10 research outputs found

    Controlling Product Risks When Consumers are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability vs. Minimum Quality Standard Regulation

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    Contributing to the literature on the consequences of behavioral biases for market outcomes and institutional design, we contrast producer liability and minimum quality standard regulation as alternative means of social control of product-related torts when consumers are heterogeneously overconfident about the risk of harm. We elucidate the role of factors shaping the relative desirability of strict liability vis-à-vis minimum quality standard regulation from a social welfare standpoint. We also clarify when and why joint use of strict liability and minimum quality standard regulation welfare dominates the exclusive use of either mode of social control of torts

    Household Debt: Facts, Puzzles, Theories, and Policies

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    Unravelling Cooperation: The Role and Limits of Cooperation in the Governance of International Watercourses

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    In Search of the Optimal Tort Litigation System: Reflections on Korea's Civil Procedure through Inquiry into American Jurisprudence

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    Mechanical Ventilation

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