Egalitarian justice and expected value

According to all-luck egalitarianism, the differential distributive effects of both brute luck, which defines the outcome of risks which are not deliberately taken, and option luck, which defines the outcome of deliberate gambles, are unjust. Exactly how to correct the effects of option luck is, however, a complex issue. This article argues that (a) option luck should be neutralized not just by correcting luck among gamblers, but among the community as a whole, because it would be unfair for gamblers as a group to be disadvantaged relative to non-gamblers by bad option luck; (b) individuals should receive the warranted expected results of their gambles, except insofar as individuals blamelessly lacked the ability to ascertain which expectations were warranted; and (c) where societal resources are insufficient to deliver expected results to gamblers, gamblers should receive a lesser distributive share which is in proportion to the expected results. Where all-luck egalitarianism is understood in this way, it allows risk-takers to impose externalities on non-risk-takers, which seems counterintuitive. This may, however, be an advantage as it provides a luck egalitarian rationale for assisting ‘negligent victims’

In defence of global egalitarianism

This essay argues that David Miller's criticisms of global egalitarianism do not undermine the view where it is stated in one of its stronger, luck egalitarian forms. The claim that global egalitarianism cannot specify a metric of justice which is broad enough to exclude spurious claims for redistribution, but precise enough to appropriately value different kinds of advantage, implicitly assumes that cultural understandings are the only legitimate way of identifying what counts as advantage. But that is an assumption always or almost always rejected by global egalitarianism. The claim that global egalitarianism demands either too little redistribution, leaving the unborn and dissenters burdened with their societies' imprudent choices, or too much redistribution, creating perverse incentives by punishing prudent decisions, only presents a problem for global luck egalitarianism on the assumption that nations can legitimately inherit assets from earlier generations – again, an assumption very much at odds with global egalitarian assumptions

Principles of Stakes Fairness in Sport

Fairness in sport is not just about assigning the top prizes to the worthiest competitors. It is also about the way the prize structure itself is organised. For many sporting competitions, although it may be acceptable for winners to receive more than losers, it can seem unfair for winners to take everything and for losers to get nothing. Yet this insight leaves unanswered some difficult questions about what stakes fairness requires and which principles of stakes fairness are appropriate for particular competitions. In this article I specify a range of different principles of stakes fairness (ten in total) that could regulate sporting competitions. I also put forward a theoretical method for pairing up appropriate principles of stakes fairness with given sporting competitions. Specifically, I argue that the underlying rationales for holding sporting competitions can provide useful guides for identifying appropriate principles of stakes fairness. I then seek to clarify and work through some of the implications of this method for a sample of real world controversies over sporting prize structures. I also attempt to refine the method in response to two possible objections from indeterminacy and relativism. Finally, I compare and contrast my conclusions with more general philosophical debates about justice

How to Identify Disadvantage: Taking the Envy Test Seriously

In this paper, I am concerned with the comparative disadvantage an individual suffers in having less valuable opportunities than another individual. The dominant approach with respect to this topic proceeds by identifying a metric by which to determine whether an individual?s opportunities are less valuable than another?s. Let?s call this the Metric Test. However, there is another way in which to proceed. Rather than appealing to a metric by which to determine disadvantage, we could instead allow an individual to determine for herself whether or not she is disadvantaged. On the version of this view that I shall defend, we should treat an individual as disadvantaged if and only if that individual envies another?s opportunities. Let?s call this the Envy Test. My overall aim is to illuminate the appeal of the Envy Test and, in particular, to explain its superiority over the Metric Test

Axiomatic Bargaining Theory on Opportunity Assignments

This paper discusses issues of axiomatic bargaining problems over opportunity assignments. The fair arbitrator uses the principle of "equal opportunity" for all players to make the recommendation on re- source allocations. A framework in such a context is developed and several classical solutions to standard bargaining problems are reformulated and axiomatically characterized. Working Paper 06-4

Mapping genomic and transcriptomic alterations spatially in epithelial cells adjacent to human breast carcinoma.

Almost all genomic studies of breast cancer have focused on well-established tumours because it is technically challenging to study the earliest mutational events occurring in human breast epithelial cells. To address this we created a unique dataset of epithelial samples ductoscopically obtained from ducts leading to breast carcinomas and matched samples from ducts on the opposite side of the nipple. Here, we demonstrate that perturbations in mRNA abundance, with increasing proximity to tumour, cannot be explained by copy number aberrations. Rather, we find a possibility of field cancerization surrounding the primary tumour by constructing a classifier that evaluates where epithelial samples were obtained relative to a tumour (cross-validated micro-averaged AUC = 0.74). We implement a spectral co-clustering algorithm to define biclusters. Relating to over-represented bicluster pathways, we further validate two genes with tissue microarrays and in vitro experiments. We highlight evidence suggesting that bicluster perturbation occurs early in tumour development

E-learning and health inequality aversion : A questionnaire experiment

In principle, questionnaire data on public views about hypothetical trade-offs between improving total health and reducing health inequality can provide useful normative health inequality aversion parameter benchmarks for policymakers faced with real trade-offs of this kind. However, trade-off questions can be hard to understand, and one standard type of question finds that a high proportion of respondents-sometimes a majority-appear to give exclusive priority to reducing health inequality. We developed and tested two e-learning interventions designed to help respondents understand this question more completely. The interventions were a video animation, exposing respondents to rival points of view, and a spreadsheet-based questionnaire that provided feedback on implied trade-offs. We found large effects of both interventions in reducing the proportion of respondents giving exclusive priority to reducing health inequality, though the median responses still implied a high degree of health inequality aversion and-unlike the video-the spreadsheet-based intervention introduced a substantial new minority of non-egalitarian responses. E-learning may introduce as well as avoid biases but merits further research and may be useful in other questionnaire studies involving trade-offs between conflicting values

On Justification, Idealization, and Discursive Purchase

Conceptions of acceptability-based moral or political justification take it that authoritative acceptability, widely conceived, constitutes, or contributes to, validity, or justification. There is no agreement as to what bar for authoritativeness such justification may employ. The paper engages the issue in relation to (i) the level of idealization that a bar for authoritativeness, ψ, imparts to a standard of acceptability-based justification, S, and (ii) the degree of discursive purchase of the discursive standing that S accords to people when it builds ψ. I argue that (i) and (ii) are interdependent: high idealization values entail low discursive purchase, while high degrees of purchase require low idealization values. I then distinguish between alethic conceptions of justification that prioritize ends that commit to high idealization values, and recognitive conceptions that favor high discursive purchase. On this basis, I argue for a moderately recognitivist constraint on idealization. To render the recognitive discursive minimum available to relevant people at the site of justification, S should set ψ low enough so that it is a genuine option for actual people to reject relevant views in ways that S recognizes as authoritative. (The Appendix applies this to a Forst-type view of reciprocity of reasons to draw out some limitations of this view.) [Draft available from author on request.