A Second Best Theory of Institutional Quality

This paper illustrates a theory of the second best where the constraints to the achievement of the optimum are of institutional nature. We consider the effects of corruption and bad governance on the public decision to privatize the provision of a service when contracts are incomplete and there is asymmetric information. We show that both corruption and bad governance are detrimental to welfare, but that removing only one of the two is not necessarily beneficial if the other is still present. The theory supplies a possible explanation to the controversial empirical evidence on the economic effects of corruption

Understanding market failure in the developing country context.

Market failure makes it difficult to achieve the condition of economic efficiency by distorting price mechanisms and normal distribution of goods and services thereby, leading to welfare loss. They are entrenched in the socio-economic fabrics of most developing countries, underpinned by the lack of well-functioning market structures and economic systems – which are supposed to make the market economy resilient to such economic shortcomings

Minor Physical Anomalies in Patients with Schizophrenia, Unaffected First-Degree Relatives, and Healthy Controls: A Meta-Analysis

Background: Minor physical anomalies (MPAs) have been found to be more prevalent in schizophrenia than control participants in numerous studies and may index a potential endophenotype for schizophrenia.</p

Path dependence in energy systems and economic development

Energy systems are subject to strong and long-lived path dependence, owing to technological, infrastructural, institutional and behavioural lock-ins. Yet, with the prospect of providing accessible cheap energy to stimulate economic development and reduce poverty, governments often invest in large engineering projects and subsidy policies. Here, I argue that while these may achieve their objectives, they risk locking their economies onto energy-intensive pathways. Thus, particularly when economies are industrializing, and their energy systems are being transformed and are not yet fully locked-in, policymakers should take care before directing their economies onto energy-intensive pathways that are likely to be detrimental to their long-run prosperity

Central Banking, Climate Change and Green Finance

Responsibility for financial and macroeconomic stability implicitly or explicitly lies with the central bank, which therefore ought to address climate-related and other environmental risks on a systemic level. Furthermore, central banks, through their regulatory oversight over money, credit, and the financial system, are in a powerful position to support the development of green finance models and enforce an adequate pricing of environmental and carbon risk by financial institutions. The central topic of this paperare the public financial governance policies through which central banks, as well as other relevant financial regulatory agencies, can address environmental risk and promote sustainable finance. The paperfirst discusses the reasons why central banks should be concerned with aligning finance with sustainable development. Second, the paperreviews the tools and instruments that can be utilized by central banks and financial regulatory agencies to address environmental risk and promote green finance and sustainable development. Third, the paperprovides a brief review of green public financial governance initiatives

Facts, Principles, and (Real) Politics

Should our factual understanding of the world influence our normative theorising about it? G.A. Cohen has argued that our ultimate normative principles should not be constrained by facts. Many others have defended or are committed to various versions or subsets of that claim. In this paper I dispute those positions by arguing that, in order to resist the conclusion that ultimate normative principles rest on facts about possibility or conceivability, one has to embrace an unsatisfactory account of how principles generate normative political judgments. So political theorists have to choose between principles ostensibly unbiased by our current understanding of human motivation and political reality, or principles capable of reliably generating political judgments. I conclude with wider methodological observations in defence of the latter option, and so of a return to political philosophy’s traditional blend of normative and descriptive elements

Problem Behavior in Children of Chronically Ill Parents: A Meta-Analysis

The aim of this meta-analysis is to examine whether children of chronically ill parents differ from norm groups in problem behavior. We report moderator effects and overall effect sizes for internalizing, externalizing and total problem behavior assessed by children and parents. In fixed effect models, we found a significant overall effect size for internalizing problem behavior (number of studies k = 19, total sample size N = 1,858, Cohen’s d = .23, p < .01) and externalizing problem behavior (k = 13, N = 1,525, d = .09, p < .01) but not for total problem behavior (k = 7; N = 896). Effects for internalizing and externalizing problem behavior were larger in non-cancer studies, in samples including younger children and younger ill parents, in samples defined by low average SES and in studies including parents with longer illness duration. In addition, effects for externalizing problem behavior were larger in studies characterized by a higher percentage of ill mothers and single parents. With exclusive self-report, effect sizes were significant for all problem behaviors. Based on these results, a family-centered approach in health care is recommended