Liquidity constraints and credit subsidies in auctions

I consider an auction with participants that differ in valuation and access to liquid assets. Assuming credit is costly (e.g. due to moral hazard considerations) different auction rules establish different ways of screening valuation-liquidity pairs. The paper shows that standard auction forms result in different allocation rules. When the seller can deny access to capital markets or offer credit subsidies, she gains an additional tool to screen agents. The paper derives conditions under which the seller increases profits by way of subsidizing loans. In particular, in a second price auction, the seller always benefits from offering small subsidies. The result extends to a non-auction setting to show that a monopolist may use credit subsidies as a price discrimination device

MORAL HAZARD IN TEAMS WITH LIMITED PUNISHMENTS AND MULTIPLE OUTPUTS

This paper studies incentive provision with limited punishments. It revisits the moral hazard problem with risk neutral parties and solves for optimal compensation schemes in situations where agents' participation is implied by a limited liability constraint. Providing minimum cost incentives to teams or individuals requires awarding high bonuses only when extreme performances are observed. Even when the first-best is attainable, the principal may prefer to induce more (or less) effort than it is sociably desirable because she only cares about the marginal cost of motivation. With positive production externalities joint bonuses are optimal. With limited liability on the principal's side, the optimal scheme becomes a tournament---even in the absence of externalities. The paper also looks at conditions that favor one incentive scheme over another when agents adapt their strategies as information becomes available.

LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS AND CREDIT SUBSIDIES IN AUCTIONS

I consider an auction with participants that differ in valuation and access to liquid assets. Assuming credit is costly (e.g. due to moral hazard considerations) different auction rules establish different ways of screening valuation-liquidity pairs. The paper shows that standard auction forms result in different allocation rules. When the seller can deny access to capital markets or offer credit subsidies, she gains an additional tool to screen agents. The paper derives conditions under which the seller increases profits by way of subsidizing loans. In particular, in a second price auction, the seller always benefits from offering small subsidies. The result extends to a non-auction setting to show that a monopolist may use credit subsidies as a price discrimination device.

Obtaining Au thin films in atmosphere of reactive nitrogen through magnetron sputtering

4d and 5d series of the transition metals are used to the obtaining nitrides metallic, due to the synthesis of PtN, AgN and AuN in the last years. Different nitrides are obtained in the Plasma Assisted Physics Vapour Deposition system, due to its ionization energy which is necessary for their formation. In this paper a Magnetron Sputtering system was used to obtain Au thin films on Si wafers in Nitrogen atmosphere. The substrate temperature was varied between 500 to 950°C. The samples obtained at high temperatures (>500°C) show Au, Si and N elements, as it is corroborated in the narrow spectrum obtained for X-Ray Photoelectron Spectroscopy; besides the competition of orientation crystallographic texture between (111) and (311) directions was present in the X-Ray Diffraction analysis to the sample heated at 950°C

τ\tau-Flavour Violation at the LHC

We study the conditions required for $\chi_2 \to \chi + \tau^\pm \mu^\mp$ decays to yield observable tau flavour violation at the LHC, for cosmologically interesting values of the neutralino relic density. These condition can be achieved in the framework of a SU(5) model with a see-saw mechanism that allows a possible coexistence of a LHC signal a low prediction for radiative LFV decays.Comment: 7 pages, 5 figures, Prepared for the proceedings of the workshop: "LC09: $e^+ e^-$ Physics at the TeV Scale and the Dark Matter Connection", 21-24 September 2009, Perugia, Ital

Anomalies of ac driven solitary waves with internal modes: Nonparametric resonances induced by parametric forces

We study the dynamics of kinks in the $\phi^4$ model subjected to a parametric ac force, both with and without damping, as a paradigm of solitary waves with internal modes. By using a collective coordinate approach, we find that the parametric force has a non-parametric effect on the kink motion. Specifically, we find that the internal mode leads to a resonance for frequencies of the parametric driving close to its own frequency, in which case the energy of the system grows as well as the width of the kink. These predictions of the collective coordinate theory are verified by numerical simulations of the full partial differential equation. We finally compare this kind of resonance with that obtained for non-parametric ac forces and conclude that the effect of ac drivings on solitary waves with internal modes is exactly the opposite of their character in the partial differential equation.Comment: To appear in Phys Rev