Interaction between valence of empathy and familiarity: is it difficult to empathize with the positive events of a stranger?

Background: Empathy in humans is thought to have evolved via social interactions caused by the formation of social groups. Considering the role of empathy within a social group, there might be a difference between emotional empathy for strangers and familiar others belonging to the same social group. In this study, we used the global field power (GFP) index to investigate empathic brain activity during observation of a cue indicating either a negative or positive image viewed by a stranger or close friend. Methods: Sixteen healthy participants observed a partner performing an emotional gambling task displayed on a monitor. After the partner\u27s choice-response, a frowning or smiling face symbol was simultaneously presented to the participant\u27s monitor while a negative or positive emotional image was presented to the partner\u27s monitor. All participants observed a control condition (CT) showing a computer trial, a stranger-observation condition (SO) showing the trial of a stranger, and a friend-observation condition (FO) to observe the trial of a close friend. During these observations, participants\u27 event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded to calculate GFP, and after the task, a subjective assessment of their feelings was measured. Results: Positive emotion was significantly larger under the FO compared to the CT and the SO. Significantly larger negative emotion was found under the SO and FO compared to the CT. In response to a positive cue, significantly larger GFP during 300 to 600 ms was observed under the FO compared to the CT and SO. In response to a negative cue, significantly larger GFP was observed under the FO and SO compared to the CT. A significantly larger GFP under the SO was found in response to only a negative cue. Topographic map analysis suggested that these differences were related to frontal-occipital dynamics. GFP was significantly correlated with empathic trait. Conclusion: These results revealed that familiarity with another person has different effects depending on the valence of empathy. Negative empathy, including the danger perception function, might easily occur even among strangers, whereas positive empathy related to nursing and supporting an inner group does not happen easily with strangers

Goal Slippage: A Mechanism for Spontaneous Instrumental Helping in Infancy?

In recent years, developmental psychologists have increasingly been interested in various forms of prosocial behavior observed in infants and young children—in particular comforting, sharing, pointing to provide information, and spontaneous instrumental helping. We briefly review several models that have been proposed to explain the psychological mechanisms underpinning these behaviors. Focusing on spontaneous instrumental helping, we home in on models based upon what Paulus (Child Development Perspectives 8(2):77–81, 2014) has dubbed ‘goal-alignment’, i.e. the idea that the identification of an agent’s goal leads infants to take up that goal as their own. We identify a problem with the most well-known model based upon this idea, namely the ‘goal contagion’ model. The problem arises from the way in which the model specifies the content of the goal which is identified and taken up. We then propose an alternative way of specifying the content of the goal, and use this as a starting point for articulating an alternative model based upon the idea of alignment, namely the ‘goal slippage’ model. By elucidating the difference between goal contagion and goal slippage, we contribute to the articulation of experimental criteria for assessing whether and when the mechanisms specified by these two models are at work

Eight-month-old infants’ behavioural responses to peers’ emotions as related to the asymmetric frontal cortex activity

Infants are sensitive to and converge emotionally with peers’ distress. It is unclear whether these responses extend to positive affect and whether observing peer emotions motivates infants’ behaviors. This study investigates 8-month-olds’ asymmetric frontal EEG during peers’ cry and laughter, and its relation to approach and withdrawal behaviors. Participants observed videos of infant crying or laughing during two separate sessions. Frontal EEG alpha power was recorded during the first, while infants’ behaviors and emotional expressions were recorded during the second session. Facial and vocal expressions of affect suggest that infants converge emotionally with their peers’ distress, and, to a certain extent, with their happiness. At group level, the crying peer elicited right lateralized frontal activity. However, those infants with reduced right and increased left frontal activity in this situation, were more likely to approach their peer. Overall, 8-month-olds did not show asymmetric frontal activity in response to peer laughter. But, those infants who tended to look longer at their happy peer were more likely to respond with left lateralized frontal activity. The link between variations in left frontal activity and simple approach behaviors indicates the presence of a motivational dimension to infants’ responses to distressed peers

A developmental perspective on moral emotions

This article outlines a developmental approach to the study of moral emotions. Specifically, we describe our developmental model on moral emotions, one in which emotions and cognitions about morality get increasingly integrated and coordinated with development, while acknowledging inter-individual variation in developmental trajectories across the lifespan. We begin with a conceptual clarification of the concept of moral emotions. After a brief review of our own developmental approach to the study of moral emotions, we provide a selective summary of the developmental literature on negatively and positively valenced moral emotions, and describe a recent line of developmental research on the anticipation of negatively and positively valenced moral emotions in multifaceted contexts of social exclusion and inclusion. Next, we describe what it means to take a developmental perspective on moral emotions. Finally, we provide some preliminary conclusions and recommendations for future work to the developmental study of moral emotions