398 research outputs found
Clientelism, income inequality, and social preferences: an evolutionary approach to poverty traps
Political clientelism is a dyadic relation in which a politician (the patron) gives material goods and services to a citizen (the client), in exchange for political support. We argue that there is a two-way relation between clientelism and income inequality and poverty. In a poor society in which income inequality is high, clientelism will be a natural outcome. Once clientelism is established, it is harder for democracy to redistribute income and it is easier for the society to be caught in a poverty trap. We develop a two-part game-theoretic model. In the first part, clientelism emerges in a poor and unequal society as a consequence of social preferences, in particular, strong reciprocity. In the second part, using evolutionary and stochastic game theory, we show that clientelism causes income inequality and poverty.
âIstenben bĂzunk.â Ăs mĂ©g miben? â A bizalom pĂ©nzĂŒgyi letĂ©temĂ©nyei Nyugat-EurĂłpa elmĂșlt 250 Ă©ves törtĂ©netĂ©ben Gondolatok Youssef Cassis Ă©s Giuseppe Telesca (szerk.) PĂ©nzĂŒgyi elitek Ă©s az eurĂłpai bankrendszer cĂmƱ könyvĂ©hez (Pallas AthĂ©nĂ© KönyvkiadĂł, 2020)
From the idea of the law on tourism to the law on tourist services : the origin of the first tourist law in Poland
Searching online for health-related information by people suffering from respiratory allergy and asthma: the results of a survey study
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INTRODUCTION: The objective of the study was to compare online behaviour in groups of persons suffering from respiratory allergy and/or asthma and in the reference group.
MATERIAL AND METHODS: Comparative analysis of two independent questionnaire studies. Study A was carried out in the Masovian Voivodeship, Poland in 2013. As many as 1,728 questionnaires were collected and 51 respondents were selected for analysis (study A, reference group). Study B was carried out in 2014 in a group of 59 patients of the outpatient allergy clinic.
RESULTS: More than 92% of the general population (study A) declared that they used the Internet to search for health-related information, health protection, while in the group of patients (study B) the same was declared by 97%. Both studies showed that more than 74% of respondents looked for online information on a specific disease (p > 0.05). Information on how other persons cope with similar health issues was searched by 20% (study A) and 33% (study B) of respondents. Advice on different methods of treatment of a given disease was sought by 40% and 51% of respondents, respectively. Nearly 51% of respondents in study A and 56% of subjects in study B searched online for health information when they did not feel well or were sick.
CONCLUSIONS: Both in the group of chronically ill persons and in the reference group, it is common to search online for health- -related information. Persons suffering from respiratory allergy and/or asthma verified the physicianâs diagnosis on the Internet much more often than did the reference group.
Az oldĂĄs Ă©s a kötĂ©s gazdasĂĄgi formĂĄi â föld Ă©s pĂ©nz
Ebben az ĂrĂĄsban arra keresem a vĂĄlaszt, hogy a föld Ă©s a pĂ©nz mint gazdasĂĄgi formĂĄk mikĂ©nt hordozzĂĄk az oldĂĄs Ă©s kötĂ©s kettĆssĂ©gĂ©t. Ehhez a vĂĄllalkozĂĄshoz Georg Simmel A pĂ©nz filozĂłfiĂĄja Ă©s G. K. Chesterton A jĂłzan Ă©sz nevĂ©ben vonatkozĂł rĂ©szeinek összehasonlĂtĂł elemzĂ©sĂ©re tĂĄmaszkodom
âIstenben bĂzunk.â Ăs mĂ©g miben? â A bizalom pĂ©nzĂŒgyi letĂ©temĂ©nyei Nyugat-EurĂłpa elmĂșlt 250 Ă©ves törtĂ©netĂ©ben Gondolatok Youssef Cassis Ă©s Giuseppe Telesca (szerk.) PĂ©nzĂŒgyi elitek Ă©s az eurĂłpai bankrendszer cĂmƱ könyvĂ©hez (Pallas AthĂ©nĂ© KönyvkiadĂł, 2020)
A gazdasĂĄgi Ă©s tĂĄrsadalmi folyamatok irĂĄnti bizalom megteremtĂ©sĂ©nek szolgĂĄlata a pĂ©nzĂŒgyek egy kevĂ©ssĂ©
hangsĂșlyozott vonulata. Jelen ĂrĂĄs a Youssef Cassis Ă©s Giuseppe Telesca szerkesztĂ©sĂ©ben megjelent
pĂ©nzĂŒgytörtĂ©neti ĂĄttekintĂ©sekhez fƱzött kommentĂĄrokkal azonosĂtani igyekszik a pĂ©nz, a pĂ©nzĂŒgyi
eszközök Ă©s a pĂ©nzĂŒgyi intĂ©zmĂ©nyrendszer azon elemeit, amelyek a francia forradalom Ăłta bizalmi
infrastruktĂșrakĂ©nt funkcionĂĄltak a nyugati vilĂĄgban. Ez a perspektĂva nĂ©mi eligazĂtĂĄsul is szolgĂĄlhat a
digitĂĄlis pĂ©nzĂŒgyi forradalom kĂŒszöbĂ©n.
A hazai olvasĂłközönsĂ©g a Pallas AthĂ©nĂ© KönyvkiadĂł rĂ©vĂ©n a tavalyi Ă©vtĆl magyar nyelven is
megismerheti azt a mintegy tizenhĂĄrom szerzĆ ĂrĂĄsĂĄt tartalmazĂł kötetet, amely Youssef Cassis Ă©s Giuseppe
Telesca szerkesztĂ©sĂ©ben ĂĄttekintĂ©st kĂvĂĄn nyĂșjtani a pĂ©nzĂŒgyi vezetĂ©s elmĂșlt 250 Ă©ves nyugat-eurĂłpai
törtĂ©netĂ©rĆl. E vĂĄllalkozĂĄs hĂĄtterekĂ©nt a szerkesztĆk âa globalizĂĄlt vilĂĄggazdasĂĄg elmĂșlt harminc Ă©vĂ©nek
ellentmondĂĄsait, kĂŒlönösen a növekvĆ jövedelmi Ă©s vagyoni egyenlĆtlensĂ©geket, illetve a 2008-as
gazdasĂĄgi vĂĄlsĂĄg kirobbanĂĄsĂĄtâ festik fel, amely szerintĂŒk ĂșjraĂ©leszti az elit â mint a vezetĂ©s kiemelt
szereplĆinek â tudomĂĄnyos igĂ©nyƱ elemzĂ©sĂ©t
Drawing Lines
My work uses process as a course of action that marks the death of moments through a continuous stream of consciousness. I metaphorically link disparate pieces of information to the human condition in order to present multiple readings through juxtaposition. I assemble both abstract and figurative subject matter in a collage-like manner through methods of cropping and fragmentation to symbolize the disjuncture I feel is indicative of how we experience the world through short-lived thoughts, feelings, and actions
Clientelism, Income Inequality, and Social Preferences: an Evolutionary Approach to Poverty Traps *
Abstract Political clientelism is a dyadic relation in which a politician (the patron) gives material goods and services to a citizen (the client), in exchange for political support. We argue that there is a two-way relation between clientelism and income inequality and poverty. In a poor society in which income inequality is high, clientelism will be a natural outcome. Once clientelism is established, it is harder for democracy to redistribute income and it is easier for the society to be caught in a poverty trap. We develop a two-part game-theoretic model. In the first part, clientelism emerges in a poor and unequal society as a consequence of social preferences, in particular, strong reciprocity. In the second part, using evolutionary and stochastic game theory, we show that clientelism causes income inequality and poverty
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