Mobilizing the State as Public Risk Mitigator

Streaming audio requires RealPlayer.The University Archives has determined that this item is of continuing value to OSU's history.Economic historian Hilton Root came to Mershon to discuss his newest book, Capital and Collusion (Princeton University Press 2005), in which he proposes a new analytical framework for economics. While most current economic theories propose that market transactions manage risk most efficiently, Root contended that economies in the developing world do not operate in this manner, so in order to bring the developing economies up to pace with major industrialized countries, policy makers must distinguish between “measurable risk” and “un-measurable opportunities,” as economists had done in the early 20 th century.Ohio State University. Mershon Center for International Security StudiesEvent webpage, streaming audi

Book Review Forum: The rise of global networks may mean the end of hegemony: Response to Peter Trubowitz

As part of USAPP’s first Book Review Forum, Hilton Root responds to comments from the LSE’s Peter Trubowitz on his recent book, Dynamics among Nations. He argues that changes in the structure of global networks are becoming more able to connect countries and their resources, without the influence of a large hegemon like the US. This means that we are now seeing the end of hegemony as a source of global order, whether those in the US are motivated towards liberal internationalism or not

Opening the Doors of Invention: Institutions, Technology and Developing Nations

What can the knowledge economy offer developing countries? Can developing nations hope to transform existing social and economic relations into an information society? What are the roles of trust, social forces, laws, internal governance structures, financial and information intermediaries, regulators and civil society? Does the creation of an information society represent a paradigm shift in development that requires different thinking and a different path from that taken by agrarian societies that have industrialized? This article explores these questions, investigating the path that developing nations can follow to build a knowledge-based service economy

Judicial Systems and Authoritarian Transitions

For several decades, development policy specialists and donor agencies have championed investment in the judicial systems of developing countries to promote economic growth and, eventually, democracy. The assumption of a causal link among these three phenomena motivates donors’ investments in the physical and human capacity of the legal system. Some reforms are narrowly focused—better enforcement of property rights and contract law—conducive to enhanced trade and investment. Although these narrow reform programs imply that political liberalisation is an ultimate objective, studies are unable to substantiate causality between the rule of law, economic growth and democracy [Carothers (2003)]. Autocratic regimes may establish courts to protect the property rights of regime insiders and to expropriate the rights of outsiders. In our view a rule of law will have emerged only once the state has achieved legitimacy in the hearts and minds of citizens. The idea that better rule of law would generate economic growth, which would in turn build constituencies for democratic reforms will be questioned in this paper. An alternative view will be suggested, most notably the alignment of national identity with the institutions of the state is critical to establishing a rule of law

Pakistan's Managerial Dilemmas

Discretion without accountability is deeply rooted in Pakistan's political history, profoundly shaping the country's administrative system. Pakistan's political institutions offer the leadership many opportunities for violating citizen trust. Institutional change is proposed as a tool for politicians to maintain their authority through policy reform rather than patronage. Institutions are needed that allow politicians to lead while preserving the impartiality, permanence, and expertise of a public bureaucracy.

Different Modelling Purposes

How one builds, checks, validates and interprets a model depends on its ‘purpose’. This is true even if the same model code is used for different purposes. This means that a model built for one purpose but then used for another needs to be re-justified for the new purpose and this will probably mean it also has to be re-checked, re-validated and maybe even re-built in a different way. Here we review some of the different purposes for a simulation model of complex social phenomena, focusing on seven in particular: prediction, explanation, description, theoretical exploration, illustration, analogy, and social interaction. The paper looks at some of the implications in terms of the ways in which the intended purpose might fail. This analysis motivates some of the ways in which these ‘dangers’ might be avoided or mitigated. It also looks at the ways that a confusion of modelling purposes can fatally weaken modelling projects, whilst giving a false sense of their quality. These distinctions clarify some previous debates as to the best modelling strategy (e.g. KISS and KIDS). The paper ends with a plea for modellers to be clear concerning which purpose they are justifying their model against