and effectiveness, as well as a newly emerging issue: the status of export associations, formed pursuant to the Act, in the light of freeworld antitrust legislation and enforcement. A determination of that status is important because even if the Act remains unchanged, American export associations operating under it must still consider what antitrust issues must be dealt with abroad. This article is divided into two parts. The first is a discussion of the history of the Act, the reasons advanced for its enactment, and the Act\u27s performance in meeting its ends. The second part of this article will describe briefly some of the antitrust statutes of member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Economic Community (EEC), as well as a study of the recently issued OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. This article will also examine the status of Webb associations under these statutes and guidelines

Behavioral Advertising: From One-Sided Chicken to Informational Norms

When you download the free audio recording software from Audacity, you agree that Audacity may collect your information and use it to send you advertising. Billions of such pay-with-data exchanges feed information daily to a massive advertising ecosystem that tailors web site advertising as closely as possible to individual interests. The vast majority want considerably more control over our information. We nonetheless routinely enter pay-with-data exchanges when we visit CNN.com, use Gmail, or visit any of a vast number of other websites. Why? And, what, if anything, should we do about it? We answer both questions by describing pay-with-data exchanges as a game of Chicken that we play over and over with sellers under conditions that guarantee we will always lose. Chicken is traditionally played with cars. Two drivers at opposite ends of a road drive toward each other at high speed. The first to swerve loses. We play a similar game with advertisers—with one crucial difference: we know in advance that the advertisers will never “swerve.” In classic Chicken with cars, the players’ preferences are mirror images of each other. When Phil and Phoebe face each other in their cars, Phil’s first choice is that Phoebe swerve first. His second choice is that they swerve simultaneously. Mutual cowardice is better than a collision. Unilateral cowardice is too, so third place goes to his swerving before Phoebe does. Collision ranks last. Phoebe’s preferences are the same except that she is in Phil’s place and Phil in hers. Change the preferences a bit, and we have the game we play in pay-with-data exchanges. Phil’s preferences are the same, but Phoebe’s differ. She still prefers that Phil swerve first, but collision is in second place. Given these preferences, Phoebe will never swerve. Phil knows Phoebe has these preferences, so he knows he has only two options: he swerves, and she does not; and, neither swerves. Since he prefers the first, he will swerve. Call this One-Sided Chicken. We play One-Sided Chicken when in our website visits we enter pay-with-data exchanges. We argue that buyers’ preferences parallel Phil’s while the sellers’ parallel “collision second” Phoebe’s. We name the players’ choices in this pay-with-data game “Give In,” (the “swerve” equivalent) and “Demand” (the “don’t swerve” equivalent). For buyers, “Demand” means refusing to use the website unless the seller’s data collection practices conform to the buyer’s informational privacy preferences. “Give in” means permitting the seller to collect and process information in accord with whatever information processing policy it pursues. For sellers, “Demand” means refusing to alter their information processing practices even when they conflict with a buyer’s preferences. “Give in” means conforming information processing to a buyer’s preferences. We contend that sellers’ first preference is to demand while buyers to give in and that their second is the collision equivalent in which both sides demand. Such demanding sellers leave buyers only two options: give in and use the site, or demand and do not. Since buyers prefer the first option, they always give in. It would be better if we were not locked into One-Sided Chicken. Ideally, informational norms should regulate the flow of personal information. Informational norms are norms that constrain the collection, use, and distribution of personal information. We contend that such norms would ensure free and informed consent to businesses’ use of consumer data. Unfortunately, pay-with-data exchanges are one of a number of situations in which rapid advances in information processing technology have outrun the slow evolution of norms. We argue that, in a sufficiently competitive market, the needed norms would arise if we had adequate tracking prevention technologies

Beyond Notice and Choice: Privacy, Norms, and Consent

Informational privacy is the ability to determine for yourself when and how others may collect and use your information. Adequate informational privacy requires a sufficiently broad ability to give or withhold free and informed consent to proposed uses. Notice and Choice (sometimes also called “notice and consent”) is the current paradigm for consent online. The Notice is a presentation of terms, typically in a privacy policy or terms of use agreement. The Choice is an action signifying acceptance of the terms, typically clicking on an “I agree” button, or simply using the website. Recent reports by the Federal Trade Commission explicitly endorse the Notice and Choice approach (and provide guidelines for its implementation). When the Notice contains information about data collection and use, the argument for Notice and Choice rests on two claims. First: a fully adequate implementation of the paradigm would ensure that website visitors can give free and informed consent to data collection and use practices. Second: the combined effect of all the individual decisions is an acceptable overall tradeoff between privacy and the benefits of collecting and using consumers’ data. There are (we contend) decisive critiques of both claims. So why do policy makers and privacy advocates continue to endorse Notice and Choice? Most likely, they see no need to seek an alternative. We find the critique of Notice and Choice conclusive, but our assessment is far from widely shared—and understandably so. Criticisms of Notice and Choice are scattered over several articles and books. No one has unified them and answered the obvious counterarguments. We do so. Making the critique plain, however, is not enough to ensure that policy makers turn to a viable alternative. The critiques are entirely negative; they do not offer any alternative to Notice and Choice. We offer an alternative: informational norms. When appropriate informational norms govern online data collection and use, they both ensure that visitors give free and informed consent to those practices, and yield an acceptable overall tradeoff between protecting privacy and the benefits of processing information. A fundamental difficulty is the lack of norms. Rapid advances in information processing technology have fueled new business models, and the rapid development has outpaced the slow evolution of norms. Notice and Choice cannot be pressed into service to remedy this lack. It is necessary to develop new norms

