222 research outputs found
Takeovers of Foreign Banks: A Supervisory Perspective
This paper investigates the determinants of the takeover of a foreign bank by a domestic bank, whereby the former becomes a branch of the latter, and its welfare effects for both the domestic and the foreign country. The analysis is based on a model of a bank that is supervised by an agency that cares about closure costs plus deposit insurance payouts. The agency uses supervisory information to decide on the early closure of the bank. Under the principle of home country control, the takeover moves responsibility for both supervision of the foreign branch and insurance of the foreign deposits to the domestic country. It is shown that the takeover is more likely to happen if the foreign bank is small (relative to the foreign market) and if its investments are riskier than those of the domestic bank. Moreover, the takeover (whenever it happens) is in general welfare improving for both countries.
Liquidity, Risk Taking, and the Lender of Last Resort
This paper studies the strategic interaction between a bank whose deposits are randomly withdrawn and a lender of last resort (LLR) that bases its decision on supervisory information on the quality of the bank’s assets. The bank is subject to a capital requirement and chooses the liquidity buffer that it wants to hold and the risk of its loan portfolio. The equilibrium choice of risk is shown to be decreasing in the capital requirement and increasing in the interest rate charged by the LLR. Moreover, when the LLR does not charge penalty rates, the bank chooses the same level of risk and a smaller liquidity buffer than in the absence of an LLR. Thus, in contrast with the general view, the existence of an LLR does not increase the incentives to take risk, while penalty rates do.
Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring: a model of the credit channel
This paper develops a model of the choice between bank and market finance by entrepreneurial firms that differ in the value of their net worth. The monitoring associated with bank finance ameliorates a moral hazard problem between the entrepreneurs and their lenders. The model is used to analyze the different strands of the credit view of the transmission of monetary policy. In particular, we derive the empirical implications of a broad credit channel, and compare them to those obtained when the model is extended to incorporate some elements of the bank lending channel.Credit ; Bank supervision
Cyclical adjustment of capital requirements: a simple framework
We present a model of an economy with heterogeneous banks that may be funded with uninsured deposits and equity capital. Capital serves to ameliorate a moral hazard problem in the choice of risk. There is a fixed aggregate supply of bank capital, so the cost of capital is endogenous. A regulator sets risk-sensitive capital requirements in order to maximize a social welfare function that incorporates a social cost of bank failure. We consider the effect of a negative shock to the supply of bank capital and show that optimal capital requirements should be lowered. Failure to do so would keep banks safer but produce a large reduction in aggregate investment. The result provides a rationale for the cyclical adjustment of risk-sensitive capital requirements
Moral hazard and debt maturity
We present a model of the maturity of a bank’s uninsured debt. The bank borrows funds and chooses afterwards the riskiness of its assets. This moral hazard problem leads to an excessive level of risk. Short-term debt may have a disciplining effect on the bank’s risk-shifting incentives, but it may lead to inefficient liquidation. We characterize the conditions under which short-term and long-term debt are feasible, and show circumstances under which only short-term debt is feasible and under which short-term debt dominates long-term debt when both are feasible. Thus, short-term debt may have the salutary effect of mitigating the moral hazard problem and inducing lower risk-taking. The results are consistent with key features of the common narrative of the period preceding the 2007-2009 financial crisis
La nueva regulaciĂłn bancaria
Rafael Repullo, que es Premio Jaime I de EconomĂa 2010. Doctor por la London School of Economics (LSE). Profesor y Director del Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI) del Banco de España tratĂł en esta conferencia los siguientes puntos: ÂżPor quĂ© es necesario regular la actividad bancaria?
ÂżCĂłmo era la regulaciĂłn antes de la crisis?
ÂżEn quĂ© consiste la nueva regulaciĂłn?Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional AndalucĂa Tec
Liquidity, Risk Taking, and the Lender of Last Resort
This paper studies the strategic interaction between a bank whose deposits are randomly withdrawn and a lender of last resort (LLR) that bases its decision on supervisory information on the quality of the bank’s assets. The bank is subject to a capital requirement and chooses the liquidity buffer that it wants to hold and the risk of its loan portfolio. The equilibrium choice of risk is shown to be decreasing in the capital requirement and increasing in the interest rate charged by the LLR. Moreover, when the LLR does not charge penalty rates, the bank chooses the same level of risk and a smaller liquidity buffer than in the absence of an LLR. Thus, in contrast with the general view, the existence of an LLR does not increase the incentives to take risk, while penalty rates do
Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?
A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and
induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However, this argument does not take into account the fact that lower rates also reduce the banks´revenues from performing loans. This paper shows that when this effect is taken into account, a U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure generally obtains.Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science [Grant SEJ2005-08875] is gratefully acknowledged
Presentation of the First Conference on Financial Stability and of the panel The countercyclical provisions of the Banco de España, 2000-2016
ArtĂculo de revist
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