The EU’s Sanctions against Syria: Conflict Management by Other Means. Security Policy Brief No. 38

Since May 2011, the EU has launched one of its most far reaching and sophisticated sanctions operations in support of the protests against the current regime in Syria. The present brief examines the measures wielded by the EU, its expected impact and its implications for the EU’s relations with its global partners. While seriously undermined by the lack of support of Russia, the sanctions are having a noticeable economic impact. Yet, the choice of measures is ill-suited to stop the bloodshed. The sanctions have also served to (re)define partnerships with other powers, both in the Middle-East and globally

China’s rise means the EU must look for new areas of cooperation with ASEAN.

The EU has long supported greater regional integration in Southeast Asia, but its influence is now in decline due to China’s growing economic importance. Anja Jetschke and Clara Portela argue that in order to continue in its promotion of regional integration, the EU now needs to do more to engage the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the fields of human rights and non-traditional security

Myanmar: the beginning of reforms and the end of sanctions

On 23 April 2012, the European Union (EU) suspended its sanctions against Burma/ Myanmar in response to a series of domestic political reforms that have been enacted since Thein Sein became the new president in March 2011. Since March 2011, Burma/ Myanmar has witnessed a liberalization of the press, the release of political prisoners and the initiation of a political dialogue between the regime on the one hand and the opposition and ethnic groups on the other. The reforms culminated in by-elections on 1 April 2012, which in turn resulted in a landslide victory for Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD). Overall, political reforms in Burma/ Myanmar are being initiated from "above." They are elite-driven and stem from the president and progressive members of the military-dominated party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Political reforms in Myanmar are a regime reaction to both internal and external factors. Internally, the military felt secure enough to embark on the slow liberalization of the political system. Externally, the growing economic presence of China seems to have worried the generals. Progress is, however, slow, uneven and very fragile. Hard-liners within the regime still threaten the reform process. Moreover, the influence of the military within the political system and the economy is still pervasive. The EU has responded to the reforms by suspending almost all existing sanctions, with the exception of the arms embargo and the withdrawal of trade preferences, while starting to employ "carrots" such as development aid. By EU standards, agreement on the suspension of the virtual entirety of sanctions has been reached remarkably swiftly. The exclusion of the arms embargo from the suspension reflects the EU’s policies on armaments supply. The resumption of trade preferences will require a separate, lengthier legal process

Myanmar: the beginning of reforms and the end of sanctions

On 23 April 2012, the European Union (EU) suspended its sanctions against Burma/ Myanmar in response to a series of domestic political reforms that have been enacted since Thein Sein became the new president in March 2011. Since March 2011, Burma/ Myanmar has witnessed a liberalization of the press, the release of political prisoners and the initiation of a political dialogue between the regime on the one hand and the opposition and ethnic groups on the other. The reforms culminated in by-elections on 1 April 2012, which in turn resulted in a landslide victory for Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD). Overall, political reforms in Burma/ Myanmar are being initiated from "above." They are elite-driven and stem from the president and progressive members of the military-dominated party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Political reforms in Myanmar are a regime reaction to both internal and external factors. Internally, the military felt secure enough to embark on the slow liberalization of the political system. Externally, the growing economic presence of China seems to have worried the generals. Progress is, however, slow, uneven and very fragile. Hard-liners within the regime still threaten the reform process. Moreover, the influence of the military within the political system and the economy is still pervasive. The EU has responded to the reforms by suspending almost all existing sanctions, with the exception of the arms embargo and the withdrawal of trade preferences, while starting to employ "carrots" such as development aid. By EU standards, agreement on the suspension of the virtual entirety of sanctions has been reached remarkably swiftly. The exclusion of the arms embargo from the suspension reflects the EU’s policies on armaments supply. The resumption of trade preferences will require a separate, lengthier legal process

The Design and Impacts of Individual Sanctions: Evidence From Elites in Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe

