A framework of values: reasons for conserving biodiversity and natural environments

The idea that «natural» environments should be protected is a relatively recent one. This new attitude is reflected in the activities of preservation and restoration of natural environments, ecosystems, flora and wildlife that, when scientifically based, can be defined as conservation. In this paper, we would like to examine the framework of values behind these activities. More specifically, we would like to show that there is no single specific reason that can justify conservation in each of its manifestations It is therefore necessary to adopt a complex framework of values, which must be composed carefully, since many of the canonical arguments used to justify conservation provide, when combined together, an incoherent or, at least, incomplete set of reasons. One way to avoid these inconsistencies or incompleteness is, in our view, to adopt, in conjunction with the classic economic and ecological arguments for conservation, a set of arguments appealing to the importance of nature for human flourishing

Rights, Duties, and Moral Conflicts

In this paper I would like to make a contribution to the debate on rights-talk and duties-talk relationship and priority by addressing the problem from a peculiar angle: that of moral conflicts and dilemma. My working hypothesis is that it should be possible to identify some basic and relevant normative features of rights-talk and duties-talk by observing how they modify the description of moral conflicts. I will try to show that both rights and duties posses original and irreducible normative features, and that these latter can be employed in a general assessment of their pro and con. I will first show the conceptual relationship between rights and duties, analyzing in the process a deflationary argument for rights. Second, I will define the general features of moral conflict and dilemma. I will then analyze the different readings that can be given, taking rights or duties as standpoints, of two kinds of moral conflicts: «asymmetric» and «symmetric» conflicts

La filosofia morale di John Leslie Mackie

Questo lavoro esplora la riflessione morale di John Leslie Mackie procedendo lungo due indirizzi complementari. Da una parte fornendo una ricostruzione e un'esposizione della speculazione etica del filosofo australiano in ognuna delle sue principali articolazioni: dalla metaetica scettica della teoria dell'errore, all'indagine esplicativa sulla morale basata su una ripresa di tematiche convenzionalistiche, fino alla proposta normativa basata sui diritti. Dall'altra evidenziando tutte quelle parti del suo lavoro che possono contribuire a un riflessione sull'etica di più ampio respiro, inserita nell'odierno confronto tra il naturalismo darwiniano e la filosofia morale. This work explores John Leslie Mackie's moral thinking following two complementary courses. On one side it provides a reconstruction and an exposition of Mackie's moral speculation in each of its main articulations: from the skeptical metaethics of the error theory and the following explicative research based on a reprise of conventionalist thesys, to the normative proposal of a right-based theory. On the other side, it highlights all of the parts of his work which can contribute to a wider reflection on ethics, placed inside the contemporary debate over darwinist perspectives and moral philosophy

Apprezzare l’ambiente naturale come ‘altro da sé’ . La bellezza e l’esistenzialità come alternative alla rabbia e all’invidia nei confronti dell’animalità

Animals and, more generally, the natural environment, may be seen as something radically different from our existence as subjects. According to some views, this radical alterity between human beings as linguistic creatures and the natural environment can result only in a negative relation in which the animal dimension is anhilated. In this paper we try to show that the radical autonomy of the natural dimension from the linguistic subjects can result in positive forms of relationship. Natural objects, including animals, can be appreciated for their separateness from the human world as objects of beauty and reverence

Ethical Analysis of the Application of Assisted Reproduction Technologies in Biodiversity Conservation and the Case of White Rhinoceros ( Ceratotherium simum ) Ovum Pick-Up Procedures

Originally applied on domestic and lab animals, assisted reproduction technologies (ARTs) have also found application in conservation breeding programs, where they can make the genetic management of populations more efficient, and increase the number of individuals per generation. However, their application in wildlife conservation opens up new ethical scenarios that have not yet been fully explored. This study presents a frame for the ethical analysis of the application of ART procedures in conservation based on the Ethical Matrix (EM), and discusses a specific case study—ovum pick-up (OPU) procedures performed in the current conservation efforts for the northern white rhinoceros (Ceratotherium simum cottoni)—providing a template for the assessment of ART procedures in projects involving other endangered species

