Calibration: Respice, Adspice, Prospice

“Those who claim for themselves to judge the truth are bound to possess a criterion of truth.” JEL Code: C18, C53, D89calibration, prediction

Single and Multi-Dimensional Optimal Auctions - A Network Approach

This paper highlights connections between the discrete and continuous approaches to optimal auction design with single and multi-dimensional types. We provide an interpretaion of an optimal auction design problem in terms of a linear program that is an instance of a parametric shortest path problem on a lattice. We also solve some cases explicitly in the discrete framework.Auctions, Networks, Linear Programming

Characterization of revenue equivalence

The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called \emph{revenue equivalence}. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results are immediate consequences. Moreover, revenue equivalence can be identified in cases where existing theorems are silent