Vulnerable Software: Product-Risk Norms and the Problem of Unauthorized Access

Unauthorized access to online information costs billions of dollars per year. Software vulnerabilities are a key. Software currently contains an unacceptable number of vulnerabilities. The standard solution notes that the typical software business strategy is to keep costs down and be the first to market even if that means the software has significant vulnerabilities. Many endorse the following remedy: make software developers liable for negligent or defective design. This remedy is unworkable. We offer an alternative based on an appeal to product-risk norms. Product-risk norms are social norms that govern the sale of products. A key feature of such norms is that they ensure that the design and manufacture of products impose only acceptable risks on buyers. Unfortunately, mass-market software sales are not governed by appropriate product-risk norms; as result, market conditions exist in which sellers profitably offer vulnerability-ridden software. This analysis entails a solution: ensure that appropriate norms exist. We contend that the best way to do so is a statute based on best practices for software development, and we define the conditions under which the statute would give rise to the desired norm. Why worry about creating the norm? Why not just legally require that software developers conform to best practices. The answer is that enforcement of legal’s requirement can be difficult, costly, and uncertain; once the norm is in place, however, buyers and software developers conform on their own initiative

Self, Privacy, and Power: Is It All Over?

The realization of a multifaceted self is an ideal one strives to realize. One realizes such a self in large part through interaction with others in various social roles. Such realization requires a significant degree of informational privacy. Informational privacy is the ability to determine for yourself when others may collect and how they may use your information. The realization of multifaceted selves requires informational privacy in public. There is no contradiction here: informational privacy is a matter of control, and you can have such control in public. Current information processing practices greatly reduce privacy in public thereby threatening the realization of multifaceted selves. To understand way this is happening and to figure out how to respond, we analyze the foundations of privacy in public. Privacy in public consists in privacy by obscurity and privacy by voluntary restraint. Privacy by obscurity is essentially a matter of getting lost in the crowd. Privacy by voluntary restraint was perhaps first explicitly discussed by the great nineteen century sociologist, Georg Simmel. He was impressed by the fact that people voluntary limit their knowledge of each other as interact in various social roles. Merchants and customers, students and teachers, restaurant customers and waiters, for example, typically exchange only the information necessary to their interaction in those roles and voluntarily refrain from requesting, disclosing, or otherwise discovering more. Advances in information processing have greatly reduced both privacy by obscurity and privacy by voluntary restraint. We focus on the latter. One reason is that, as privacy by obscurity declines, the need for privacy in public by voluntary restraint increases. We confine our attention to the private sector; however, given the current corporate-government surveillance partnership, constraining private information processing is an essential part of constraining governmental processing. Unlike privacy by obscurity, you need the cooperation of others to realize privacy by voluntary restraint. We explain the cooperation by appeal to informational norms, norms that define contextually varying permissions and restrictions on the collection, use, and distribution of information. Norm-implemented coordination is essential to privacy in public (in the form of voluntary restraint), and it is this coordination that advances in information processing and related business practices undermined. This happens in two ways. First, businesses exploit existing norms to create a debased form of “coordination” that serves their interests while eroding privacy in public. Second, technology-driven business innovation has created new forms of interaction not governed by relevant information norms. This lack of norms means the lack the coordination essential to privacy in public. As privacy in public disappears, multifaceted selves face the threat of disappearing—literally—from the scene. The solution is to establish norms that ensure sufficient privacy in public. We conclude by considering the prospects for doing so. Our results are highly relevant to the proper legal approach to privacy. A critical task for legal regulation, as well as public policy generally, is the creation of appropriate informational norms. One of our primary motives is to reorient privacy regulation toward that task

Vulnerable Software: Product-Risk Norms and the Problem of Unauthorized Access

Unauthorized access to online information costs billions of dollars per year. Software vulnerabilities are a key. Software currently contains an unacceptable number of vulnerabilities. The standard solution notes that the typical software business strategy is to keep costs down and be the first to market even if that means the software has significant vulnerabilities. Many endorse the following remedy: make software developers liable for negligent or defective design. This remedy is unworkable. We offer an alternative based on an appeal to product-risk norms. Product-risk norms are social norms that govern the sale of products. A key feature of such norms is that they ensure that the design and manufacture of products impose only acceptable risks on buyers. Unfortunately, mass-market software sales are not governed by appropriate product-risk norms; as result, market conditions exist in which sellers profitably offer vulnerability-ridden software. This analysis entails a solution: ensure that appropriate norms exist. We contend that the best way to do so is a statute based on best practices for software development, and we define the conditions under which the statute would give rise to the desired norm. Why worry about creating the norm? Why not just legally require that software developers conform to best practices. The answer is that enforcement of legal’s requirement can be difficult, costly, and uncertain; once the norm is in place, however, buyers and software developers conform on their own initiative