Application of decision tools to ethical analysis in biodiversity conservation

Achieving ethically responsible decisions is crucial for the success of biodiversity conservation projects. We adapted the ethical matrix, decision tree, and Bateson's cube to assist in the ethical analysis of complex conservation scenarios by structuring these tools so that they can implement the different value dimensions (environmental, social, and animal welfare) involved in conservation ethics. We then applied them to a case study relative to the decision-making process regarding whether or not to continue collecting biomaterial on the oldest of the two remaining northern white rhinoceroses (Ceratotherium simum cottoni), a functionally extinct subspecies of the white rhinoceros. We used the ethical matrix to gather ethical pros and cons and as a starting point for a participatory approach to ethical decision-making. We used decision trees to compare the different options at stake on the basis of a set of ethical desiderata. We used Bateson's cube to establish a threshold of ethical acceptability and model the results of a simple survey. The application of these tools proved to be pivotal in structuring the decision-making process and in helping reach a shared, reasoned, and transparent decision on the best option from an ethical point of view among those available

Lo spazio dei diritti nelle teorie morali. Ricerche normative

In this work I will evaluate the functions of rights within the moral discourse, and I will point out the benefits and the characteristics of a moral theory that takes rights seriously. In the first chapter I will sketch a definition of rights as a moral category that can be distinguished from categories such as the ones of juridical rights and natural rights. In the second chapter, I will propose a hohfeldian analysis of the normative syntax of rights, and I will focus on the key problem of the relation between rights and duties. The issue I will deal with in the third chapter is the general function of specific rights. On this matter I will draw an hybrid solution between the orthodox proposals of the so-called interest and choice theories, and the more recent approaches provided by the past ten years literature. In the fourth and fifth chapters topics such as the conflict of rights, their violations and infringements will allow me to go deeper in the context and premises of the model of moral theory that I will take into account in the last section of this work. In the sixth chapter I will give an answer to the central questions of this research, and I will also provide a general model of abstract rights, by shading light on their original normative functions. I will use this model to investigate the possibility of justifying a moral theory on its ground, and I will compare this kind of theory with other theories structured upon different categories of normative objects – like duties and goals.In questo lavoro cercherò di valutare quali siano le funzioni dei diritti nel contesto del discorso morale, e di individuare le caratteristiche e i vantaggi posseduti da una teoria morale che prenda i diritti sul serio. Nella primo capitolo isolerò una definizione di diritti come categoria morale – moral rights – originale rispetto ad altre declinazioni di questo concetto – in particolare, rispetto ai diritti giuridici e ai diritti naturali. Nel secondo capitolo proporrò un'analisi di matrice hohfeldiana della sintassi normativa dei diritti soffermandomi sul nodo concettuale della relazione tra diritti e doveri. La questione che affronterò nel terzo capitolo sarà quella della funzione generale dei diritti, ed elaborerò una soluzione ibrida tra le proposte ortodosse basate sulle cosiddette teorie dell'interesse e della scelta, e i più recenti approcci forniti dalla letteratura degli ultimi dieci anni. I temi del conflitto tra diritti, della loro violazione e dell'infrazione mi permetteranno di approfondire nel quarto e nel quinto capitolo il contesto e le premesse del modello di teoria morale cui farò riferimento nell'ultima sezione di questo lavoro, quella in cui cercherò di rispondere alle domande centrali della ricerca. Nel sesto capitolo fornirò infatti un modello generale di diritti, mettendone in luce le funzioni normative originali. Adopererò questo modello per vagliare le possibilità di giustificare, a partire da esso, una teoria morale, e confronterò questo tipo di teoria con alternative strutturate a partire da diverse categorie di oggetti normativi – come i doveri e gli scopi

Valuing abiotic nature: perspectives on terraforming in K.S. Robinson mars trilogy

In our everyday experience, life, environment, and nature are connected and we tend to confuse the value we assign to them. One way around this issue is to analyze our intuitions on the terraformation of other planets such as Mars. In this way, we are forced to consider whether the original abiotic nature has a value of some kind regardless of its capacity to support ecosystems and life, what kind of value this might be, and what weight it might have when compared with other values. In this contribution, I will draw a map of the possible answers to these questions by analyzing the different perspectives brought forth by some of the main characters in K. S. Robinson's The Mars Trilogy. In this way, it will be possible to observe that, while on Earth instrumental and non-instrumental kinds of environmental value generally concur and support each other, in an abiotic landscape, such as that offered (we assume) by Mars, they may conflict