91 research outputs found

    Fichte, Kant and the Copernican turn

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    The paper studies Fichte’s views of the cognitive problem, especially his account of the three fundamental principles. I argue three points: fi rst, Kant’s position includes two incompatible approaches to knowledge I will be calling representationalism and constructivism; second, in his early writings Fichte defends a version of the so-called Copernican Revolution or Copernican turn, more specifically a revised conception of “representation”; and, third, though Fichte’s version of the Copernican turn improves on Kant’s, it is not a satisfactory solution to the cognitive problem

    Determination of the pion-nucleon coupling constant and scattering lengths

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    We critically evaluate the isovector GMO sum rule for forward pion-nucleon scattering using the recent precision measurements of negatively charged pion-proton and pion-deuteron scattering lengths from pionic atoms. We deduce the charged-pion-nucleon coupling constant, with careful attention to systematic and statistical uncertainties. This determination gives, directly from data a pseudoscalar coupling constant of 14.11+-0.05(statistical)+-0.19(systematic) or a pseudovector one of 0.0783(11). This value is intermediate between that of indirect methods and the direct determination from backward neutron-proton differential scattering cross sections. We also use the pionic atom data to deduce the coherent symmetric and antisymmetric sums of the negatively charged pion-proton and pion-neutron scattering lengths with high precision. The symmetric sum gives 0.0012+-0.0002(statistical)+-0.0008 (systematic) and the antisymmetric one 0.0895+-0.0003(statistical)+-0.0013(systematic), both in units of inverse charged pion-mass. For the need of the present analysis, we improve the theoretical description of the pion-deuteron scattering length.Comment: 27 pages, 5 figures, submitted to Phys. Rev. C, few modifications and clarifications, no change in substance of the pape

    What is the crisis of Western sciences?

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    © 2016, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. This article is an attempt to formulate a clear definition of the concept of crisis of Western sciences introduced by Husserl in his last work. The attempt will be based on a reading of the Krisis, which will stress its underlying continuity with Husserl’s life-long concerns about the theoretical insufficiency of positive sciences, and downplay the novelty of the idea of crisis itself within Husserl’s work. After insisting on the fact that, according to Husserl, only an account of the shortcomings of the scientificity of Western sciences can justify the claim that they are undergoing a crisis, it will be argued that the common definition of the crisis of the sciences as the loss of their significance for life rests on a misunderstanding. The crisis of Western sciences will be characterized, instead, as the repercussion of the crisis of the scientificity of philosophy (and, specifically, of metaphysics) on the scientificity of positive sciences. The loss of significance of scientific knowledge for our existence will in turn appear as a further, inevitable consequence of the uprooting of the sciences from the soil of a universal philosophy culminating in metaphysics, and thus, as a phenomenon deeply intertwined with the crisis of Western sciences, but not identical to it

    Old wine in new bottles: Exploring pragmatism as a philosophical framework for the discipline of coaching

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    The practice and industry of organizational coaching are now well established, but how it is understood theoretically continues to lag behind. In this paper we analyze possible reasons for this state of affairs and argue that the development of coaching as an academic discipline will benefit from adopting philosophical pragmatism as an overarching theoretical framework. This move will enable coaching academics to utilize the contributions to knowledge that different paradigms generate. Positioning pragmatism as a theory of action we argue that organizational coaching is by default a pragmatic enterprise and provide three examples of the considerable benefits to be gained by conceptualizing it this way. (1) Drawing from the pragmatists’ ideas, particularly those of John Dewey, we demonstrate how the theoretical understanding of organizational coaching can be enhanced by considering its nature as a joint inquiry. (2) Pragmatism suggests development as an ultimate purpose for organizational coaching which also helps to resolve fundamental conceptual debates. (3) In light of the complexity and diversity involved in the way that organizational coaching is practiced, pragmatism offers coaches a useful framework for developing the flexibility required for navigating the multiplicity of influences on their practice

    Some remarks concerning the compositeness conditions

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