Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of Compelled Speech

Krpelji su parazitski člankonošci iz reda grinja koji je dio razreda paučnjaka. Dijele se na tvrde krpelje Ixodidae (krpelji šikare; 692 vrste), meke krpelje Argasidae (krpelje nastambe; 186 vrsta) i Nuttalliellidae koja sadržava samo jednu vrstu. Uzorkovanje tvrdih krpelja (Acari: Ixodidae) na području Rekreacijsko športskog centra Jarun obavljeno je od ožujka do rujna 2018. godine. Ukupno je prikupljeno 88 jedinki. Determinacijom je ustanovljeno da sve jedinke pripadaju istoj vrsti - obični ili šumski krpelj (Ixodes ricinus). Krpelji su lovljeni metodom krpeljne zatege na pet različitih mikrolokaliteta. Među uzorkovanim krpeljima utvrđena je dominacija krpelja u razvojnom stadiju larve. Najveći broj uzorkovanih jedinki vrste Ixodes ricinus bio je u srpnju, dok je najmanji bio u kolovozu. Krpelji su glavni prijenosnici zoonoza (lajmske borelioze, krpeljnog meningoencefalitisa, tularemije) kod ljudi i životinja, te je stoga bitno utvrditi njihovu brojnost, te educirati javnost kako bi se podigla svijest o realnoj opasnosti od ugriza krpelja

Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of Compelled Speech

In Harris v. Quinn, the Supreme Court held that unionized homecare workers have a First Amendment right to refuse to pay their fair share of the cost of services that the union is statutorily required to provide. The Court thus transformed what had been a legislative debate about “right-to-work” laws, which about half of states have adopted, into a constitutional requirement for one narrow category of public sector employees. The problem with transforming this policy argument into a First Amendment requirement is that treating fair-share or agency-fee payments to a union as compelled speech raises First Amendment rights of both supporters and opponents of the union. If expenditures on union representation are speech—as the majority in Harris thinks they are—then the union’s obligation to provide free representation compels speech by the union and its members. While, in our view, the requirement to pay for services is not compelled speech, the Court’s entire agency-fee jurisprudence, including Harris, insists that it is. On the Court’s analysis, contracts that require unionized employees to pay for union representational services compel speech of dissenters exactly to the same extent that their prohibition compels speech of unions and their members. Accordingly, the Court must alter its usual analysis of the constitutionality of agency-fee agreements and recognize that union representation requires balancing competing freedom of speech and association interests. Once the First Amendment rights of unions and union members are recognized, agency fees emerge as a constitutionally sound accommodation of the interests of dissenters, unions, and union members

The sixth sense : synaesthesia and British aestheticism, 1860-1900

“The Sixth Sense: Synaesthesia and British Aestheticism 1860-1900” is an interdisciplinary examination of the emergence of synaesthesia conceptually and rhetorically within the ‘art for art’s sake’ movement in mid-to-late Victorian Britain. Chapter One investigates Swinburne’s focal role as both theorist and literary spokesman for the nascent British Aesthetic movement. I argue that Swinburne was the first to practice what Pater meant by ‘aesthetic criticism’ and that synaesthesia played a decisive role in ‘Aestheticising’ critical discourse. Chapter Two examines Whistler’s varied motivations for using synaesthetic metaphor, the way that synaesthesia informed his identity as an aesthete, and the way that critical reactions to his work played a formative role in linking synaesthesia with Aestheticism in the popular imagination of Victorian England. Chapter Three explores Pater’s methods and style as an ‘aesthetic critic.’ Even more than Swinburne, Pater blurred the distinction between criticism and creation. I use ‘synaesthesia’ to contextualise Pater’s theory of “Anders-streben” and to further contribute to our understanding of his infamous musical paradigm as a linguistic ideal, which governed his own approach to critical language. Chapter Four considers Wilde’s decadent redevelopment of synaesthetic metaphor. I use ‘synaesthesia’ to locate Wilde’s style and theory of style within the context of decadence; or, to put it another way, to locate decadence within the context of Wilde. Each chapter examines the highly nuanced claim that art should exist for its own sake and the ways in which artists in the mid-to-late Victorian period attempted to realise this desire on theoretical and rhetorical levels

Walter Pater’s Anders-Streben: as Theory and as Practice

In Walter Pater’s seminal essay ‘The School of Giorgione’ (1877), he formulated for the first and only time, a theory of art and aesthetic experience complete with its own title, observation and uses and which was modelled less on music than on its metaphor. In this article, I examine Pater’s theory of ‘Anders-streben’ in relation to the concept of synaesthesia and as a context for understanding the role, function and rhetorical style of ‘aesthetic criticism.’ For this was Pater’s art and thus, certainly not exempt from the paradigm he formulated in ‘Giorgione.

Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of Compelled Speech

In Harris v. Quinn, the Supreme Court held that unionized homecare workers have a First Amendment right to refuse to pay their fair share of the cost of services that the union is statutorily required to provide. The Court thus transformed what had been a legislative debate about “right-to-work” laws, which about half of states have adopted, into a constitutional requirement for one narrow category of public sector employees. The problem with transforming this policy argument into a First Amendment requirement is that treating fair-share or agency-fee payments to a union as compelled speech raises First Amendment rights of both supporters and opponents of the union. If expenditures on union representation are speech—as the majority in Harris thinks they are—then the union’s obligation to provide free representation compels speech by the union and its members. While, in our view, the requirement to pay for services is not compelled speech, the Court’s entire agency-fee jurisprudence, including Harris, insists that it is. On the Court’s analysis, contracts that require unionized employees to pay for union representational services compel speech of dissenters exactly to the same extent that their prohibition compels speech of unions and their members. Accordingly, the Court must alter its usual analysis of the constitutionality of agency-fee agreements and recognize that union representation requires balancing competing freedom of speech and association interests. Once the First Amendment rights of unions and union members are recognized, agency fees emerge as a constitutionally sound accommodation of the interests of dissenters, unions, and union members