Metabotropic glutamate antagonists alone and in combination with morphine: comparison across two models of acute pain and a model of persistent, inflammatory pain

The present study examined the effects of the mGluR1 antagonist JNJ16259685 (JNJ) and the mGluR5 antagonist MPEP alone and in combination with morphine in two acute pain models (hotplate, warm water tail-withdrawal), and a persistent, inflammatory pain model (capsaicin). In the hotplate and warm water tail-withdrawal procedures, JNJ and MPEP were ineffective when administered alone. In both procedures, JNJ potentiated morphine antinociception. In the hot plate procedure, MPEP potentiated morphine antinociception at the highest dose examined, whereas in the warm water tail-withdrawal procedure MPEP attenuated morphine antinociception at a moderate dose and potentiated morphine antinociception at a high dose. For both JNJ and MPEP, the magnitude of this morphine potentiation was considerably greater in the hotplate procedure. In the capsaicin procedure, the highest dose of MPEP produced intermediate levels of antihyperalgesia and also attenuated the effects of a dose of morphine that produced intermediate levels of antihyperalgesia. In contrast, JNJ had no effect when administered alone in the capsaicin procedure and did not alter morphine-induced antihyperalgesia. The present findings suggest that the effects produced by mGluR1 and mGluR5 antagonists alone and in combination with morphine can be differentiated in models of both acute and persistent pain

No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations

Bankruptcy scholarship is largely a debate about the comparative merits of a mandatory regime on one hand and bankruptcy by free design on the other. By the standard account, the current law of corporate reorganization is mandatory. Various rules that cannot be avoided ensure that investors’ actions are limited and they do not exercise their rights against specialized assets in a way that destroys the value of a business as a whole. These rules solve collective action problems and reduce the risk of bargaining failure. But there are costs to a mandatory regime. In particular, investors cannot design their rights to achieve optimal monitoring as they could in a system of bankruptcy by free design. This Article suggests that the academic debate has missed a fundamental feature of the law. Bankruptcy operates on legal entities, not on firms in the economic sense. For this reason, sophisticated investors do not face a mandatory regime at all. The ability of investors to place assets in separate entities gives them the ability to create specific withdrawal rights in the event the firm encounters financial distress. There is nothing mandatory about rules like the automatic stay when assets can be partitioned off into legal entities that are beyond the reach of the bankruptcy judge. Thus, by partitioning assets of one economic enterprise into different legal entities, investors can create a tailored bankruptcy regime. In this way, legal entities serve as building blocks that can be combined to create specific and varied but transparent investor withdrawal rights. This regime of tailored bankruptcy has been unrecognized and underappreciated and may be preferable to both mandatory and free design regimes. By allowing a limited number of investors to opt out of bankruptcy in a particular, discrete, and visible way, investors as a group may be able to both limit the risk of bargaining failure and at the same time enjoy the disciplining effect that a withdrawal right brings with it

Consequences of the September 11 terrorist attack: foreign relations & international legal issues (forum 1)

Presented as the first lecture in a forum on the September 11th terrorists attacks by the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center on October 1, 2001, at the Franklin Thomas Backus School of Law, Case Western Reserve Universit

Consequences of the September 11 terrorist attack: foreign relations & international legal issues (forum 1)

Presented as the first lecture in a forum on the September 11th terrorists attacks by the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center on October 1, 2001, at the Franklin Thomas Backus School of Law, Case Western Reserve Universit

Canada-United States Law Institute annual conference: the management and resolution of cross border disputes as Canada and the U.S. enter the 21st century, April 14-16, 2000 (tape 1 of 2)

Video 1 : Friday April 14 -- Purpose of the Canada/US Law Institute / Sidney Picker, Jr. -- Introduction and welcome / Henry King, Jr. -- Overview of Canada/US dispute management and settlement : where we are in terms of successes and failures / James J. Blanchard & Donald S. MacDonald -- The roles of law and diplomacy in disputes resolution - the International Joint Commission as a possible model / Professor Hiram Chodosh, presiding & Davis R. Robinson (not entire speech

Canada-United States Law Institute annual conference: the management and resolution of cross border disputes as Canada and the U.S. enter the 21st century, April 14-16, 2000 (tape 1 of 2)

Video 1 : Friday April 14 -- Purpose of the Canada/US Law Institute / Sidney Picker, Jr. -- Introduction and welcome / Henry King, Jr. -- Overview of Canada/US dispute management and settlement : where we are in terms of successes and failures / James J. Blanchard & Donald S. MacDonald -- The roles of law and diplomacy in disputes resolution - the International Joint Commission as a possible model / Professor Hiram Chodosh, presiding & Davis R. Robinson (not entire speech