Since the 1990s, sanctions senders like the European Union, the United States, and the United Nations have been imposing visa bans and asset freezes on individuals as a key element of their sanctions packages. Notwithstanding the growing centrality that individual sanctions have acquired in international sanctions practice, little is known about the impact of sanctions listings on designees. Some researchers have scrutinised targeting choices, while others have explored the effects of sanctions on designees. However, no study has yet examined the fit between targeting choices and impacts on designees. First, we interrogate the theory of targeted sanctions to identify the expectations that it generates. Second, we examine the effects on designees and contrast them with the targeting logic of the sender, in a bid to ascertain their fit. Our analysis of the cases of Côte d'Ivoire (2010-2011) and Zimbabwe (2002-2017) benefits from original interview material

The Rise of Sanctions Cooperation between Regional Organizations, the United States, and the EU

When a country is sanctioned for violating international rules today, it is usually targeted by several different entities. The degree to which sanctions by different senders overlap remains a largely unexplored phenomenon. In this paper, we examine the extent of sanctions cooperation, i.e. joint action among major sanctions senders (the US, the EU, and regional organizations) against identical targets. We then map regional patterns and evaluate one potential explanation for them. Our analysis leads to three major findings. First, sanctions overlap is predominant and has consistently increased over the last three decades. Twothirds of sanctions involve more than a single sender. Targets today are usually subject to punishment by at least three different sanctions senders (up from one in 1980) and sometimes up to six different senders. Second, world regions vary widely in the extent of sanctions cooperation, the profile of sanctions senders, and their interactions. Third, to explain variation in sanctions cooperation, we find that hegemonic stability theory does not provide much leverage. We conclude by outlining avenues for future research on sanctions cooperation relating to sanctions onset and effectiveness

Beyond Foreign Policy? EU Sanctions at the Intersection of Development, Trade, and CFSP

In the wake of unsettling conflicts and democratic backsliding, states and organisations increasingly respond with sanctions. The European Union (EU) is one of them: Brussels makes use of the entire toolbox in its foreign policy, and its sanctions appear in different forms - diplomatic measures, travel bans, financial bans, or various forms of economic restrictions. Yet, there is little debate between different strands in the literature on EU sanctions, in particular concerning measures under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and those pertaining to the development and trade policy fields. Our thematic issue addresses this research gap by assembling a collection of articles investigating the design, impact, and implementation of EU sanctions used in different realms of its external affairs. Expanding the definition of EU sanctions to measures produced under different guises in the development, trade, and foreign policy fields, the collection overcomes the compartmentalised approach characterising EU scholarship

EU sanctions against North Korea: making a stringent UN sanctions regime even tougher

While Pyongyang had been under sanctions by the United States since the end of the Korean War in 1953, the United Nations Security Council only imposed sanctions on North Korea in 2006, after it conducted a series of launches of ballistic missiles, soon to be followed by its first nuclear test. The first nuclear proliferation crisis involving the North Korea broke out in 1993, when Pyongyang first announced its intention to leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it had first joined in 1985. In 1994, the EU published its first Asia Strategy, where it proposed to play a more active role in the region. Economic exchanges between the EU and North Korea also increased as a result of this political rapprochement. The EU had actively participated in the mechanism created to manage the first nuclear crisis, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development OrganisationThis chapter is part of the research project "Public Security, Private Security and Fundamental Rights" (RT2018-098405-B-100) awarded by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universitie

Global Governance from Below: Regional Sanctions as Drivers of UN Sanctions

The imposition of sanctions by the UN Security Council (UNSC) is notoriously selective. Many crises have qualified for UNSC sanctions by endangering peace and security, yet the UN has imposed sanctions in only a few. Selectivity in UNSC sanctions is conventionally explained by conflict intensity or the interests of the Council’s permanent members. Complementing these accounts, we document a third explanation: pre-existing sanctions by regional organizations. We argue that the UNSC has incentives to sanction countries which are already under sanctions by regional organizations because regional sanctions embody neighborhood consensus on the legitimacy of these sanctions and reassure the Council about implementation. Statistical analyses of original data, text analyses, a case study, and interviews strongly support our argument: regional sanctions increase the likelihood of UNSC sanctions adoption, particularly when these are enacted by regional organizations composed of neighboring states. This study advances research on sanctions, conflict resolution, and regime complexity