Buying and Selling in Strategic Market Games

Players may be allowed to both buy and sell the same commodity in a strategic market game. Any outcome of such a game can also be obtained as an outcome of a game in which players either buy or sell. However, an equilibrium allocation of the buy and sell game may not be so in the corresponding buy or sell game as the set of achievable allocations for any player, given others' strategies, is different in these two games.Strategic market game; Buy and sell; Buy or Sell.

Game Theory Via Revealed Preferences

We investigate equilibrium notions in game theory from the revealed preference approach. For extensive game forms with complete information, we derive a set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for the observed outcomes to be rationalized by subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither.Revealed preference, subgame-perfect equilibrium

Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity condition and therefore can not be fully implemented in Nash equilibriu