18 research outputs found

    Cognitive Invariants of Geographic Event Conceptualization: What Matters and What Refines?

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    Behavioral experiments addressing the conceptualization of geographic events are few and far between. Our research seeks to address this deficiency by developing an experimental framework on the conceptualization of movement patterns. In this paper, we report on a critical experiment that is designed to shed light on the question of cognitively salient invariants in such conceptualization. Invariants have been identified as being critical to human information processing, particularly for the processing of dynamic information. In our experiment, we systematically address cognitive invariants of one class of geographic events: single entity movement patterns. To this end, we designed 72 animated icons that depict the movement patterns of hurricanes around two invariants: size difference and topological equivalence class movement patterns endpoints. While the endpoint hypothesis, put forth by Regier (2007), claims a particular focus of human cognition to ending relations of events, other research suggests that simplicity principles guide categorization and, additionally, that static information is easier to process than dynamic information. Our experiments show a clear picture: Size matters. Nonetheless, we also find categorization behaviors consistent with experiments in both the spatial and temporal domain, namely that topology refines these behaviors and that topological equivalence classes are categorized consistently. These results are critical steppingstones in validating spatial formalism from a cognitive perspective and cognitively grounding work on ontologies

    Aspects of generalisation

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    SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:D201425 / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo

    The simplicity model of unsupervised categorisation

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    Contingent necessity versus logical necessity in categorisation

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    Critical (necessary or sufficient) features in categorisation have a long history, but the empirical evidence makes their existence questionable. Nevertheless, there are some cases that suggest critical feature effects. The purpose of the present work is to offer some insight into why classification decisions might misleadingly appear as if they involve critical features. Utilising Tversky's (1977) contrast model of similarity, we suggest that when an object has a sparser representation, changing any of its features is more likely to lead to a change in identity than it would in objects that have richer representations. Experiment 1 provides a basic test of this suggestion with artificial stimuli, whereby objects with a rich or a sparse representation were transformed by changing one of their features. As expected, we observed more identity judgements in the former case. Experiment 2 further confirms our hypothesis, with realistic stimuli, by assuming that superordinate categories have sparser representations than subordinate ones. These results offer some insight into the way feature changes may or may not lead to identity changes in classification decisions
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