Small Business Manager Scanning Emphases and the Dominant Logic of the Business-level Strategy

Normative prescription dictates that the pursuit of a business-level strategy can be best achieved when strategic decision makers focus their attention on those functions and activities most relevant to that particular strategy (Porter, 1980; 1985). We examine two elemental research questions for strategic management: 1) what is the connection, if any, between business-level strategies and the sectors managers scan most in their external environments; and 2) are business-level strategies associated with specific internal firm characteristics and capabilities managers attend to most? We evaluate these questions using a field survey in which small business managers identify differences in the external environmental sectors and internal firm attributes they scan most when pursuing different strategies. Results demonstrate some connections between the strategy being pursued and external and internal scanning emphases. Importantly, we conclude that this "scanning connection" should not be taken for granted and we offer suggestions for how managers should be deliberate about their scanning behavior

Is there a “Dark Side” to Monitoring? Board and Shareholder Monitoring Effects on M&A Performance Extremeness

Research summary: We investigate the effects of monitoring by boards of directors and institutional shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A) performance extremeness using a sample of M&A deals from 1997 to 2006. Both governance research and legal reforms generally have espoused a “raise all boats” view of monitoring. We instead investigate whether monitoring may serve as a double-edged sword that limits CEO discretion to undertake both value-destroying M&A deals and value-creating ones. Our findings indicate that the relationship between monitoring and M&A performance is more complex than previously believed. Rather than “raising all boats” in a shift towards better M&A outcomes, monitoring instead is associated with lower M&A losses, but also with lower M&A gains

Repairing Trust in Organizations and Institutions: Toward a Conceptual Framework

Trust plays a fundamental role in facilitating social exchange, yet recent global events have undermined trust in many of society’s institutions and organizations. This raises the pertinent question of how trust in organizations and institutions can be restored once it has been lost. The emerging literature on trust repair is largely focused at the micro level, with limited examination of how these processes operate at the macro level and across levels. In this introductory essay, we show how the papers in this special issue each advance our understanding of macro-level trust repair. We draw on these papers, as well as the extant interdisciplinary literature, to propose an integrated conceptual model of six key mechanisms for restoring trust in organizations and institutions, highlighting the merits, limits and paradoxes of each. We conclude that no single mechanism can be relied on to rebuild organizational trust and identify a future research agenda for advancing scholarly understanding of organizational and institutional trust repair

CEO succession and the CEO’s commitment to the status quo

Chief executive officer (CEO) commitment to the status quo (CSQ) is expected to play an important role in any firm’s strategic adaptation. CSQ is used often as an explanation for strategic change occurring after CEO succession: new CEOs are expected to reveal a lower CSQ than established CEOs. Although widely accepted in the literature, this relationship remains imputed but unobserved. We address this research gap and analyze whether new CEOs reveal lower CSQ than established CEOs. By analyzing the letters to the shareholders of German HDAX firms, we find empirical support for our hypothesis of a lower CSQ of newly appointed CEOs compared to established CEOs. However, our detailed analyses provide a differentiated picture. We find support for a lower CSQ of successors after a forced CEO turnover compared to successors after a voluntary turnover, which indicates an influence of the mandate for change on the CEO’s CSQ. However, against the widespread assumption, we do not find support for a lower CSQ of outside successors compared to inside successors, which calls for deeper analyses of the insiderness of new CEOs. Further, our supplementary analyses propose a revised tenure effect: the widely assumed relationship of an increase in CSQ when CEO tenure increases might be driven mainly by the event of CEO succession and may not universally and continuously increase over time, pointing to a “window of opportunity” to initiate strategic change shortly after the succession event. By analyzing the relationship between CEO succession and CEO CSQ, our results contribute to the CSQ literature and provide fruitful impulses for the CEO succession literature

Explicitly Articulated Strategy and Firm Performance Under Alternative Levels of Centralization

On behalf of