Economic pressure, parent personality and child development: an interactionist analysis

"Der gegenwärtige ökonomische Abschwung in den USA und auf der ganzen Welt hat wieder die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Prozesse gelenkt, durch die Familien und Kinder durch ökonomische Härten belastet sind. Diese Studie betrachtet die Reaktionen auf ökonomische Härten in einer Stichprobe von Erwachsenen, die zum ersten Mal vor 20 Jahren befragt wurden, als sie noch Jugendliche waren. Insgesamt 271 der ursprünglichen G2 Jugendlichen (Durchschnittsalter M = 25.6 Jahre) nahmen an dieser Studie zusammen mit ihren kleinen Kindern (G3, Durchschnittsalter M = 2.31 Jahre zum ersten Erhebungszeitpunkt) und, in 81% der Fälle, zusammen mit dem anderen Elternteil des Kindes. Die Datenanalysen folgten einem interaktionistischen Modell und gingen davon aus, dass positive Persönlichkeitseigenschaften im Jugendalter der G2 weniger ökonomische Belastungen im Erwachsenenalter vorhersagen würden. Gleichzeitig wurde erwartet, dass diese positiven Persönlichkeitseigenschaften die negativen Familienprozesse aufhalten würden, die eine kompetente Entwicklung in G3 wahrscheinlich behindern. Die Befunde waren mit dem Selektionsaspekt im interaktionistischen Modell konsistent. Das Model sagte darüber hinaus vorher, dass ökonomischen Belastungen und andere familienbezogene Stressprozesse die Entwicklung von G3 über die frühere G2 Persönlichkeit beeinflussten. Der Sozialisationsaspekt im interaktionistischen Modell erhielt also auch Unterstützung. Die Befunde sprechen dafür, dass die Beziehung zwischen den ökonomischen Bedingungen und der Entwicklung von Kindern einen dynamischen Prozess aus Selektion und Sozialisation darstellt, der über Zeit und über Generationen zum Tragen kommt." (Autorenreferat)"The current economic downturn in the U.S. and around the world has refocused attention on the processes through which families and children are affected by economic hardship. This study examines the response to economic pressure of a cohort of youth first studied 20 years ago as adolescents and now grown to adulthood. A total of 271 of the original G2 adolescents (M age = 25.6 years) participated in the study with their young child (G3, M age = 2.31 years at the first time of assessment) and the child's other parent in 81% of the cases. Data analyses were guided by the interactionist model which proposed that positive G2 personality attributes during adolescence would predict lower economic pressure during adulthood and would diminish the negative family processes related to economic pressure expected to disrupt competent G3 development. The findings were consistent with this social selection aspect of the interactionist model. The model also predicted that economic pressure and other aspects of the related family stress process would affect G3 development net of earlier G2 personality. This social causation aspect of the interactionist model also received support. The findings suggest that the relationship between economic conditions and child development reflect a dynamic process of selection and causation that plays out over time and generations." (author's abstract

If cooperation is likely punish mildly: Insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game

Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.Comment: 15 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON

Economic pressure, parent personality and child development : an interactionist analysis

That positive personality characteristics in the youth age of the G2 would predict less economic stresses in the adult age. At the same time, these positive personality traits were expected to stop the negative family processes that are likely to hinder a competent development in G3. The findings were consistent with the selection aspect in the interactionist model. The model also said beforehand that economic stress and other family-related stress processes influenced the development of G3 over the earlier G2 personality. The socialization aspect in the interactionist model thus also received support. However,The findings were consistent with this social selection. The model also predicted that of the G1 personality. This social causation of the interactionist model also received support. (Author\u27s abstract) The findings suggest that the relationship between the individual and the individual is the same. This social causation of the interactionist model also received support. (Author\u27s abstract) The findings suggest that the relationship between the individual and the individual is the same. This social causation of the interactionist model also received support. (Author\u27s abstract) The findings suggest that the relationship between the individual and the individual is the same

Benevolent characteristics promote cooperative behaviour among humans

Cooperation is fundamental to the evolution of human society. We regularly observe cooperative behaviour in everyday life and in controlled experiments with anonymous people, even though standard economic models predict that they should deviate from the collective interest and act so as to maximise their own individual payoff. However, there is typically heterogeneity across subjects: some may cooperate, while others may not. Since individual factors promoting cooperation could be used by institutions to indirectly prime cooperation, this heterogeneity raises the important question of who these cooperators are. We have conducted a series of experiments to study whether benevolence, defined as a unilateral act of paying a cost to increase the welfare of someone else beyond one's own, is related to cooperation in a subsequent one-shot anonymous Prisoner's dilemma. Contrary to the predictions of the widely used inequity aversion models, we find that benevolence does exist and a large majority of people behave this way. We also find benevolence to be correlated with cooperative behaviour. Finally, we show a causal link between benevolence and cooperation: priming people to think positively about benevolent behaviour makes them significantly more cooperative than priming them to think malevolently. Thus benevolent people exist and cooperate more

Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders

Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its emergence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large, the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders, punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the "punishment pool" from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institutionalized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the competition against defectors.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 3 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Report