Observational Evidence of the Accelerated Expansion of the Universe

The discovery of cosmic acceleration is one of the most important developments in modern cosmology. The observation, thirteen years ago, that type Ia supernovae appear dimmer that they would have been in a decelerating universe followed by a series of independent observations involving galaxies and cluster of galaxies as well as the cosmic microwave background, all point in the same direction: we seem to be living in a flat universe whose expansion is currently undergoing an acceleration phase. In this paper, we review the various observational evidences, most of them gathered in the last decade, and the improvements expected from projects currently collecting data or in preparation.Comment: Accepted review article to appear in a special volume of the "Comptes Rendus de l'Acad\'emie des Sciences" about Dark Energy and Dark Matte

Product innovation and imitation in a duopoly with differentiation by attributes

This paper considers a probabilistic duopoly in which products are described by their specific attributes, this form of differentiation embodying the horizontal and vertical dimensions. Consumers make discrete choices and follow a random decision rule based on these attributes. A three-stage game is studied in which firms develop new attributes for their products (innovation), then may imitate the attributes of the competing product and finally compete in price. At the equilibrium, the firm selling the less appreciated product is generally incited to imitate its rival. Confronted to a threat of imitation, the benchmark firm sometimes decreases strategically its attribute index in order to diminish its unit cost of innovation and the differentiation on the market, deterring the imitation in this way. This strategy is efficient when imitation costs are sufficiently concave. In the opposite case, it is preferable for the benchmark firm to accept the imitation. Thus, according to the shape of imitation costs, equilibria with "deterrence" or with "accommodation" "accommodation" occur, completing the current typology of strategic responses to a threat of imitation.quality choices ; differentiation by attributes ; product innovation, product imitation

Differentiated duopoly with 'elimination by aspects'

"Elimination by aspects" (EBA) is a discrete model of probabilistic choice worked out by Tversky in 1972 which supposes that decision makers follow a particular heuristic during a process of sequential choice. Options are described by their attributes and, at each decision stage, the individuals eliminate all the options not having an expected given attribute, and so until only one option remains. In this paper, probabilities resulting from the EBA model are used to construct demands of a differentiated duopoly with imperfect rationality. These demands are consistent with partial heterogeneity of tastes and may be linked with a spatial framework in which consumers have convex perception of distance. In this model, a Nash price equilibrium in pure strategies exists if the cost of the highest attributes level firm is not too low. In this case, the "differentiation by attributes" form retained here is both horizontal and vertical, which is not very frequent in the literature. When the equilibrium does not exists, the interaction of best response functions of the firms induces an Edgeworth cycle instead of an exit of the lowest attributes level firm. This result underlines the role of cost difference in the existence of such a cycle.discrete choices ; product differentiation ; imperfect competition ; elimination-by-aspects ; Edgeworth cycles

Probalilistic duopoly with differentiation by attributes

This paper proposes a discrete choice duopoly in which products are described and differentiated by their specific attributes. These attributes can be discrete characteristics or differences in continuous variables, such as prices or qualities. Consumers follow a probabilistic reasoning which is consistent with random decision rule models such as Tversky's "Elimination by Aspects" framework (1972a,b). This type of behavior is relevant for small everyday life purchases. The demand system provides a general structure of product differentiation in which special cases are given by classical models of horizontal and vertical differentiation. Existence and uniqueness of a price Nash equilibrium in pure strategies are established in the duopoly. When attributes' utilities vary, comparative statics properties of profits can be explained by "attractiveness" and "differentiation" effects. These effects are combined in a new way compared to the deterministic structures or to the logit duopoly. For example, an increase in the low utility index of attributes strengthens product differentiation.discrete choices ; product differentiation ; imperfect competition ; "Elimination by Aspects"

Normal Elliptic Bases and Torus-Based Cryptography

We consider representations of algebraic tori $T_n(F_q)$ over finite fields. We make use of normal elliptic bases to show that, for infinitely many squarefree integers $n$ and infinitely many values of $q$, we can encode $m$ torus elements, to a small fixed overhead and to $m$ $\phi(n)$-tuples of $F_q$ elements, in quasi-linear time in $\log q$. This improves upon previously known algorithms, which all have a quasi-quadratic complexity. As a result, the cost of the encoding phase is now negligible in Diffie-Hellman cryptographic schemes

Choice of new attributes in the 'Elimination by Aspects' duopoly

The "Elimination by aspects" (EBA) duopoly of product differentiation (Laurent, 2006a) was constructed from the discrete model of probabilistic choice worked out by Tversky (1972a,b). In this framework, an unique price equilibrium exists with a "differentiation by attributes", which embodies horizontal and vertical differentiations as possible special cases. This paper extends this analysis by studying a two-stage game in which firms choose the specific attributes of their product and then compete in prices. At the price equilibrium, the "competitive effect", present in pure vertical differentiation models, is replaced by a "differentiation effect" in this EBA duopoly. Subgame perfect Nash equilibria are shown to exist with exogenous costs but also with attributes-dependent unit and fixed costs. At the equilibrium, products are generally differentiated both horizontally and vertically. But a purely vertical outcome may also occur when costs of innovation are strongly convex or when consumers are very sensible to the price levels. When costs are endogenous, the social optimum is achieved for a pure horizontal differentiation. Thus, there is too much differentiation at the equilibrium: the vertical dimension induces a strong raise of prices, which also reduces the welfare.elimination-by-aspects ; product differentiation ; quality choices ; welfare analysis

Galois invariant smoothness basis

This text answers a question raised by Joux and the second author about the computation of discrete logarithms in the multiplicative group of finite fields. Given a finite residue field \bK, one looks for a smoothness basis for \bK^* that is left invariant by automorphisms of \bK. For a broad class of finite fields, we manage to construct models that allow such a smoothness basis. This work aims at accelerating discrete logarithm computations in such fields. We treat the cases of codimension one (the linear sieve) and codimension two (the function field sieve)